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Foreword
The nature of work and the composition and expectations 
of the workforce have undergone considerable change in re 
cent years. Numerous observers of emerging trends in oc 
cupational structure and labor force participation have 
predicted crises such as the mass displacement of workers by 
technology or the deterioration of the work ethic in 
American society. Levitan and Johnson challenge such views 
with an analysis based heavily on statistical evidence of labor 
market trends and conditions.
Tracing the broader evolution of work in America, the 
authors note the positive and gradual nature of many of the 
changes which are reshaping the nature of work today. 
However, they also acknowledge labor market problems 
which stem from uneven distribution of societal gains. 
SECOND THOUGHTS ON WORK provides a perspective 
for better understanding the history and contemporary reali 
ty of work, and for identifying issues and problems which 
will require public policy attention in the years ahead.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole 
responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent the positions of The W. E. Upjohn In 
stitute for Employment Research.
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Preface
Every generation selects new problems, real or imagined, 
on which to focus its energies. Whether influenced by chang 
ing perceptions of reality or impatience with the slow pace of 
change, society's agenda is forever being revised. Old prob 
lems quickly give way to new issues "discovered" by 
reporters in search of a story, by academics in search of a 
reputation, or by politicians in search of a platform. Even 
when basic social and economic conditions evolve slowly and 
predictably, the spotlight of public concern seldom rests for 
long on a single subject.
Our perceptions of the nature of work offer no exception 
to this pattern. Since Adam was banished from the Garden 
of Eden, the debate over work has persisted, but with ever- 
changing emphases. In the 1960s, national attention focused 
on poverty and labor market analysts worried about the 
ability of a changing economy to provide jobs for all persons 
seeking employment. At the end of that decade, even though 
the evils of poverty and unemployment had not disappeared, 
the attention of many policymakers and social scientists 
moved on to the design of jobs and the plight of blue-collar 
workers. As the 1970s continued, this concern for the quality 
of work broadened to include a diverse array of work reform 
experiments, culminating in the current interest in worker 
participation and innovative management techniques. There 
is little reason to believe that the socioeconomic forces shap 
ing the nature of work have fluctuated dramatically during 
the last twenty years, and yet students of the labor market
have always managed to highlight something new and dif 
ferent.
SECOND THOUGHTS ON WORK is an attempt to 
transcend the narrow scope of such periodic shifts in focus 
and to trace the broader evolution of work in America. In 
examining what is happening at today's workplace and what 
work will be like in the future, the analysis relies heavily 
upon statistical evidence of labor market trends and condi 
tions. The wealth of data collected by governments and 
researchers is not without limitations, but these sources can 
be used to gauge the relative strength of contemporary 
claims regarding the future of work. Contrary to predictions 
of imminent crisis, the evidence reminds us that work's many 
functions and roles ensure a more gradual pace of evolu 
tionary change.
In writing about the future of work, it is impossible to 
avoid the question of semantics: What is "work"? In com 
mon usage, the word refers to a myriad of activities artists 
work on paintings, pensioners work in their gardens, 
volunteers work without pay. Usually, the term "work" is 
used as shorthand for activities through which we earn a 
livelihood, but this definition is necessarily arbitrary. The 
professional athlete who earns his living by playing tennis 
works, but the amateur who relaxes after work with a set of 
tennis is playing. The housewife who tends to her own fami 
ly's needs is not working, but if she is paid to labor in some 
one else's home she is working. A "workaholic" may toil 
more for pleasure than for money, but the financial compen 
sation makes it work nonetheless.
Yet work has always conjured up other feelings and im 
plications as well. For most of us, the term refers to activities 
which we feel compelled to do rather than those which we 
would freely choose if left to our own devices. Historically, 
work has also been closely associated with society's collective
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survival, although in an era in which a minority of the 
workforce produces more than enough for our sustenance 
this connotation is becoming antiquated. As an alternative, 
much of our "work" is best described as sustained and pur 
poseful activity to accomplish goals, the continuing struggle 
to bend the world to our will and imagination. In this form, 
work provides us with a sense of community, purpose and 
identity, and plays an integral part in shaping life's meaning.
Despite this ambivalence toward work, Americans show 
no sign of abandoning the labor market. To the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that many of the changes which are reshap 
ing the nature of work today are positive generating in 
creased options with regard to work and broadening oppor 
tunities for leisure. Disturbing trends in the workplace re 
main, but they stem more from the uneven distribution of 
societal gains than from any deterioration of work quality or 
job satisfaction. Hopefully, this book will serve as a 
reminder of our many blessings, while at the same time iden 
tifying those problems which truly warrant our greatest 
energies in the years ahead.
As a revision to Work Is Here To Stay, Alas, prepared 
with William Johnston, this book ̂ offered an opportunity 
not only to revise the data but also to test earlier judgments. 
Even as many trends identified in the 1973 version of the 
book continued throughout the decade, other developments 
required more detailed consideration in this revision. The 
dramatic gains achieved in the use of computerized 
technologies and the surge of interest in participative 
management techniques in the late 1970s have received 
specific attention in this regard. The revision also provided a 
chance to refine arguments presented in the earlier edition, 
so that more careful distinctions have been made between 
work motivation and participation in the labor force, and 
more detailed analyses are offered in discussing the tensions 
inherent in work reform efforts. Finally, this sequel includes
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some brief remarks on the challenges for public policy im 
plicit in current trends in work.
Although William Johnston has gone on to other 
endeavors and consequently did not participate in the revi 
sion, many of his insights into the nature of work and his 
contributions to the earlier book have withstood the test of 
time and are retained in the present work. In addition, the 
publication of this revision was greatly facilitated by the con 
tributions to an earlier draft of Steve Silberman, for which 
we are most grateful. We are also indebted to Jack Barbash 
and Rick Belous for helpful critical comments. The art work 
enlivening the prose was prepared by Al Lediard of Bailey 
Montague & Associates, while Nancy Kiefer went through 
the various drafts preparing the book for publication.
SECOND THOUGHTS ON WORK was prepared under a 
grant from the Ford Foundation to the George Washington 
University's Center for Social Policy Studies. In accordance 
with the Foundation's practice, responsibility for the content 
was left completely to the authors.
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1 Changes at Work
Life grants nothing to us 
mortals without hard work.
 Horace, Satires
As the cornerstone of civilized society, there was little 
reason in centuries past to question either the nature or the 
future of work. From Biblical times well into the 20th cen 
tury, work was intimately linked to both individual and col 
lective survival, a necessity of life which required no explana 
tion. Occasionally an author paused to examine the hard 
ships of common laborers, but never with the expectation 
that their lot could be changed. Even if a handful were for 
tunate enough to enjoy a life of leisure, the prospect of a 
society in which many individuals were freed from work was 
beyond imagination for all but the most recent generations.
When earlier writers did turn their attention to the institu 
tion of work, it was usually in fear of some dwindling com 
mitment to work which might threaten national survival and 
progress. As Sigmund Freud suggested, "After primal man 
had discovered that it lay in his own hands, literally, to im 
prove his lot on earth by working, it cannot have been a mat 
ter of indifference whether another man worked." 1 Thus, in 
both religious and secular literature the virtues of dedication 
and hard work were repeatedly extolled. In early American 
history, these themes are easily traced Benjamin Franklin 
lamented that working days were being wasted "expensively
at the ale house," and nearly a century later Abraham Lin 
coln still viewed the desire to work as "so rare a want that it 
should be encouraged." These comments reflected popular 
views of prior generations, in which the nation was por 
trayed as teetering on the brink of economic and moral 
decline due to a widespread aversion to work.
The unprecedented economic growth and affluence during 
the three decades following World War II has begun to alter 
the way we view work in modern societies. In many ways, 
work no longer has the obvious role or significance which it 
carried for our predecessors, if only because each 
individual's labor is no longer essential for societal or even 
personal sustenance. All but a tiny part of the workforce in 
1900 was working to produce the goods necessary for com 
mon survival, but now more than six of every ten workers 
have no hand in these activities. We now have more 
cosmetologists than plumbers, more social workers than 
brickmasons, and more professors than coal miners. Our 
range of work options is broader than ever before, and at 
least collectively we have been freed from the constant strug 
gle for survival. In this sense, work increasingly represents 
our will rather than our curse.
Modern Fears and Hopes
As we move ever further away from the direct production 
of goods, the option of changing work or abandoning it 
completely becomes more significant. Inevitably, it seems 
less clear why we work, and so the traditional fears of a deca 
dent society that values leisure more than work persist. Yet 
in a more optimistic vein, this new freedom makes us wonder 
how our jobs might be reshaped in response to more lofty 
goals and needs. Thus, for perhaps the first time, we have 
become concerned not only with our motivation or will 
ingness to work but also with our satisfaction at the 
workplace.
Those who perceive work as integrally related to social 
stability continue to view the weakening ties between work 
and survival with alarm. For example, David Riesman 
argued that the expansion of leisure "threatens to push work 
itself closer to the fringes of consciousness and 
significance." 2 Daniel Bell views current trends in leisure and 
affluence as undermining the Protestant work ethic, 3 and 
Christopher Lasch also contends that Americans identify 
"not with the work ethic but with the ethic of leisure, 
hedonism, and self-fulfillment." 4 Such predictions of work's 
demise are seldom dispassionate more typical is Arthur 
Schlesinger's warning that "the most dangerous threat hang 
ing over American society is the threat of leisure." 5 The fear 
of a decaying work ethic is so pervasive that the federal 
Department of Commerce initiated in the 1970s an advertis 
ing campaign to bolster an allegedly weakening commitment 
to work.
Of course, even if one accepts the premise that the will to 
work is eroding, the vision of the future which follows 
depends largely on one's view of human nature. Utopian 
forecasters rely on the same presumed trend toward a 
workless society which prophets of doom project, but these 
more optimistic observers view leisure as a stimulus rather 
than a threat to societal advancement. For those who see 
leisure as enhancing human development, technology 
becomes a panacea which frees individuals from the necessi 
ty of work without sacrificing gains in economic well-being. 
One may question the underlying view of a world without 
work, but such an eventuality would no doubt offer oppor 
tunities as well as dangers.
Analysts of work quality and worker satisfaction usually 
do not stretch recent gains in leisure into projections of a 
workless society, but they are often guilty of other excesses. 
In contrast to the image of technology as the great liberator 
from work, technological change is frequently portrayed as 
necessarily eliminating skilled work roles and reducing pros 
pects for personal satisfaction at the workplace. Claims of 
widespread discontent among workers are forcefully advanc 
ed, along with sweeping promises of newly designed jobs 
which would heighten satisfaction within the workforce. In 
the eyes of work reform advocates, modern workers seek a 
wide array of challenges and rewards in their jobs, and 
employers have considerable latitude in redesigning jobs to 
meet these emerging needs. It is an appealingly optimistic vi 
sion, but one that may overestimate both our character and 
our capabilities.
When viewed collectively, contemporary discussions of 
work motivation and satisfaction present widely divergent 
visions of work's future, ranging from the catastrophic to 
the Utopian. These disparate accounts reflect the ample room 
for confusion created by rapid changes in labor force par 
ticipation, occupational structure, and technology during the
past few decades. Particularly when based on isolated 
trends, most sketches depicting the future of work shed more 
light on the hopes and fears of their authors than on the 
nature of tomorrow's workplace. Yet when labor market 
data are carefully examined in the context of broader social 
changes and market forces, a more coherent view of work in 
the 1990s and beyond emerges.
Chasing Expectations
The broad outlines of work's future will be shaped by the 
level of our expectations at the workplace and by our relative 
ability to respond to them. Although their influence reaches 
far beyond the labor market, current trends in wealth, 
education, and technology provide the driving forces behind 
the gradual evolution of work, raising expectations and set 
ting the limits within which we can hope to fulfill them. 
Because of their scope, these sweeping changes in American 
society are frequently overlooked or given scant attention in 
topical studies of the workplace. Yet it is this set of forces 
which will have the greatest role in defining the goals of 
tomorrow's worker, affecting both the motivation to work 
and the prospects for job satisfaction.
The most pervasive force behind rising expectations is the 
increasing wealth of American society. The trend toward af 
fluence is unmistakable: in the last three decades, the average 
American's spendable income has risen 87 percent, after 
allowing for inflation and higher federal income and payroll 
taxes. Thirty-five percent of all families had an income of 
$25,000 or better in 1979, compared to only 8 percent with 
real incomes that high a quarter of a century earlier. Cast in 
more vivid terms, Americans spent more on liquor alone in 
1981 than their grandparents and great-grandparents did on 
all goods and services a century ago. This unprecedented 
growth in real incomes has radically revised our lifestyles,
but more importantly it has lowered our tolerance for hard 
ship and led us to expect even further gains.
To the extent that economic necessity provides a prime 
motivation to work, increasing affluence has weakened the 
ties between workers and their jobs. In addition to swelling 
the ranks of the independently wealthy, rising incomes have 
made possible a host of transfer payments which give many 
others the option not to work. During the 1970s, a decade 
commonly associated with conservative climates, these 
transfer payments increased 77 percent in real terms an ex 
pansion of the welfare state without parallel. Most of these 
payments went to the retired, disabled and unemployed 
workers, and veterans, with less than one-fifth of the total 
devoted to "public assistance" provided on the basis of 
need. While the great majority of Americans still find it 
necessary to work, the evolution of the welfare state has 
softened the consequences of not working and provided new 
choices (such as early retirement) to those who do work.
The rising incomes and expectations of recent decades 
have had a mixed impact on work motivation. As burgeon 
ing transfer payments approach one-sixth of the nation's 
disposable income, and assuming real earnings resume their 
dominant upward course, Americans increasingly will be 
able to change jobs or reject work in response to rising ex 
pectations. At the same time, however, relative income ap 
pears to be much more relevant to work motivation than any 
absolute gains, so that individuals have strong incentives to 
keep working no matter what release from work they could 
have collectively reaped from productivity gains. Like the 
mechanical rabbit leading the greyhounds around the 
racetrack, goals have consistently stayed ahead of produc 
tivity. This alone will keep most of us tied to work in the 
decades ahead.
In the same manner that rising affluence has led us to ex 
pect steadily growing incomes, rising levels of educational at-
tainment have caused us to expect greater challenges and 
skill requirements in our jobs. Again, the data reflect un 
questionable gains in education: In the three decades follow 
ing 1950, the proportion of the adult population that com 
pleted four years of high school almost doubled, jumping 
from 34.3 percent to 67 percent. Half of American workers 
had at least a whiff of college education (12.7 years of 
schooling) by 1980, four more years than attained by the 
average worker in 1940 when half the labor force had barely 
completed elementary school. In virtually all occupational 
categories, Americans are entering the labor force later and 
with more educational background than ever before, 
creating both opportunities and strains at the modern 
workplace.
If a few added years of history and algebra represented the 
full scope of educational expansion, the impact on worker 
expectations might be rather limited. Yet these extensions of 
formal education have been accentuated by a veritable "in 
formation explosion" which has raised the gazes of even the 
most isolated Americans far beyond their immediate sur 
roundings. Unlike the closed world of our grand 
parents without radio, television, and often even 
newspapers in which values and aspirations changed slow 
ly, we are now more aware of the lives which others enjoy. 
With this greater awareness, "overeducated" workers are 
more likely to be unhappy in their jobs or even to reject the 
work which society requires for its maintenance. The educa 
tional gains do create the possibility of more demanding 
work roles, but the failure of skill requirements to keep pace 
with educational improvements is likely to leave workers 
less, rather than more, satisfied with their jobs.
Finally, as changes in relative wealth and access to infor 
mation raise expectations, changes in technology will dictate 
the extent to which we can respond to new demands at the 
workplace. Technological advances have broadened occupa-
tional choices for some, freeing women from housekeeping 
chores and transforming the world into a much smaller place 
through innovations in transportation and communications. 
For other segments of the workforce, technological change is 
a more ominous force, eliminating skilled jobs and displac 
ing workers in declining manufacturing industries. The 
development of new technologies does not lead in a single 
direction in the formation of tomorrow's workplace, but it 
does present a set of real constraints too often overlooked by 
those who would reshape work to meet rising expectations.
Any one of these broad social changes, when viewed in 
isolation, can be used as the basis for extreme predictions 
regarding the future of work. Increasing wealth has been 
linked to both the demise of work and as the key to expand 
ing occupational choice and worker satisfaction. Added 
education and greater awareness lead some to project revolu 
tions at the workplace while causing others to hope for an 
era of increasingly skilled and challenging work roles. 
Technology may render workers obsolete, or simply 
eliminate the most harsh and unrewarding jobs while open 
ing new work opportunities. In all areas, the changes are so 
broad as to create endless possibilities for their selective ap 
plication, but such prophecies are myopic and misleading. 
Only when viewed together and assessed with the guidance of
current labor market data is it possible to construct a 
coherent picture of the future of work in a rapidly changing 
society.
The Commitment to Work
The dangers of extrapolating disparate trends are most 
clearly demonstrated by predictions that work will disap 
pear. Although the vision of a society in which many are 
freed from work is not illogical, current work patterns do 
not support such claims, but reflect great continuity with the 
work habits of our predecessors. The length of the full-time 
workweek, which steadily decreased during the first four 
decades of this century, has stabilized at a nearly universal 
40-hour week since World War II. More surprisingly, the 
proportion of the population that works has actually increas 
ed during this century, bolstered by growing labor force par 
ticipation among women. Even recent survey results confirm 
a continuing attachment to work a Roper Organization 
survey found that only one in five people place more em 
phasis on their personal satisfaction and pleasure than on 
working hard and doing a good job, 6 and 85 percent of those 
interviewed by the American Council of Life Insurance 
believe that success in life is dependent on their working 
hard. 7 If we are really about to abandon work, somebody 
had better tell the workers.
Rising levels of affluence among American workers have 
had an effect on work trends today's jobholders are in 
creasingly opting for greater leisure through paid vacations 
and holidays, and they are also spending fewer years of their 
lives working than ever before, retiring earlier in spite of 
growing life spans. Yet any expectations of freedom from 
work have been matched by expectations of higher incomes, 
limiting the scope of movements away from work. Rather 
than shunning their jobs, Americans have responded to ris 
ing productivity and affluence partially by seeking higher in-
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comes and partially by enjoying more "free time" while 
employed. These choices reflect somewhat predictable 
market decisions regarding the marginal utility of additional 
income and leisure, and such work-leisure tradeoffs can be 
expected to continue in the years ahead.
The economic incentives to work will not dissipate for the 
great majority of workers in the foreseeable future, and even 
this unlikely event would not lead to a workless society. 
Work fulfills a variety of needs in modern societies, pro 
viding not only an income but a sense of identity, of com 
munity and of purpose. Already we call many activities free 
ly chosen by individuals "work," and as we move further 
away from the effort to clothe and feed ourselves, our 
understanding of the nature of work will continue to change. 
Feudal lords would probably not have viewed many of our 
contemporary pursuits as work, but according to a modern 
definition we will continue to work nonetheless.
work (wurk), n. [ME. werk; AS. were, weorc; akin to G. 
werk; IE. base *werg-, to do, act, seen also in Gr. ergon 
(for *wergon), action, work (cf. ERG), organon, tool, 
instrument (cf. ORGAN)], 1. bodily or mental effort 
exerted to do or make something; purposeful activity; 
labor; toil. 2. employment: as, out of work. 3. occupa 
tion; business; trade; craft; profession: as, his work is 
selling. 4. a) something one is making, doing, or acting 
upon, especially as one's occupation or duty; task: 
undertaking: as, he laid out his work. 6) the amount of 
this: as, a day's work. 5. something that has been made 
or done; result of effort or activity; specifically, a) 
usually pi. an act; deed: as, a person of good works. 
6) pi. collected writings: as, the works of Whitman. 
c) pi. engineering structures, as bridges, dams, docks,
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Satisfaction at the Workplace
The continuing willingness of Americans to work is no 
guarantee of their satisfaction at the workplace. Workers 
may reluctantly conclude that unrewarding jobs are 
preferable to no jobs at all, but the potential for worker 
discontent remains a legitimate source of concern. At the 
same time, if claims of widespread dissatisfaction at the 
workplace are to become mandates for public or private 
remedies, the burden of proof must lie with the critics of 
work. Thus far, their case has not been convincing.
Efforts to gauge worker dissatisfaction and identify shifts 
in such attitudes over time pose numerous research prob 
lems. Surveys which attempt to assess worker discontent are 
plagued by methodological shortcomings, with results vary 
ing widely depending on how survey questions are phrased 
and responses collected and interpreted. Because work is so 
closely associated with one's identity and self-esteem, 
measures of work satisfaction invariably provoke defensive 
reactions which preserve one's self-image and dignity. 
Hence, workers are found to be generally satisfied with their 
jobs, but also to feel underutilized and inadequately 
challenged by their work roles. Without admitting that they 
have "settled" for unsatisfying jobs, respondents react to 
specific questions of work quality by criticizing the con 
straints inherent in their roles and thereby preserving their 
sense of self-esteem.
As difficult as it is to develop meaningful measures of 
worker satisfaction, it is even harder to construct defensible 
claims of long term changes in worker attitudes. While 
sizable portions of the workforce are no doubt (and 
justifiably) unhappy with their jobs, we have little basis for 
comparing this level of dissatisfaction with that of prior 
generations. The few available longitudinal studies on work 
satisfaction have encountered difficulties in distinguishing
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attitude changes of workers as they grow older from broader 
societal shifts over time. For this reason, we may believe that 
worker discontent is sufficiently prevalent to warrant public 
attention and concern, but calls for remedial action based on 
the claims that dissatisfaction is spreading and work quality 
deteriorating are sorely lacking empirical support.
Looking at the occupational shifts already underway in 
the labor market, it seems impossible to predict whether the 
prospects for satisfaction at the workplace will improve or 
diminish in the foreseeable future. The well-worn generaliza 
tions concerning shifts from blue-collar to white-collar and 
from manufacturing to service roles identify the broad direc 
tions of occupational change, but these observations reveal 
surprisingly little about the future quality of work. White- 
collar or service jobs will not necessarily be better or more 
rewarding than those which they replace, and much will de 
pend on the expectations which tomorrow's workers bring to 
these new jobs. The most certain and significant wariables in 
the satisfaction of future generations are the continuing 
gains in education and awareness among workers, which 
may lead to deeper concerns for work quality within the 
ranks of both labor and management. Revolution at the 
workplace still seems most unlikely, but a gradual evolution 
of priorities at work could have an important effect on the 
nature of jobs in decades to come.
The Attempt to Reform Work
Most discussions of work reform stem from a belief that 
much of today's work is unacceptably bleak and unreward 
ing. Such judgments are inherently subjective, and run the 
risk of underestimating the full diversity of worker interests 
and needs which shape expectations and attitudes on the job. 
Nevertheless, there remains a humanitarian quality to work 
reform efforts which justifies their pursuit even in the 
absence of impending crises. Where the potential for im-
13
proving the organization and design of work exists within the 
bounds of technological and economic constraints, no threat 
of uprising should be necessary to ensure work reform in 
itiatives.
The accumulating literature on work reform first focus 
ing on costly job redesign schemes and more recently on 
broad issues of participative management has served a 
useful purpose. Advocates of work reform have succeeded in 
calling the attention of managers to the costs of excessive 
specialization and to the potential for tapping the knowledge 
of workers. Another byproduct of the work reform debate 
has been the occasional readiness of managers to reconsider 
the importance of worker commitment and morale as a 
"human variable" in analyses of production efficiency. 
Although the wholesale revision of work organizations has 
rarely been attempted, the critics of work have at least 
temporarily alerted some management and labor represen 
tatives to unattended problems in the workplace. The extent 
to which reform advocates can sustain that interest and 
actually change established practices remains to be seen.
Because they have tended to overstate their case, pro 
ponents of work reform are likely to encounter considerable 
skepticism in the years ahead. Concentrating on visions of 
meaningful work and rhetoric about the elimination of 
"dehumanizing" jobs, advocates of "work enrichment" 
and job redesign have failed to heed the technological con 
straints and economic considerations which establish the 
limits of potential work reform. They paid scant attention to 
questions of who will bear the costs of reforming work and 
what incentives managements will have to do so. Further 
more, specialized functions in work organizations were 
treated as though they were developed on a wholly irrational 
basis; Adam Smith's famous observations on the effect of a 
division of labor in the manufacture of pins are somehow
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forgotten. 8 Assuming that reform initiatives are designed to 
be implemented voluntarily in a manner consistent with 
market forces, their prospects for adoption seem far more 
limited than advocates suggest.
It is appealing to imagine a world in which there are no 
losers, in which both labor and management benefit by new 
approaches to work design and management. Under this 
scenario, workers would enjoy new challenges and accept 
greater responsibility in their jobs, heightening prospects for 
self-fulfillment at the workplace. Similarly, managers would 
be compensated for the time and effort they devoted to work 
reform by the increased productivity of a more satisfied 
workforce. Yet such anticipations assume an overriding 
community of interest between labor and management far 
different from the adversarial roles which have characterized 
American labor-management relations. While hard times 
may spur brief periods of reconciliation and cooperation be 
tween employers and their workers, such spells are not likely 
to be long-lived.
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Redesigned jobs or participative management efforts may 
serve as good public relations props, but private firms can 
not be expected to spend money for the sole purpose of 
enhancing worker satisfaction. While cooperation may be 
possible on narrowly-defined projects of limited duration, 
the commitment of management to work reform ex 
periments will last only as long as they generate tangible 
returns in improved product quality and higher profits. And 
if workers perceive reform initiatives as giving management 
higher profits while they get far less tangible rewards, even 
labor support for such experiments may be shortlived.
Dramatic improvements in work quality with worker 
satisfaction given priority over productivity and pro 
fits will be achieved only through the traditional adver 
sarial mechanisms of labor-management relations, won as 
workers' rights in the same manner as higher pay, safer 
working conditions, and restrictive work rules. To date, 
organized labor has not been willing to push work quality 
issues in collective bargaining, at least in part because the 
rank and file are not prepared to trade pay and benefits for 
less tangible or known rewards. As the education and expec 
tations of workers continue to rise, however, unions may ex 
tend their agenda to include these issues, thereby ensuring a 
more lasting and determined move toward satisfying work in 
the years ahead.
The Future
In rejecting more dramatic claims of a disintegrating work 
ethic or of workplaces redesigned along Utopian lines, the 
picture of the future which remains is more one of gradual 
change than of radical departures from work as we know it 
today. Americans will continue to work, although more and 
more will enjoy the benefits of leisure through longer vaca 
tions, added paid holidays, and more part-time employment. 
Menial and unrewarding jobs will persist, although the in-
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cumbents will increasingly wear a white collar or perform 
their work in service roles as opposed to the classic 
stereotypes of harsh factory work. Consultants will envision 
better worlds using values and priorities we all might em 
brace, but in the absence of sharp political and economic 
upheavals the technological and economic forces of the 
marketplace will continue to dictate the organization and 
design of work.
There are a number of encouraging trends to be found in 
current work patterns. Growing segments of the workforce 
will enjoy freedom of choice in work, selecting their prefer 
red occupations and switching jobs with relative ease. 
Leisure gains will allow individuals unprecedented control 
over their lives, enabling them to pursue their interests out 
side of work as well as selecting the work they will do on the 
job. There is even some hope that the needs and motivation 
of workers will be given additional attention in the coming 
decades, as human resources are reassessed for their poten 
tial contributions to economic growth.
This relatively bright outlook of the future of work is 
clouded by the awareness that not all segments of the labor 
force will share its fruits. Amidst disturbing signs of a widen 
ing gap between the most and least fortunate workers, the 
danger to American society is that increasing numbers of 
workers will be excluded from productive work or confined 
to menial and unrewarding jobs. The pace of technological 
change threatens to displace growing numbers of workers in 
declining manufacturing sectors, and the expansion of skill 
ed employment will be of little consolation to the uneducated 
with limited or narrow skills. The challenge for public policy 
in the labor market will be to minimize these disparities in 
work experience, and to ensure that opportunities are of 
fered for those left behind to partake in a society of growing 
affluence, freedom and leisure at work.
2 The Meaning of Work
Let us be grateful to Adam,
our benefactor. He cut us
out of the 'blessing' of idleness
and won us the 'curse' of labor.
 Mark Twain
Any attempt to discern future patterns of work must begin 
with a clear sense of why people work. The motivation to 
work is hardly self-evident some people enjoy their jobs, 
while others relish only the paycheck. The diversity of reac 
tions toward work is partly attributable to objective dif 
ferences in the tasks which various jobs require, but more 
importantly it stems from the broad range of expectations 
which are brought to the workplace. In a world with many 
happy auto mechanics and disgruntled corporate executives, 
there can be no hierarchy of jobs or set of personal needs and 
interests which is applicable to all. The forces which are 
woven into work motivation are much more complex and 
difficult to predict.
Popular wisdom usually ties work motivation to some 
vague notion of the "work ethic," which in the extreme 
describes only a willingness to work while revealing nothing 
about one's reasons for working. Thus, even though a poet, 
a preacher and a plumber would likely offer very different 
explanations for why they "work," we count them all as 
staunch supporters of the "work ethic." Conversely, when
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we decry the disintegration of the "work ethic," we envision 
a world in which everyone refuses to work and civilizations 
crumble. It is a useful form of shorthand at times, but offers 
no guidance for assessments of work's future.
Discussions of work motivation are complicated by 
historical overtones, for our perceptions of the "work ethic" 
and of the desirability of work are influenced by ideas 
shaped over many centuries. The extent to which images 
from the past accurately reflect the realities of work in prior 
eras is not easily determined, for the writing of philosophers 
and theologians tell us more about intellectual and religious 
movements than what the- Greek helots or medieval serfs 
thought about work motivation. Yet there are links between 
the evolution of ideas about work and changes in the nature 
of work itself, and both the perception and substance of 
work in earlier times still exert powerful influences on work 
patterns today. An understanding of the development of 
historical views toward work thus provides an important 
basis for examining contemporary sources of work motiva 
tion and satisfaction.
Early Concepts: The Curse of Adam
The earliest commentaries on the nature of work were far 
from positive. From the ancient philosophers into the six 
teenth century, two basic concepts dominated intellectual 
and philosophical views on the role of work in society.' First, 
work was equated with the effort (usually physical) required 
to satisfy survival needs. Second, this effort was accepted 
not as an end in itself, but as a means by which others might 
be freed to pursue higher goals. Work, conceived as an 
unpleasant reality, could only impede the search for ultimate 
ends, and was to be avoided whenever possible.
The writings of the early Greek philosophers were firmly 
rooted in this view of work. Aristotle declared that just as 
the ultimate goal of war was peace, so the object of work was
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leisure. As an end in itself, leisure meant activity pursued 
free of compulsion or desire for gain for example, music or 
contemplation. Aristotle saw work as a burden which he had 
no duty to bear, accepting slavery because it freed him for 
leisure and higher pursuits. The slaves left no written record 
of their feelings about such arrangements, and their plight 
seldom captured the recorded attention of those who pro 
fited by their labors.
Biblical and later Christian views of work were similar to 
these early Greek concepts. There was no work in the Garden 
of Eden. In the book of Genesis, toil was a curse imposed 
upon Adam and Eve as a symbol of their banishment from 
God. In later Christian writings, work became a necessary 
activity of this earthly world; yet the work of this life was 
supposed to be of little consequence compared to the 
spiritual work of preparing to face God. By itself, work had 
no meaning. Only the contemplation of God could redeem 
life.
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All of these views of work had in common a hierarchical 
image of the world in which work and workers were low on 
the scale. Even the language reflected this perspective the 
Hebrew word for "work," avodah, is derived from the same 
root as eved, meaning "slave." Work by definition included 
servitude and compulsion (the thought of freely choosing to 
work was inconceivable), and work effort engendered 
neither distinction nor respect. Rather than a laudable or 
joyful activity, work was an often unpleasant means to other 
ends, at best stones on the path to a better reality. Labor 
purified, but only in that the soul might turn itself more fully 
toward higher ends. Aquinas thought that the simplest, most 
routine tasks were best because they held no danger of 
distracting the mind from its higher purposes.
These early views of work and leisure were rational 
responses to a world of work which encompassed virtually 
nothing but physical labor, and which rendered the idea of 
"meaningful" or "challenging" work inconceivable. If 
Aristotle were living in the 1980s, we would almost certainly 
consider him to be working as an author, a tutor, or 
whatever but in his time such intellectual pursuits were an 
tithetical to the concept of work. Leisure and work were as 
distinct as mind and body, with each the joy or the curse of a 
separate social class. Few were so fortunate as to escape 
work entirely; for the vast majority, there was no avoiding a 
harsh world of strenuous and unending labor.
Birth of the Work Ethic
It remained for the developments of the Renaissance and 
Reformation to relieve work of its temporary, means-to-an- 
end, bottom-of-the-hierarchy status. The ideas which altered 
this curse-of-work perspective evolved along many fronts. 
For example, the emergence of democratic ideas challenged 
the hierarchical image of the world. The long-accepted right 
of a few to a life of leisure was questioned, and Utopian
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models were developed in which all shared equally in both 
leisure and labor. Similarly, some challenged the notion that 
this world was simply a dreary way station on the path to 
paradise. The blossoming of science and craft began to 
glorify and explore efforts to transform the world. Rather 
than waiting patiently for miracles, the Renaissance 
philosophers discarded the thesis that they could not 
presume to alter God's universe. Labor, no longer only an 
evil to be avoided, became an activity in which many took 
pride and enjoyment.
This transformation of work's image was to a large extent 
a secular outgrowth of technological, demographic and 
economic change. With the birth of modern science during 
the Renaissance, engineers and craftsmen began to replace 
abstract theorists and feudal lords as dominant actors shap 
ing society's future. The merchant class also gained increas 
ing influence as populations grew and cities expanded. While 
the privileged retained their rank, the men who sought to 
change existing social and economic institutions were doing 
so through work, and the interests of these emerging classes 
were dependent upon the existence of a stable and malleable 
labor force. Thus, work became not only a respected activity 
for the fortunate, but also a moral imperative for those 
laboring beneath them.
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This emerging work ethic, spawned by secular forces, was 
reinforced with religious doctrine. By advancing the belief 
that work was good, that all men should work, and that even 
menial jobs were worth doing well, the Protestant church 
placed the imprimatur of God himself on work. Reformers 
such as Luther and Wesley declared that work was the in 
dividual's missionary contribution to God and the path to 
salvation. By proclamation, if not in fact, work was trans 
formed from the accursed to the blessed, and labor (in this 
life at least) became an end in itself. Work became the 
rightful duty of all, and leisure (defined now as idleness) was 
declared to be the worst sin.
This complete reversal of recorded attitudes toward work 
preceded the industrial revolution and the universal educa 
tion systems which are sometimes credited with spawning the 
work ethic. Still, the work ethic was eagerly adopted by 
society as a response to the needs of mass production. 
Because the efficiency of developing industries relied upon 
willing and diligent labor, every agent of authority and 
education proclaimed the virtues of work throughout the 
several hundred years following the Reformation. From 
Luther to Ben Franklin and Horatio Alger, workers received 
a steady diet of exhortation and incantation from press, 
pulpit, and primer. All work was laudable, work well done 
would inevitably bring reward, work shirked led to degrada 
tion and ruin. The idea, of course, endures both as an of 
ficial caveat and as a popular idea.
The new emphasis on human capabilities among 
Renaissance scholars and the force of teachings stemming 
from religious reformers combined to grant strength and 
legitimacy to the idealization of work. To some extent, these 
revised perceptions were reinforced by changes in the nature 
of work itself. As the age of industrialization approached, 
local economies and the range of work activities became in 
creasingly diverse, and tasks requiring considerable skills"
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and intellectual abilities were subsumed under the definition 
of work. For a minority of skilled craftsmen, the intimate 
ties between work, physical labor and dreary exertion began 
to unravel, and a more equitable distribution of work gained 
acceptance. Yet for the masses of unskilled laborers, little 
changed except the setting of their servitude, and the forces 
of industrialization quickly made a mockery of the ideal of 
dignified work, although religious doctrine and secular con 
ceptualization about the noble functions of work remained 
unchanged.
Industrialization and the Loss 
of Meaning in Work
From the first flowering of the work ethic, the religious 
and secular trends which gave it meaning began to 
disintegrate as the nature of work continued to change. 
While the model of the skilled craftsman did not disappear, 
the factory worker came to symbolize work in an in 
dustrialized society and to overshadow the considerable con 
tinuity of work in other occupational sectors. Industrializa 
tion and urbanization, the diminished authority of the 
church, and a gradual recognition that much of the work re 
quired by society was indeed tedious and unrewarding, all 
contributed to the eroding of the notion that work was a 
good in itself. Even if lauded in the sanctuary, work ap 
peared once again to be the accursed obstacle standing be 
tween men and the realization of a freer, leisured paradise.
The analyses of Marx and Freud often have served as the 
bases for indictments of work in industrialized societies, and 
their writings reflected a new emphasis on sociological or 
psychological aspects of work. Both men argued that work 
plays a major role in providing individuals with a sense of 
purpose and significance. Marx analyzed manufacturing 
work in the early years of industrialization and concluded 
that factory labor had alienated workers from some rightful
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integral relation of work and meaning. Similarly, Freud held 
that work was the single most important factor in the 
psychology of self-esteem, and the central activity by which 
individuals gave meaning to their lives. Even though images 
of work in a preindustrial age characterized by life on the 
farm and the craft method of manufacture suffered from 
idealization, the contrasts drawn by Marx, Freud and their 
successors highlighted very real and important changes in the 
way people viewed work, and in the nature of work itself.
Prior to the machine age, the farmer and the craftsman 
had a close identification with their work. They owned their 
tools and controlled the pace of their work. The gratification 
derived from work efforts was immediate, rendering work 
rather than leisure the central focus of their lives. In this con 
text, sharp distinctions between work and leisure were in 
comprehensible work was an integral part of both survival 
and satisfaction. With the move from the countryside to the 
cities and from the workshop to the factory, however, most 
of this sense of intimacy with and control over work was lost 
forever.
Critics of the modern workplace suggest that industrializa 
tion conflicted severely with the harmony between work and 
the individual in several ways. Many people were removed 
from the production of the objects by which they lived, los 
ing the knowledge of how the goods on which they depended 
were made. The symbolic link between work and fulfillment 
of basic needs was further weakened by the introduction of 
currencies and other standardized terms of trade which 
replaced the direct exchange of goods and services. The tools 
and processes of production became more complex, removed 
and unfamiliar the industrial worker not only did not own 
the tools of the trade, but also understood them imperfectly, 
could not repair them, and usually did not control their pace. 
In an unfamiliar environment, the factory worker was 
alienated and left with none of the feelings of competency
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and security common to the farmer and the village crafts 
man.
In this bleak view of industrialization, the content of work 
also underwent major revision. The development of methods 
and scales of production which required the coordinated ef 
forts of tens or hundreds or thousands meant that individual 
desires and rhythms had to be subordinated to imposed 
schedules. Labor began to be defined and measured by time 
on the clock, and huge organizations removed most in 
dividuals many layers from the center of responsibility and 
control. Most importantly, the industrial process, in its 
search for efficiency, compressed the scope of individual 
jobs to the point that almost no production-line job required 
more than a tiny fraction of an individual's capabilities. 
Workers lost the clearly recognizable stake in production 
which they previously enjoyed, and the outlet for creative 
energy was all but destroyed in many occupations.
To the extent that work in an industrial area narrowed the 
potential for fulfillment through one's job, people 
presumably made sharper distinctions between work and 
leisure. Fewer could find reason to adhere to the "work
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ethic," at least if defined as a "conviction that work is a 
worthwhile activity in its own right, and not merely as a 
means to some important end such as material comfort or 
wealth." 2 Unsatisfying jobs gave rise to the goal of escaping 
work for leisure, and reinforced the idea that work encom 
passed everything that was unpleasant but necessary and 
continuing. Self-realization was sought increasingly during 
leisure time, and worker demands for paid leisure and for 
consumer goods and services increased. As a product of the 
forces of industrialization which transformed the nature of 
work, this sharp division of life into work and leisure has 
been viewed as a distinctly modern phenomenon and a 
significant departure from the experience of prior genera 
tions.
While this description of work "dehumanized" by the in 
dustrial transition may be shopworn, it does reflect the 
changed status and working conditions of some occupations 
during the machine age. Those involved in the industrial 
mass manufacture of goods certainly faced new problems, as 
the size of organizations grew and the scope of jobs narrow 
ed in pursuit of greater efficiency. Similar shifts were felt 
outside the factory as well concepts of specialization were 
adapted to service industries, and the emergence of large cor 
porations deprived many white-collar workers of a sense of 
control and meaning at work. These developments may not 
have touched the lives of even a majority of workers in the 
nineteenth century, but they did generate the concepts of 
alienating work which most of society came to accept.
Whose Work Ethic?
The more difficult issue in the history of work is not 
whether its nature changed, but rather whether it was 
perceived differently by successive generations of workers. 
The writings of scholars and theologians portray a series of 
reversals, in which work is transformed from a curse to a
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blessing and religious duty, and then to a dreary and 
alienating necessity. Yet this process of abstracting a concept 
of the work ethic and then plotting its rise and fall over 
simplifies complex developments and masks underlying con 
tinuities. It fails to explain why men worked, or worked 
hard, or what they thought of their jobs. The philosophical 
connotations of work did change, but their relationship to 
actual work patterns and worker attitudes is at best uncer 
tain.
Clearly the Reformation, the rise of crafts and the 
emergence of democratic ideals gave new dignity to work. 
No longer just the inevitable toil by which one survived, 
work gained recognition among the learned and privileged as 
the activity by which individuals and societies progress. It is 
less clear whether the elitists' praise of work was ever ac 
cepted by workers, or how much it actually fueled their 
motivation to work. Surely many artisans had always taken 
pride in their crafts and had no need of a church-sanctioned 
morality or self-serving employers' exhortations to shore up 
the self-esteem they derived from their work. For those in 
less skilled labor, necessity no doubt played a stronger role in 
their journeys to work than any attempts at moral indoc 
trination. Andrew Carnegie may have dedicated his empire 
to the glory of God, but the men in his employ more likely 
worked for gold rather than grace.
A closer look at work habits during the early stages of 
mass production illustrates the weakness of moral im 
peratives concerning work. Turnover rates before World 
War I were greater than in 1980, with textile and steel mills, 
clothing shops, machine works and early automobile plants 
reporting turnover as high as 100 percent. Absenteeism was 
also a source of serious concern as much as 10 percent of 
the workforce was absent on any given day. 3 In response to 
turnover rates reaching 370 percent, Henry Ford hired 
sociologists in 1914, hoping that they would strengthen
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workers' commitment to sustained work. A devotion to 
work certainly seemed absent from typical work patterns, 
even as philosophical discussions of the work ethic flourish 
ed. The work ethic has always existed more in the world of 
scholars than of laborers, more as a concept than as a power 
ful motivating force keeping people at work.
Much of the anxiety concerning the strength of the work 
ethic in contemporary society seems to stem from an exag 
gerated sense of its importance to work motivation in 
generations past. There has never been much evidence to 
support Max Weber's description of man as "driving hard 
against the environment because of his need to prove himself 
before God." The Protestant ethic may have heightened the 
social stigma associated with not working, but the struggle 
for survival offered ample motivation to work for even the 
most irreverent of characters. With greater affluence, 
workers have more opportunities to voice and act upon their 
discontent. Now as then, the survival of work does not de 
pend on the motivational force of an abstract work ethic.
Theories of Work Motivation
Recognizing that the rise and fall of the work ethic is link 
ed only tenuously to work behavior and motivation, most 
analysts of this century have sought other explanations for 
our attachment to work. A variety of possibilities have been 
raised, most focusing on some concept of need fulfillment. 
Given the diversity of both work and individuals, no single 
concept can fully account for why people work, but the con 
tributions of various disciplines form the basis for a relative 
ly comprehensive portrait of work motivation in a modern 
era.
Perhaps the most basic theory of work motivation 
describes the desire to work as part of human nature. This 
simple view of work motivation posits the existence of a fun 
damental human urge to exert oneself, a drive to learn, to
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achieve, and to shape one's surroundings. The presence of a 
"work instinct" is impossible to prove, and its strength can 
not be measured. Yet this perspective on work motivation 
does derive legitimacy from traits we commonly associate 
with human nature: a sense of curiosity, a responsiveness to 
challenge, a capacity for pursuing hopes and aspirations. 
Even as the debate over whether these qualities are acquired 
or whether they are innate continues, the desire of most to 
exert and achieve is difficult to dispute.
The economic explanations for work are familiar ones. 
Subsistence needs create pressures for work in all civiliza 
tions, and continue to fuel work motivation even in affluent 
welfare states. While the aggregate wealth of society may be 
sufficient to free substantial portions of the population from 
the necessity of work, distribution systems within the 
economy generally ensure that people work if they wish to 
enjoy anything more than the most meager of incomes and 
lifestyles. As the Industrial Workers of the World once 
chanted, "We go to work to get the dough to get the food to 
get the strength to go to work . ..." A paycheck is no 
guarantee of an escape from poverty millions of Americans 
earn too little for them to avoid this fate but the economic 
advantages of working are almost always sufficient to give 
individuals powerful incentives to remain employed.
In wealthy industrialized nations, the concern for relative 
income gains is a far more powerful source of work motiva 
tion than any basic survival needs. Most of the "necessities 
of life" in America already are a reflection of cultural norms 
and expectations rather than of provisions for food, shelter 
and clothing. This process of revising expectations upward 
leaves the majority working for nicer homes, cars and 
stereos, while only an impoverished minority still struggles to 
place dinner on their tables. The point is not to legitimize this 
distribution of income, but simply to stress that even amidst 
considerable wealth, the lure of relative income gains pro 
vides meaningful economic incentives to work.
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In themselves, these instinctual and economic views might 
be sufficient to explain why most people work. Still, the 
most intriguing (and in affluent societies perhaps the most 
powerful) accounts of work motivation have emerged from 
sociological and psychological perspectives. Arguing that 
work in modern societies is more than a means of subsistence 
or an avenue for fulfilling economic needs, sociologists have 
suggested that work is also essential in providing a sense of 
meaning, of community and self-esteem to the individual. 
Through work, we seek to justify our own existence, to 
develop a feeling of participation in a design which is 
grander than our personal lives. Through work, we join a 
community of individuals with common experiences, skills 
or goals. Through work, we derive feelings of competence 
and achievement, making contributions which enable us to 
believe in our own worth.
Thus, while people may not want to labor, they usually 
want a job. The distinction is not merely semantic few are
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compelled by the sheer excitement or challenge of their 
work, but by having a job they can earn social acceptance. 
Work is "a membership card that entitles the holder to all 
the privileges of bountiful culture." 4 For this reason, 
Americans work even when it is not imperative: millions 
hold jobs in spite of their eligibility for welfare at com 
parable income levels, and labor market studies have shown 
repeatedly that three of four workers would continue work 
ing even if they inherited enough money to live comfortably 
in leisure. 5 One person who enjoyed the good fortune of in 
herited wealth told journalist Studs Terkel, "I have come to 
some conclusions after having been free economically from 
the necessity of work. To be occupied is essential." 6
The impact of unemployment on the human psyche pro 
vides a dramatic illustration of the social and psychological 
needs which work fulfills. For those without jobs, the 
psychic scars can be great. The reflections of John Coleman, 
a labor economist who took a sabbatical from a college 
presidency to try his hand at manual work, are instructive; 
after only day of unemployment, he wrote:
This day hit me hard. I have a secure, or reasonably 
secure, job to go back to. My family's bills are be 
ing paid while I'm away. I can still use my name to 
open doors here and there. But none of that mat 
tered today. I felt unwanted and out of work. I 
wondered why people couldn't see what a valued 
employee I would be ... . 7
Deprived of a community of co-workers and unable to con 
tribute to the support of family or society, the jobless quick 
ly feel alienated and unproductive. The causes of this forced 
idleness are of secondary importance even when wholly 
beyond the individual's control, the sense of dependency, of 
uselessness and isolation can be devastating.
Not surprisingly, research data suggest that unemploy 
ment and mental health are inversely related, with the strains
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of joblessness so severe as to be potentially life-threatening. 
M. Harvey Brenner of Johns Hopkins University has 
estimated that a 1 percent increase in the U.S. unemploy 
ment rate results in some 37,000 additional deaths, with 
more than half of those fatalities caused by increased in 
cidences of heart attacks and other cardiovascular diseases. 8 
Obviously most people denied work do not die. But 
unemployment has robbed them if not of life, then of 
something else. "The bewilderment they often express is like 
that of the homeowner who returns to find rooms ransacked, 
valuable and beloved objects missing," Harry Maurer con 
cludes in his oral history of the unemployed:
The sense of violence and invasion, the feelings of 
fear and loss and helplessness descend with the 
same stunning force when a worker is deprived of 
work. And the loss is much greater, because work, 
if the longing of the unemployed is any indication, 
remains a fundamental human need even in the 
crushing form it has increasingly assumed in the 
modern world. It provides not simply a livelihood, 
but an essential passage into the human communi 
ty. It makes us less alone. 9
Thus, the forces which lead us to the workplace are much 
subtler than any proscriptions and religious moralisms of the 
work ethic. We work because it defines our place in the 
world, and creates a world in which we can feel both needed 
and useful.
A Worker's Identity Crisis?
"Who am I? ... Pm a  ." Almost regardless of how the 
response is completed whether electrician, banker or 
teacher the reply will conclude with a description of the in 
dividual's job. The sociological importance of work is 
epitomized by the widespread practice of defining people by 
their work roles, and often of characterizing ourselves in the
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same manner. A quick glance at the obituary page of the 
newspaper illustrates the point: the headlines do not an 
nounce the passing of a beloved husband, mother or 
neighbor, but rather of a former city councilman or social 
studies teacher. Terkel explored this theme repeatedly in in 
terviews with a cross section of workers: "Your work is your 
identity;" it "tells you who you are;" "your occupation 
molds your personality;" and "my work and my life have 
become one" were typical replies. Even when people hated 
their work, Terkel concluded, it remained the reference point 
for identity.
Again, the attitudes of the unemployed demonstrate vivid 
ly the role of work in shaping self-image. Many jobless per 
sons feel stripped of their identity, lost in a sea of statistics 
and without a role to assert in a community of workers. An 
unemployed forty-five year old construction worker express 
ed his frustration:
Right now I can't really describe myself be 
cause . . . I'm unemployed. . . . So, you see, I 
can't say who I am right now. ... I guess a man's 
something else besides his work, isn't he? But 
what? I just don't know. 10
This link between work and identity has been perceived to be 
so strong as to sustain work effort even in the absence of 
significant economic incentives to work. A 1972 federal 
government report concluded:
... to be denied work is to be denied far more than 
the things that paid work buys; it is to be denied the 
ability to define and respect one's self.
It is illusory to believe that if people were given suf 
ficient funds most of them would stop working and 
become useless idlers. 11
Supported by considerable research on work attachment 
among the poor, it seems clear that Americans of all income
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levels gauge their self-esteem and identity in relation to their 
jobs, and that these personal needs provide compelling 
motivations to work.
"I just introduced Mr. Indemnity Bonds 
to Ms. Paralegal Services "
It is important to note that the close connection between 
work and identity or self-esteem has had special meaning for 
women in American society. With dominant values still fail 
ing to acknowledge housekeeping activities as work, millions 
of women have been denied the recognition or status which 
virtually any other "job" would confer. Betty Friedan 
presented one of many examples of how this lack of recogni 
tion has affected women who remain at home:
A young mother with a beautiful family, charm, 
talent and brains is apt to dismiss her role 
apologetically. 'What do I do?' you hear her say. 
'Why nothing, I'm just a housewife.' A good 
education it seems has given this paragon among 
women an understanding of the value of everything 
except her own worth. 12
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Not surprisingly, women increasingly are working for wages 
outside the home, with dramatic implications for the com 
position of the labor force and the nature of work. The 
record number of women who are working may not be as 
single-minded in their attachment to jobs as their male 
counterparts, but they are clearly expressing a desire to 
define themselves in terms other than John Smith's wife or 
Bill Jones's mother.
Thus, among all of the groups which might be presumed 
to have the weakest attachment to the labor market the 
unemployed, the poor, and women who previously have not 
entered the labor force work continues to play a powerful 
role. Some of the pressures to work indeed may stem from 
the remnants of the Protestant ethic, placing a stigma on 
those choosing not to work. Yet these negative forces could 
not fully account for the continuing strength of work 
motivation in modern society. The desire to work reaches far 
beyond pious exhortations, and even beyond the pressures of 
economic necessity. We work because it offers one certain 
way of participating in the world around us, of developing a 
shared sense of community and of building a sense of identi 
ty and self-esteem which adds meaning to our lives.
Who Really "Wants" to Work?
The list of reasons why we may "need" to work whether 
psychological, economic or sociological provides ample 
ways of understanding the motivation to work. Yet this 
discussion should not evoke images of workers springing 
cheerfully from their beds each morning, eager to reach their 
jobs. Just as work satisfaction is distinct from work motiva 
tion, wanting to work is quite different from needing to 
work. A fortunate few manage to hold jobs which they find 
challenging and exciting, but they are truly blessed. The 
struggle to cope with tedious and unpleasant work is far 
more common. Even if Americans do not shirk work in the 
coming decades, they may not rush to embrace it either.
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It is perhaps most accurate to view people as of two minds, 
fundamentally ambivalent in their attitudes toward work. 
"The desire to work ... is a powerful human need, an ego 
drive related to self-expression, power, creativity," conclud 
ed historian John Garraty, and yet "so ... is the desire to 
be idle and free of responsibility." 13 Freud articulated the 
same paradox fifty years earlier, suggesting that people de 
pend on work and yet neither prize it as a path to happiness 
nor pursue it as a source of satisfaction, often working only 
under the stress of necessity. 14 In the words of Eli Ginzberg, 
this "natural aversion to work" stems from the desire of 
workers to be "masters of their souls for as much of the day 
as possible." 15
Of course, these competing desires for freedom and social 
recognition, for pleasure and achievement, are not new addi 
tions to human nature. Yet the fundamental human am 
bivalence toward work may take on increasing importance in 
labor markets of the future as workers gain the ability to 
make more personalized choices between work and leisure. 
In pragmatic terms, work will remain an economic necessity 
for all but the very rich, and the noneconomic functions of 
work will ensure some attachment to work throughout soci 
ety. Yet workers already are gaining the option to balance 
work and leisure time amidst growing affluence, and these 
work-leisure tradeoffs reflect their ambivalence toward 
work. The continuing motivation to work may not disap 
pear, but workers are increasingly able to act on their own 
mixed emotions toward their labors.
3 The Survival of Work
I don't like work no man
does but I like what is in
work the chance to find
yourself. Your own reality 
for yourself, not for
others what no other
man can ever know.
 Joseph Conrad 
Heart of Darkness
If the demise of the work ethic is a threat to civilization, 
one would never suspect it from current labor market trends. 
Whatever their ambivalence, Americans are working more 
than ever. Productivity gains and growing affluence have not 
triggered a mass exodus from work and our society has not 
decayed from idleness and sloth. Instead, both greater 
numbers and larger proportions of the population have 
entered the labor force in recent years, and the tenacious 
hold of work upon the daily activities of most Americans 
shows few signs of weakening.
The Growing Labor Force
Rather than abandoning work, Americans have sought it 
in unprecedented numbers. The U.S. labor force has more 
than tripled in size since the turn of the century, and even the 
relative percentage of the population which works has crept 
up since World War II (Figure 3.1). The growing ratio of
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Figure 3.1 Labor Force Participation Has
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workers to the working age population is particularly signifi 
cant when viewed in light of gains in productivity. Despite an 
enormous decrease' in the amount of human labor required 
to produce given quantities of goods, no corresponding 
decrease in the number or relative portion of workers has 
taken place. Driven by rising expectations and an interest in 
relative income gains, individuals have continued their work 
effort and sought to maintain their share of society's increas 
ing wealth.
The improvements in standards of living made possible by 
rising productivity are simply astounding. At the turn of the 
century, electric lighting and indoor plumbing were luxuries 
in private homes reserved for the affluent. Today, housing 
which lacks these "basics" is considered unfit for habita 
tion. In 1900, food which was not locally in season could 
rarely be obtained, even by the wealthy. Now, even the poor 
routinely consume meats, fruits, and vegetables shipped 
from across a continent and beyond. This dramatic shift in 
contemporary expectations reflects the affluence of 
American society in 1981, the average net worth per person 
was nearly $40,000, representing a collection of cars, TV 
sets, bank accounts, and real estate undreamed of even a few 
decades ago.
Workers have responded to the potential freedoms of ris 
ing productivity and affluence, but not in the manner feared 
by some. Instead of abandoning work, workers have opted 
for greater amounts of paid leisure to complement their ris 
ing incomes in traditional 40-hour per week jobs. Factories 
have not stood idle, but employers have been faced with 
demands for more paid holidays and longer vacations as part 
of the "fringe benefits" of employment. The process is one 
of gradual evolution, in which individuals continually adjust 
to rising standards of living and balance further income 
gains against the utility of additional "free time" away from 
the workplace.
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Unfortunately, all segments of the population have not 
shared equally in either the growing affluence or the stable 
labor force participation which aggregate data reflect. The 
overall trends in labor force participation disguise significant 
changes in the demographic characteristics of the workforce, 
failing to indicate who is entering the labor force and why. A 
review of the participation rates of various subgroups within 
the labor force highlights these more detailed aspects of 
work motivation, and provides a firmer basis for conclusions 
about the future of work in contemporary America.
The Arrival of Women at Work
The increasing number of people who work each day are a 
new breed, or at least a distinctly more feminine one. At the 
turn of the century, the vast majority of workers were men. 
In the social order of that day, the man was the breadwinner, 
and the woman was the homemaker. Eighty years later, the 
distribution of labor between the sexes has changed 
radically women have joined men at the workplace in 
record numbers, more than doubling their share in the labor 
force since 1900 (Figure 3.2). In more than 60 percent of all 
marriages today, the husband is not the sole provider for his 
family. For the first time in history, working wives out 
number housewives.
The movement of women into the labor force was not a 
sudden revolution, but rather a "subtle revolution" which 
began before World War II. The workplace had long been 
the natural habitat for many minority and unmarried 
women according to the 1900 census, 41 percent of all non- 
white women and 17 percent of white women (many of 
whom were immigrants) worked. Seventy-five percent of the 
female factory workers were of immigrant stock and close to 
70 percent of the working women were unmarried at the turn 
of the century. l Nearly one in every five workers was female,
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rendering the concept of the working woman at least familiar 
to industrial America.
Figure 3.2 In 1981, Women Comprise More Than 
Twice as Large a Share of the Labor 
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World War II was a watershed: the social fetters which 
barred married, middle-class women from working were 
shattered by the need to replace some 12 million men who 
left the labor force for battle. By V-E day, 36 percent of the 
women of working age were employed, compared to 25 per-
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cent before the war. Within 2 years after the war, some 
women left the workforce, reducing labor force participation 
to 32 percent. Since, female labor force participation resum 
ed an uninterrupted upward climb. Unlike the young, single, 
and poor women who worked in the first four decades of the 
twentieth century, the women who replaced the male com 
batants during the war were frequently married and over 
thirty-five years of age. Dependent upon female labor, the 
wartime economy legitimized the employment of married, 
middle-class women and triggered a pattern of increasing 
participation which continues to this day.
Having discovered the workplace, increasing numbers of 
women found that full-time homemaking had lost its attrac 
tion, despite the jump in the birth rate during the postwar 
period. Throughout the 1950s, new women entrants into the 
labor force exceeded the number of additional males, so that 
by 1960 nearly twice as many women were working than had 
been in 1940. Initially, the rush into the labor market was 
among mature women: 80 percent of the women entering the 
labor force from 1945 to 1965 were over 35 years old. Since 
then, the reverse has been the case almost the same percen 
tage of new entrants have been less than thirty-five years of 
age. Yet regardless of age variations, the surge of women in 
to the work force has been unmistakable. In 1981, slightly 
more than 50 percent of all wives held paying jobs outside 
the home, compared to only 23 percent in 1947.
Why have women rushed with such vigor into the labor 
force in the course of just a few decades? Some social scien 
tists turn to changing technology in the bedroom as well as 
the kitchen in their attempts to explain the labor market 
behavior of women. Housekeeping consumes less time today 
than a few decades ago and the number of children in the 
home has also declined, leaving more time for work. In addi 
tion, a woman now can virtually determine the number of 
children she will have and when she will have them. As a
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result of this increasing control, the average number of 
children per family dropped from 2.3 to 1.9 during the 
1970s, with the fertility rate reaching a historic low of 15.3 
births per thousand people by 1980.
Undoubtedly these technological advances have enhanced 
the ability of women to shape their own lifestyles, 
eliminating some of the burdens and uncertainties which 
complicated their labor force participation in previous eras. 
Yet changes in technology were as much a response to emerg 
ing values and demands as they were a cause of these new 
work patterns. Technological innovations may have 
facilitated female labor force participation but the oppor 
tunity to work is not synonymous with the desire to work, 
and a more complete explanation is needed.
Traditional economic incentives can also account only 
partially for the growing labor force participation of women. 
For some women, economic needs do play a significant role 
in stimulating work effort in the aggregate, white wives ac 
count for one-quarter of their family income and black wives 
provide one-third of family income. Without this work ef 
fort, many Americans families could not maintain their 
middle-class status. Yet the strong inverse relationship be 
tween a husband's income and the labor force activity of his 
wife which once dominated women's work roles has weaken 
ed considerably amidst growing affluence. The Bureau of the 
Census reported that almost 60 percent of the women in 
families with annual incomes of $25,000 or more worked in 
1980. According to the 1980 Virginia Slims American 
Women's Opinion Poll, less than 50 percent of working 
women took their jobs to support themselves or their 
families. 2 For most women, only the pursuit of relative in 
come gains provides an economic incentive for working. 
Many families simply are unwilling to settle for the standard 
of living their parents enjoyed in the 1950s, and so women 
continue to enter the labor market.
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The rapid movement of women into the workforce has 
achieved its strength and permanence due to the same 
sociological needs for a sense of community, identity and 
self-esteem which drive the work efforts of men in an af 
fluent society. Some women no doubt always envied the 
work roles and related social status of their male counter 
parts, but until the past few decades they have had little 
chance to express such yearnings. The precedent of wartime 
labor provided the first crack in social mores which had kept 
women at home, and the more recent women's movement of 
the 1970s has ensured the steady disintegration of these rigid 
stereotypes. Once unleashed by social and economic change, 
the latent desires of women for recognition outside the home 
have fueled their rapid rise in labor force participation. In 
this sense, their motives for working remain quite similar to 
those of men they just have been prevented from acting on 
them in earlier times.
Finally, it is important to note that this massive surge in 
the labor force participation of women would have been im 
possible in the absence of favorable labor market conditions.
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Structural changes in the economy which increased the de 
mand for female labor had enticed women into the labor 
force even before the women's movement flourished, and 
the ever-increasing participation of women has been 
facilitated by the growing labor requirements of an expand 
ing economy. The rapid growth of the service sector has been 
particularly significant in this regard, since women tradi 
tionally performed much of the work now found in service 
industries. Without this demand for female labor, the 
"emancipation" of women from the home would have pro 
ceeded at a much slower pace. Now, given our dependence 
on female labor to meet current labor needs, any wholesale 
return to the home is inconceivable.
Men—Working but Retiring
The dramatic influx of women into the labor force has 
hidden a divergent trend men are leaving the workforce 
with greater frequency than ever before. Since 1951, the 
labor force participation rate of men dropped almost con 
tinuously from 87.3 percent of the working age population 
to 77.5 percent three decades later. In that same period, three 
of every five added workers were female, and the average 
number of years worked in a man's lifetime steadily declin 
ed. The aggregate data are deceiving, for the expanding work 
effort of women has totally offset the drop in male labor 
force participation to produce slightly increasing overall 
rates. Even among men, the 11 percent decline in participa 
tion since 1951 fails to reveal sharper retreats from the labor 
force by older men.
While the data on male labor force participation might be 
used superficially to argue that work motivation indeed is 
disappearing, a closer examination suggests otherwise. The 
vast majority of able-bodied men are working as much as 
their fathers and grandfathers did. Even young males, who 
have little attachment to the workplace, have not shunned
46
work. Only two distinct groups within the male labor force 
have left the workplace with increasing frequency: white men 
over age 55 and blacks. As with women's rising labor force 
participation, both these trends have been driving forces 
unique to these segments of the population.
Most predictions of the disintegration of work stress the 
absence of traditional workforce attachments among the 
young, and yet the labor force participation rates of 
American youth certainly reflect no crisis at the workplace. 
Although more males aged 14-24 are enrolled in school than 
were a generation ago, they are also working more than 
students did in 1955 in part because more children from 
less affluent families are attending college, which they 
finance by working. This is not to suggest that participation 
rates among young males have not fluctuated over time in 
the mid-1960s, the rates for males aged 16-19 dipped sharply, 
only to rebound to approximately their 1950 levels by 1981. 
Coupled with the steady rise of teenage female participation 
over the course of the past three decades, the evidence 
reflects no abandonment of work at the lower end of the age 
spectrum.
Rather than rebellious youth, it is their older counterparts 
who are working less. Males forty years their junior are not 
postponing their entrance into the labor force, but older men 
are hastening the age at which they leave work. In the 1950s, 
nearly nine of ten men aged 55 to 64 worked. Thirty years 
later, less than three in four did. The drop is even more 
precipitous for men 65 years of age and over from 48 per 
cent in 1947 to 18 percent in 1981, a 61 percent decline. This 
weakened attachment to the labor force in later years is 
unique to men as well. From 1947 to 1980, the proportion of 
women aged 55 to 64 in the labor force jumped from 24 per 
cent to 42 percent, while the labor force participation rate of 
women over 65 years of age remained unchanged. Clearly, 
older men are no longer viewing work in later years as an
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unavoidable necessity. Working until at least age 65, once a 
social prescription, is turning into a social suggestion.
The length of retirement for men is growing on two fronts: 
men are retiring earlier at the same time their life expectancy 
is increasing. Today, the average male at age 65 can be ex 
pected to live another 15 years. Combined with decisions to 
retire at earlier ages, this greater life expectancy had led to a 
tripling since 1900 of the number of years the average man 
spends outside the labor force. Even over the past two 
decades, the lifetime leisure gains have been consider 
able in 1960, an average of 25.7 years were spent outside 
the labor force, but this figure for men had jumped to 31.0 
years by 1977. After age 14, the number of years men spent 
outside the workforce rose from 10.8 years to 14.0 years 
(Figure 3.3). While women's work effort has lengthened with 
gains in life expectancy to produce a relatively constant level 
of lifetime leisure throughout this century, the appetite of 
men for greater leisure in their later years has not yet been 
sated.
The movement toward earlier retirement among men is 
partially a reflection of changing social attitudes. Once car 
rying the stigma of forced idleness, retirement now has taken 
on a more positive aura of welcomed leisure. More impor 
tantly, however, the shift toward earlier retirement is also a 
response to heightened private and public "subsidization of 
leisure" which allows more men to afford early retirement 
than ever before. A recent study of determinants of planned 
retirement age, based on data from the longitudinal history 
retirement study of the Social Security Administration, 
found that being eligible for social security benefits increases 
the probability of early retirement by 11.1 percent for a 
typical married man and 12.4 percent for a typical single 
woman. 3 Eligibility for a private pension was found to pro 
vide even stronger incentives for retirement between age 62 
and 65. For this reason, social security data also reveal that 
men who had worked in low income jobs those least likely
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to have pension coverage were also the most likely to keep 
working to supplement social security benefits. 4
The expansion of coverage and benefits under both private 
and public retirement systems accounts for the greater finan 
cial security which has fueled decisions to retire early. For 
example, the percentage of workers with private pensions 
more than doubled in the course of 25 years, rising from 22 
percent of the labor force in 1950 to 46 percent in 1975. 
Similarly, the Social Security Act covered 64.5 percent of all 
workers thirty years ago, while in 1980 the figure was 90 per 
cent. During the 1970s, the average monthly benefit for 
retired workers rose 26 percent (after adjusting for 
inflation), while real average weekly earnings declined by 2 
percent. Finally, most pension plans public as well as 
private have lowered the age at which people may retire. 
More than 70 percent of all new social security recipients in 
1978 were less than 65 years of age, and similar trends can be 
found in private retirement systems.
In essence, because "retirement" is a socially accepted 
departure from the labor force, older men have been able to 
seize the leisure gains of an affluent society in a manner im 
possible in earlier generations or for most workers in less 
productive economies. While sociological forces tie younger 
workers to the labor force even in the absence of economic 
need, older men have an "easy out" in early retirement, and 
thus they are one of the few groups which have responded to 
increasing wealth by ceasing to work. Most older men have 
already established their sense of identity and self-esteem 
through their work history, and their psychological needs for 
work are less pressing. For this reason, even as work con 
tinues to provide physical and mental sustenance for some, 
men in their later years are increasingly choosing the option 
of expanded leisure.
The limits to this growth of leisure through early retire 
ment will depend on the willingness of society to subsidize
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the abandonment of work by older men. High inflation rates 
during the 1970s have severely taxed retirement systems, and 
benefits for retirees have grown much faster than their con 
tributions to such systems. The problem is becoming par 
ticularly acute for public systems, including federal social 
security, where political pressures for expanded benefits and 
a "pay as you go" financing structure have combined to 
place the system in serious financial trouble.
In response to these concerns, shifts in government policy 
designed to stem the tide of early retirement are already oc 
curring. The 1977 amendments to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, passed ostensibly to ensure fairer 
treatment of older workers under age 70, may induce them to 
remain in the workforce longer. The ongoing debate on 
social security has raised the prospect of more direct efforts 
to discourage early retirement, including proposals advanced 
by the Reagan administration in 1981 to penalize persons 
taking advantage of early retirement (prior to age 65), to 
provide additional incentives for continued work efforts by 
beneficiaries, and to raise gradually the age of eligibility for 
full retirement benefits from 65 to 68. The intensity of 
political opposition to such changes in social security 
highlights the growing appeal of early retirement. Yet the 
willingness of the rest of society to finance ever-increasing 
leisure in later years still may dictate the upper limit of this 
powerful trend.
The Exodus of Black Men
In addition to older men, the other segment of society ex 
iting the labor force in increasing numbers are black men. If 
the earlier retirement of older men is a testament to the 
benefits of an affluent society, the abandonment of work by 
black men is a sign of the failure of that same labor market 
to provide employment for all groups. There is some element 
of social progress in the declining labor force participation 
of blacks younger blacks are delaying entry into the labor
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market in order to obtain more education, and older blacks 
are increasingly able to retire under expanded disability and 
pension coverage. Yet the overall drop in labor force par 
ticipation among blacks is so precipitous that it cannot be at 
tributed to social advance. Many black men are not leaving 
the labor force to embrace the joys of greater leisure; rather, 
their departure reflects bleak job prospects, an expression of 
discouragement and despair.
Disparities between the labor force participation rates of 
white and black men have arisen only over the past two 
decades. As late as 1960, the labor force participation rates 
of white and black men were identical in fact, from the end 
of Reconstruction until the Great Depression, proportion 
ately more blacks than whites were in the labor force. Since 
that time, participation rates for both whites and blacks have 
plummeted, but not in a similar manner. The decline among 
white males correlates positively with age, but for black 
males there is no such relationship. In all age groups, fewer 
blacks are now in the labor force. Falling from 85 percent in 
1954 to 71 percent in 1981, this new pattern of falling work 
effort among black men is a source of deep concern.
The deviation of black labor force participation from that 
of other groups can be most consistently explained not by the 
presumption of structures of work motivation unique to 
blacks, but rather by the failure of the labor market to fulfill 
the needs of blacks to the extent enjoyed by other groups. 
Notwithstanding the progress made under the Great Society, 
most blacks have remained confined to demeaning, low- 
status jobs which promise little and deliver even less. In these 
work roles, black men have had little opportunity to derive a 
sense of identity or community through participation in the 
labor force, and their self-esteem often has been undermined 
instead of strengthened by poor job opportunities. As Elliot 
Liebow observes, "The streetcorner man wants to be a per 
son in his own right, to be noticed, to be taken account of, 
but in this respect, as well as in meeting his money needs, his
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job fails him." 5 Now "the job and the man are even" after 
having the job fail him, more black men are failing the job.
Even in strict economic terms, the labor market seldom 
meets the black man's needs. More than 16.3 percent of 
black workers had incomes below the poverty level in 1980 in 
spite of their employment. In this context, the withdrawal of 
black men from the labor force is often a sign of rationality 
rather than a symptom of pathology. With transfer 
payments frequently at least as remunerative as work, the 
possibility of not working becomes both a real and predic 
table option. Even though men are not eligible for public 
assistance in half the states, almost 10 percent of black males 
who were heads of households, as well as 25 percent of those 
who were not, earned no income through work. The lack of 
pecuniary rewards from work which fosters this welfare 
dependency is at best a sad commentary on the distribution 
of earnings and employment in America. It is not that 
welfare ceilings are too high wage floors simply are too low 
to lift many black workers and their dependents out of 
poverty. Cast in this light, the willingness and motivation of 
blacks to work seems stronger than one might expect.
The labor market experience of black men can be explain 
ed in various ways, but the dual labor market hypothesis 
provides one of the most persuasive illustrations of their 
plight. In its most simplified form, the basic hypothesis con 
tends that the labor market is divided into two distinct 
segments, one offering relatively high wages, good working 
conditions and job security while the other provides low pay 
ing jobs with poor working conditions and little chance for 
advancement. Workers trapped in secondary markets are 
forced to accept unstable employment, have little assurance 
of due process in their treatment on the job, and often work 
only intermittently due to lack of steady employment. The 
dual labor market approach contains no special theory of 
racial discrimination, but it deals with discrimination as one
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factor which influences labor market segmentation and con 
fines many blacks to low-paying, dead-end jobs.
It is difficult to imagine a reversal of the declines in labor 
force participation among black men in the near future, as 
current developments in the labor market seem likely only to 
exacerbate their current plight. Labor force data strongly 
suggest that the incidence of unemployment is falling in 
creasingly on already disadvantaged groups within American 
society, including blacks. 6 Until the labor market, most like 
ly in response to government policies, becomes more suc 
cessful in meeting the needs of black men, it should come as 
no surprise if growing numbers find preferable alternatives 
to working in legal labor markets.
Work Motivation Amidst 
Poverty and Unemployment
The failure of the labor market to provide steady employ 
ment and adequate incomes has had the greatest impact on 
black men, but such hardship is felt throughout the popula 
tion. Nearly one-half of all poor family heads and over one- 
third of all single poor persons in 1980 worked but were 
unable to earn enough to escape poverty. About one-fifth of 
those poor families actually had two or more persons work 
ing at some time during the year but remained poor. As of 
1979, one million family heads with about four million 
dependents, and another 233,000 unrelated individuals, were 
continuously employed full time but found it impossible to 
work their way out of poverty. Given that work for these 
households does not offer the promise of an adequate in 
come, their continuing attachment to the labor force seems 
surprisingly strong.
The continuing efforts of millions of Americans to find 
jobs in slack labor markets also reflects a deep and lasting 
commitment to work. Even the manner in which we count 
the unemployed ensures that they are among the greatest
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devotees of work by definition the unemployment statistics 
include only those who continue to search actively for 
employment, applying this test without regard for their 
specific job prospects. Those who decide the odds of finding 
work are too slim and give up on job search the 
"discouraged workers" are not counted as among the 
unemployed, even though they may have been forced into 
idleness. This willingness of the jobless to remain in the labor 
force in spite of prolonged unemployment testifies to the 
strength of work motivation on the fringes of the labor 
market.
"/ 'm not listed as unemployed, 
'cause I 've stopped looking."
It is curious that fears of a disintegrating work ethic con 
tinue to surface in an era of almost chronic labor surpluses. 
Over the past two decades, national unemployment rates 
have crept gradually upward, and the estimate of "full 
employment" in the American economy has risen from 4 
percent unemployment under the Kennedy administration to
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at least 6 percent in the Reagan administration. These of 
ficial targets do not count millions of Americans who are too 
discouraged to look for work or who are forced to accept 
part-time jobs, and yet the nation still has not approached 
full employment in any sense for nearly a decade. This per 
sistent joblessness runs directly counter to claims of the im 
minent demise of work: it is difficult to argue that 
Americans are abandoning work in droves when the labor 
market is consistently unable to provide jobs for millions 
who desire work.
The surplus of labor in the national economy is not a new 
phenomenon during most of the post-World War II 
period, the demand for labor has failed to keep pace with the 
supply of job seekers. No doubt, some portion of this 
unemployment is inevitable in a democratic society, as both 
employers and workers freely choose to accept or reject work 
situations. Yet the great bulk of unemployment is neither 
frictional nor voluntary. Due to whatever combination of 
structural barriers and governmental policies, the economy, 
though it has continued to expand, has failed to generate suf 
ficient numbers of jobs in the aggregate or to produce a 
reasonable match between the skills of unemployed workers 
and emerging demands for labor.
In strict economic terms, unemployment today may not be 
the disaster it was in earlier periods. As part of a growing 
system of income supports, our affluent society has weaken 
ed the links between unemployment and poverty. These 
cushions including old age and disability benefits, 
unemployment insurance, food stamps, medicaid, aid to 
families with dependent children and subsidized hous 
ing provide assistance to the unemployed which enables 
them at least to keep body and soul together. Perhaps more 
importantly, the rise in female labor force participation and 
in the number of two-worker households softens the conse 
quences of joblessness for many families 6 in 10 families 
have two or more wage earners. Just as employment does not
56
guarantee an adequate income, unemployment is no longer 
synonymous with abject poverty.
Even when income losses are manageable, however, 
joblessness leaves the unemployed with few opportunities to 
satisfy the social and psychological needs which work 
typically fulfills. The welfare state may fulfill basic physical 
needs, but it does little for self-esteem and cannot provide 
the sense of dignity associated with gainful employment. 
These noneconomic motivations to work seem strong 
enough to prevent precipitous drops in work attachment 
even when workers are guaranteed incomes via transfer 
payments. In four major income support demonstration pro 
jects conducted in the United States, hours of work dropped 
by 1 to 8 percent among men while declining by roughly 20 
percent among women. While these experiments were of 
limited duration and thus might not trigger more permanent 
changes in work habits, current research is consistent with 
the idea that work provides much more than a means of 
economic support. 7
Expansion of Leisure and Nonwork Time
The only pervasive indications of a movement away from 
work is a slow but growing tendency for workers to forego 
further income gains in preference for greater amounts of 
paid leisure. Predictably, with greater affluence the higher 
marginal utility of leisure has caused many workers to trade 
wage and salary hikes for paid holidays and vacations. Tak 
ing more time away from the workplace to enjoy the fruits of 
their labor, Americans spend fewer hours per day, fewer 
days per year, and fewer years of their lives working than 
they did in the past. It is this trend, stemming not from any 
weakening commitment to work but from rational economic 
judgments of the relative value of income and leisure, which 
is reshaping the nature of work in the 1980s.
The shift toward greater leisure in itself is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, the most spectacular shrinkage in
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worktime came in the early part of this century from declines 
in hours worked per week (Table 3-1). In 1900, the average 
nonagricultural worker put in 53 hours of work per week. By 
1940, that number had fallen below 44. Since World War II, 
when the work ethic was supposed to have been on the 
decline, average hours worked per week in manufacturing 
with relatively few part-time workers have stabilized and the 
40-hour workweek has become a surprisingly strong and 
universally recognized social norm. Clearly, while the 
recorded statistics of hours worked do not take into con 
sideration the coffee breaks and other interruptions in work 
that are taken for granted in most American workplaces to 
day, leisure gains are now secured in a manner different 
from the first half of this century.
Table 3-1
Decline in Average Weekly Hours 
of Work Has Slowed Since 1950
Weekly Hours of Work
Hours
1981 1975 1970 1965 1960 1955 1950
38.1 38.7 39.6 40.5 40.5 41.6 41.7
Hours
Weekly Hours of Work
1945 1940 1930 1920 1910 1900
46.1 43.9 47.7 49.8 52.1 53.2
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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The recent decline in average hours worked can be traced 
partly to the growing numbers of workers who voluntarily 
spend only part of the customary workday or workweek on 
the job. From 1963 to 1981, such part-time workers grew in 
numbers from 8.8 million to 14.7 million, rising from 12 to 
nearly 14 percent of the workforce. This jump in part-time 
employment primarily reflects the influx of women into the 
labor force (they are three times as likely as men to seek part- 
time work), although increases in the numbers of young 
workers attending school and older workers seeking fewer 
hours have reinforced this trend (Figure 3.4). Full-time 
workers taken separately have gained only slightly more than 
one-half hour of weekly leisure in the past 13 years, averag 
ing 42.4 hours of work per week in 1981.
This recent plateau in the workweek, however, has not 
halted the growth of leisure time for full-time workers. Since 
1940, much of the gain in free time has come from decreases 
in the workyear achieved through both paid vacations and 
paid holidays. Before 1940, few nonmanagerial workers 
received paid vacations. By 1970, virtually all plant workers 
and office workers in metropolitan areas worked in 
establishments that provided paid vacations, with the 
average full-time worker receiving two full weeks. Similarly, 
the number of paid holidays has more than quadrupled in 
that time span, growing from an average of 2 days in 1940 to 
9 days four decades later. Perhaps the most telling sign of 
workers' continuing appetite for leisure is that full-week 
vacations taken without pay rose between 1968 and 1979 
from 14 to 20 percent of all vacations for men and from 34 to 
39 percent for women. 8 It is this push for vacations and 
holidays plus the increase in part-time workers rather than 
shorter workweeks of full-time workers, which has reduced 
the average annual hours at work during the past four 
decades (Figure 3.4).
The rise in the number of families with two or more wage 
earners may add to the pressure for more time away from the
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Figure 3.4 Average Annual Hours Spent at Work 




1900 1940 1970 1980
Source: Peter Henle, "Recent Growth of Paid Leisure for U.S. Workers," Monthly 
Labor Review (March 1962), pp. 249-257; Geoffrey H. Moore and Janice Neipert 
Hedges, "Trends in Labor and Leisure," Monthly Labor Review (February 1971), 
pp. 3-11; and Economic Report to the President, 1981, p. 274.
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workplace. This push for greater leisure will be partially an 
outgrowth of the relative affluence of multiple income 
households, but it may also reflect an increasing pattern of 
husbands and wives sharing family responsibilities. This 
mutual acceptance of both provider and parenting roles 
would require an added measure of flexibility in work hours, 
and these emerging needs in the modern family may well be 
translated into future demands for paid leisure and shorter 
or more personalized work schedules.
There are few groups within the workforce who have not 
responded to the opportunity for greater leisure. Even the 
upward trend in total hours worked by women can be at 
tributed entirely to new entrants and part-time workers in the 
labor force the interest in paid leisure among full-time 
female workers as incomes rise parallels that of their male 
counterparts. Only dual job holders and overtime workers 
have continued to resist the appeal of greater leisure. Since 
1956, when statistics on moonlighters were first compiled, 
between 4.5 and 5.5 percent of all workers have held two 
jobs, and in recent years the figure has remained around 5.0 
percent with no evident downward trend. Similarly, the 
average hours of overtime worked per week in manufactur 
ing has ranged between 2.4 and 3.9 in the last quarter cen 
tury, hovering near 3.O. 9 Both these exceptions are easily ex 
plained overtime effort often reflects employer steps to 
cope with variations in demand as much as worker desires 
for additional hours, and those workers who seek extra 
hours or second jobs tend to have low earnings and place a 
high value on marginal income gains. Balanced against 
evidence of shrinking workweeks and workyears, these 
limited cases only qualify slightly the broad trend toward 
more time free from the job.
In some sense, it is surprising that leisure has not made 
greater inroads into the world of work. During this century 
alone, productivity has at least quintupled that increase 
means that a labor force of 20 million could produce the
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goods and services sufficient for the lifestyle that our 
ancestors enjoyed in "the golden nineties." Put in another 
way, if workers in 1982 were satisfied to live at the same 
standard of living as their parent did some three decades 
earlier, they could have cut the five-day workweek to three 
days or taken 20 weeks vacation per year. Needless to say, 
five-month vacations are not around the corner, but only 
because most workers choose steadily rising incomes over 
leisure gains. Since 1968, the share of potential pay raises 
translated into leisure growth has averaged roughly 16 per 
cent for full-time employees. 10 This pattern of apportioning 
productivity gains between pecuniary benefits and leisure 




The fear that Americans will abandon work has no ra 
tional basis, and can be advanced only when the many 
motivational forces which bring individuals to the workplace 
are ignored. People work for many different reasons, and 
even when growing affluence enables workers to obtain more 
leisure, such gains are taken in gradual increments of paid 
holidays and vacations. Labor force data suggest that 
Americans are working more, not less, opting for leisure on 
ly when that step is consistent with a continuing identifica 
tion with established work roles. While the absolute 
economic need to work may diminish over time, the desire
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for relative income gains and the social and psychological 
functions of work persist. Those who anticipate a revolution 
against work are likely to be disappointed even as both 
jobs and workers change, the great majority of Americans 
no doubt will continue to find reasons to work.
4 Tales of Work Dissatisfaction
Without work all life goes
rotten. But when work is
soulless, life stifles and dies.
 Albert Camus
Even though most Americans find reasons to remain in the 
labor force, their participation in itself reveals little about 
their satisfaction at the workplace. The persistence of 
reasonably tight labor markets and rising productivity 
lasting into the early 1970s focused new attention on this 
question of worker satisfaction in America. In many ways, 
this concern for the quality of work was a logical and ap 
propriate outgrowth of increasing affluence. It seemed 
natural to expect that work provide not only a reliable and 
adequate income, but also a sense of satisfaction and per 
sonal fulfillment. When the realities of work in modern in 
dustrial society failed to match these rising expectations, the 
"problem" of worker alienation emerged.
In retrospect, it is hard to convey the intensity of the 
debate over work satisfaction or the fervor of warnings 
regarding worker discontent which surfaced in the early 
1970s. Critics of the modern workplace not only perceived 
widespread dissatisfaction within the ranks of the employed, 
but they also feared a trend of rapid disintegration and 
decay. For example, some observers argued that "more and
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more workers and every day this is more apparent are 
becoming disenchanted with the boring, repetitive tasks set 
by a merciless assembly line or by bureaucracy." 1 More im 
portantly, others feared that the prospect of spreading 
dissatisfaction threatened the very foundations of American 
democracy. 2 While few reacted with such total alarm, the 
issue eventually attracted national attention. The Secretary 
of Health, Education, and Welfare in the early 1970s 
ordered a review of the status of work in America, and Presi 
dent Richard Nixon proclaimed that "the most important 
part of the quality of life is the quality of work, and the new 
need for job satisfaction is the key to the quality of work." 3
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The themes of worker alienation and dissatisfaction had 
both intellectual and historical precedents neither the ideas 
nor the psychological theories of human nature on which 
they were premised were particularly new. Yet fears of ram 
pant discontent, based on reports of rising turnover, 
absenteeism, and disruption at the workplace, gained con 
siderable credibility over the past decade. Most of the 
research supporting the presumed rise of work dissatisfac 
tion offered scant evidence of any such trend, relying instead 
on anecdotes and narrow survey results to bolster visions of 
the alienated worker. However, the seriousness with which 
claims of sweeping discontent have been received suggests a 
need for a thorough review of the nature of satisfaction and 
discontent at the American workplace.
Sources of Alienation
The intellectual debate regarding dissatisfaction at the 
workplace has focused primarily on the concept of aliena 
tion. Although the use of the term "alienation" has varied 
considerably, the concept is commonly traced back to Karl 
Marx and to his discussions of the alienation of labor from 
capital and control over the means of production. Marx's 
view of alienation, unlike most contemporary versions, was 
deeply rooted in his critique of capitalism, focusing on issues 
of ownership and class structure rather than on the content 
and nature of work itself. Modern day proclaimers of 
worker discontent usually reject Marx's attack on the 
economic system, but they follow his descriptions of the im 
pact of work on the alienated worker. Marx contended that 
man ''does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself, 
has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not 
develop freely his spiritual and physical powers but is 
physically exhausted and spiritually debased." 4 Certainly the 
image of the oppressive factory was vivid in Marx's mind in 
the mid-nineteenth century, and this perception continues to
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dominate discussions of dissatisfaction at the workplace to 
day.
Contemporary stereotypes of the alienated worker reflect 
little of Marx's class consciousness, emphasizing the more 
subjective reactions of workers to the demands of their jobs. 
Thus, "alienation from work" is variously used to describe 
dissatisfaction with one's job, the experience of work as not 
intrinsically rewarding, and its experience as being insuffi 
ciently self-directed, meaningful, and self-expressive. 5 This 
view of alienation is intimately linked with the lack of oppor 
tunities for personal satisfaction:
Alienation exists when workers are unable to con 
trol their immediate work processes, to develop a 
sense of purpose and function which connects their 
jobs to the overall organization of production, to 
belong to integrated industrial communities, and 
when they fail to become involved in the activity of 
work as a mode of personal self-expression. 6
While Marx's definition of alienation emphasized the in 
herent relationship between labor and capital, more recent 
observers imply that a worker is "alienated" only when he 
feels detached, powerless, isolated or without purpose in his 
work. This subjective use of the term has rendered it virtual 
ly synonymous with generalized themes of work dissatisfac 
tion and discontent.
Studies of work satisfaction since the 1930s have been 
grounded in this concept of alienation, but they have also 
been motivated by a more pragmatic belief that adjustments 
in working conditions or managerial structures might both 
enhance the contentment of workers and improve the pro 
ductivity of industry. Few researchers have been concerned 
with abstract issues of work quality. Instead, most studies 
have sought to establish clear connections between work 
organization, worker attitudes and behavior, and overall
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labor productivity. The recent enthusiasm for discussions of 
work quality and worker participation stems from this belief 
that both workers and employers will gain the hope being 
that increases in work satisfaction and labor productivity 
will be intimately linked. The potential for cooperation be 
tween labor and management is stressed throughout the 
literature as an argument for work reform even in the 
absence of evidence that work dissatisfaction is a serious 
problem.
The concept of alienation has been employed in one other 
sense, as a description of the impact of modern technological 
change on the quality of work. For example, Jacques Ellul 
described today's work as molded by technological advance, 
rendering it by nature "an aimless, useless, and callous 
business, tied to a clock, an absurdity profoundly felt and 
resented by the workers." 7 In the same vein, a popular writer 
viewed problems of meaningless work and alienation as in 
herent in traditional industrial societies and perhaps wholly
68
unresolvable given current production technologies. 8 Even 
those who do not subscribe to theories of technological 
determinism often acknowledge the "general alienating 
tendencies" of modern industrial organizations and 
technologies. 9 However, this latter group is distinguished by 
their belief that "alienating work" can be eliminated, 
vigorously contending that the quality of work can be im 
proved through reform efforts in spite of the effects of 
technological change.
Expectations and Human Nature
In examining claims of worker discontent, it is important 
to consider more than the nature of work itself. No 
job regardless of its content is inherently boring or 
challenging. Work satisfaction is necessarily a subjective 
reaction to the job, reflecting the degree of harmony between 
job demands, personal expectations and individual needs. 
Some may indeed seek exciting responsibilities at the 
workplace, but others may expect or desire little from the 
job. This highly personalized aspect of work satisfaction is 
seldom addressed by work reform advocates who rely heavi 
ly on speculations regarding human nature to support claims 
of dissatisfaction at the workplace.
The view of human nature which has come to dominate 
the debate on work satisfaction and work reform was for 
mulated by psychologist Abraham Maslow. In 1954, Maslow 
set forth in Motivation and Personality a theory of human 
motivation and behavior based on a hierarchy of human 
needs. At the lowest and most immediate level, Maslow 
claimed that physical or survival needs are operative. If these 
needs are satisfied, higher order needs presumably come into 
play for example, recognition and acceptance by peers and 
other social needs. Finally, if these needs are also fulfilled, 
the individual seeks the ultimate goals of self-realization and 
spiritual development. Maslow argued that, while in-
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dividuals may reach various levels in the hierarchy, they all 
follow a similar progression of needs in their personal 
development.
At any level of the hierarchy of needs, the failure to satisfy 
the operative need will supposedly generate frustration and 
discontent. More importantly, the satisfaction of each lower 
level need generates wants of the next highest order. 
Although low-level needs must always be satisfied first, their 
complete fulfillment cannot sustain individual satisfaction, 
leading inevitably to new desires. In Maslow's framework, 
enduring satisfaction can only be achieved through the 
fulfillment of higher order needs.
HIGHER ORDER NEEDS
Maslow's scale of needs has obvious relevance to those in 
terested in finding new ways to motivate workers, and his 
ideas have gained wide acceptance among industrial 
psychologists. Numerous experiments and studies were con 
ducted in the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to refine 
Maslow's hypotheses, and to develop specific correlations 
between work attributes and worker satisfaction which could 
be used as a guide for work reform efforts. Maslow's work 
has provided the theoretical basis for the shift away from an 
exclusive emphasis on economic and other extrinsic rewards 
of work as a means of increasing satisfaction and work ef 
fort within the labor force.
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Most contemporary theories of management and work 
satisfaction are based to some extent on Maslow's hierarchy 
of needs. The ideas of Frederick Herzberg and Douglas 
McGregor have enjoyed the widest acceptance and applica 
tion in the United States. Both Herzberg and McGregor 
focused on the implications of Maslow's view of human 
needs for effective labor-management relations, arguing that 
traditional attempts to motivate workers failed to meet and 
capitalize upon their higher order needs. Their original 
research dealt with white-collar workers, but subsequent 
studies attempted to extend their theories to many other 
work settings. In spite of limitations encountered in develop 
ing models of motivation and behavior applicable to all 
workers, Herzberg and McGregor have played an important 
role in broadening the scope of the debate over worker needs 
and sources of satisfaction.
Herzberg's theory of work satisfaction was based on 
research findings indicating that the variables linked to 
worker discontent were separate and distinct from those tied 
to work satisfaction. 10 He suggested that traditional rewards 
for work money, good working conditions, and leisure 
time could not truly motivate workers. True motivators, 
Herzberg claimed, are those job attributes which stimulate 
individual growth and fulfill Maslow's higher order needs 
for recognition, achievement, and responsibility. Traditional 
rewards, which Herzberg termed hygiene factors, could pro 
duce apathetic workers at best, while only enriched or 
autonomous work roles could sustain motivated workers.
Douglas McGregor approached the problems of work 
motivation and satisfaction from a slightly different perspec 
tive, but reached similar conclusions regarding the impor 
tance of appeals to higher order needs. McGregor examined 
two alternative theories of personnel management, which he 
labeled theory X and theory Y. 11 Theory X, the traditional 
management style, held that workers prefer limited respon-
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sibility and greater security, inherently dislike work and can 
be motivated only by coercion, control, and punishment. 
Theory Y portrayed workers as naturally desiring work and 
responsibility, and as being best motivated by challenging 
work which used their capabilities fully. McGregor believed 
that most jobs did not fully challenge workers, and that 
theory X management styles failed to capitalize on their 
natural inclinations to work. Redesigned organizations and 
broader, more autonomous jobs along the lines of theory Y 
presumably could evoke greater work efforts.
The relatively optimistic views of human nature underly 
ing the work of Maslow, Herzberg and McGregor the im 
age of workers as reaching for ever-higher goals have led 
many to prejudge reactions to work. For example, a public 
opinion analyst has concluded that when jobs do not offer 
opportunities for self-fulfillment, workers "retaliate by 
holding back their commitment, if not their labor." 12 French 
social philosopher Ellul opined "... it is in work that 
human beings develop and affirm their personality. . . . 
When the human being is no longer responsible for his work 
and no longer figures in it, he feels spiritually outraged." 13 
In these and many other instances, Maslow's observation 
that many individuals never reach the pursuit of higher order 
needs seems forgotten.
Nevertheless, attacks on the modern workplace have 
flourished. Although the evidence may not be persuasive, 
some critics have found presumed signs of worker 
withdrawal, resentment and dissatisfaction, warning of 
potential declines in productivity growth as a result. 14 Others 
have cited alleged declines in work discipline, motivation and 
satisfaction, claiming that workers suffer "a loss of in 
dividuality, dignity and self-respect." 15 The range of prob 
lems associated with perceived drops in work satisfaction is 
overwhelming: increases in job turnover, absenteeism, 
strikes and work-related accidents; deterioration of product
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quality, production standards, worker mental health and 
discipline; heightened feelings of isolation and political im 
potence among workers; and declines in national economic 
growth and the quality of life. Yet little serious research has 
been undertaken to document these trends or to establish 
causal relationships between perceived problems and issues 
of work satisfaction. In the absence of such evidence, tales 
of work dissatisfaction provide topics of interesting specula 
tion but an inadequate basis for making work reform a high 
priority in labor policy.
Examining Trends at Work
The search for "hard" data to support claims of 
widespread or growing dissatisfaction cannot avoid assump 
tions about the causal relationships between worker attitudes 
and behavior. In the literature on worker dissatisfaction, 
higher quit rates, absenteeism, accident-frequency rates, and 
increased disruptions through strikes and other work stop 
pages are all assumed to be expressions of worker discontent. 
These causal connections are extremely difficult to prove, 
but strong trends in such areas at least would lend greater 
plausibility to assertions of rising dissatisfaction at the 
workplace. If job turnover were on the upswing, for in 
stance, one would have to account for such changes in other 
ways before dismissing themes of worker discontent.
Unfortunately for critics of the modern workplace, the 
measurable evidence in support of theories of worker aliena 
tion is surprisingly weak and mostly anecdotal. Even without 
questioning the presumed causal relationships between work 
satisfaction and behavior, employment data generally pro 
vide little basis for contentions of shifting work patterns 
stemming from worker discontent. Where changes in labor 
market trends are significant, more obvious and immediate 
explanations abound. Otherwise, the data demonstrate far 
more continuity than change.
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Data on job turnover in studies of work satisfaction pro 
vide a useful example. The frequency with which workers 
quit their jobs may seem related to satisfaction at work, but 
historical trends suggest that overall employment conditions 
are far more important as a factor in fluctuating turnover 
rates. Regardless of their relative satisfaction or discontent, 
workers are more likely to leave their jobs in tight labor 
markets, while holding on to their positions during periods 
of high unemployment (Figure 4.1). George Strauss under 
took an exhaustive review of fluctuations in quit rates be 
tween 1958 and 1972, and concluded that "practically all of 
the variations can be explained by changes in factors such as 
unemployment, relative hours and earnings rates, and the 
age, sex, and racial composition of the workforce." 16 When 
econometric analysis is used to control for these factors, the 
remaining variations in turnover rates which could be at 
tributed to work dissatisfaction are not significant.
Labor market trends in other areas also offer meager sup 
port for claims of burgeoning discontent among American 
workers. Rates of absenteeism for U.S. workers have shown 
no significant trend in recent years, declining slightly during 
the 1974-75 recession but generally remaining stable 
throughout the decade at 3.5 percent of usual full-time 
hours. 17 Incidence rates for occupational injury and illness 
have climbed slightly since 1973, but are likely to reflect 
federal regulations generating better statistics rather than 
more industrial accidents. Wage-related concerns continue 
to dominate union-management disputes accounting an 
nually since 1969 for 55 to 85 percent of all time lost in 
strikes and the percent of total working time lost due to 
work stoppages in the late 1970s was among the lowest levels 
of the postwar period, with no discernible upward trend. 18 
Strikes associated with issues most directly related to job 
content (division of work, supervision, workload, work rules 
and assignments) have rarely caused more than 5 percent of
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Co 
lonial Times to 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 
181-182; and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 
1982, pp. 133, 138.
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total days idle in any given year, and also have not percep 
tibly increased.
Recognizing that current labor market trends, with their 
tenuous causal connection to worker alienation, offer 
minimal support, critics of the workplace more frequently 
rely on survey results and other subjective measures of 
dissatisfaction to bolster claims of rising worker discontent. 
The attempt to gauge worker feelings and reactions is cer 
tainly legitimate, but it also raises a morass of questions 
regarding the objectivity of survey methodologies and the 
significance of poll results. Only a careful review of survey 
approaches can reconcile conflicting results and provide a 
persuasive assessment of the relative satisfaction of 
American workers.
Are Workers Miserably Content?
At first glance, the scores of surveys on work satisfaction 
appear rife with contradictions. Taken in the aggregate, they 
seem to portray workers as both satisfied with their jobs and 
unhappy in their work. The survey results and conclusions 
depend to a great extent on the methodology 
employed how questions are phrased and what feelings or 
attitudes are viewed as relevant to an individual's satisfac 
tion with work. If one fails to look beyond superficial 
reports, survey results appear wholly contradictory and con 
fusion reigns.
One approach to measuring worker discontent is simply to 
ask people how satisfied they are with their jobs. This basic 
methodology has been employed for over three decades, and 
the findings of Gallup polls and other surveys of this type 
provide the only longitudinal data available on work 
satisfaction. The results of these surveys have been amazing 
ly constant over time: between 81 and 92 percent of all 
workers have consistently reported that they are generally
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satisfied with the work they do (Table 4-1). The remaining 
portion of the labor force expressing dissatisfaction should 
not be forgotten, but this relatively high level of reported 
contentment clashes sharply with the assumptions of those 
who have viewed work trends with increasing alarm.
Table 4-1 Most Workers Are Generally 
"Satisfied" With Their Work
Year Source1
1958 Survey Research Center2
1962 National Opinion Research Center
1963 Gallup Poll 2
1964 Survey Research Center 
	(University of California)
1964 National Opinion Research Center2
1965 Gallup Poll 2
1966 Gallup Poll 2
1966 Gallup Poll 2
1969 Survey Research Center
1969 Gallup Poll 2
1971 Survey Research Center
1971 Gallup Poll 2
1971 Gallup Poll 2
1973 Gallup Poll 2
1973 Survey Research Center
1974 National Opinion Research
1975 National Opinion Research
1976 National Opinion Research
1977 Survey Research Center
1978 National Opinion Research
1980 National Opinion Research






























1. Wording of questions and nature of sample vary by source, possibly affecting 
results.
2. Sample includes males only; all others include both sexes.
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A more complex series of work satisfaction studies has 
focused on correlations between overall job satisfaction and 
various aspects of an individual's employment. In this 
framework, researchers have been concerned less with the 
level of overall satisfaction expressed by workers than with 
the specific job attributes which seem to enhance satisfac 
tion. These studies are of particular importance to advocates 
of "challenging" work, for they directly address the ques 
tion of what matters to workers.
The survey results do not render a clear verdict on the 
origins of work satisfaction. Numerous job attributes both 
related and irrelevant to the intrinsic nature of work have 
been shown to be of some significance to the overall satisfac 
tion of workers. Perhaps the most exhaustive attempt to link 
job attributes and work satisfaction, conducted by the 
University of Michigan's Survey Research Center in 1969, 
suggested that aspects of supervision and the work environ 
ment are at least as important as the nature of the job itself 
in fostering work satisfaction (Table 4-2). Subsequent 
analyses conducted in 1973 and 1977 confirmed the conclu 
sion that adequate resources (including supervision) to do a 
job well were as closely linked to work satisfaction as the 
level of challenge intrinsic in any particular type of work. 19
When survey methodologies are changed, however, the 
apparent relationships between attributes and overall job 
satisfaction also shift. The University of Michigan Survey 
Research Center correlated measures of overall job satisfac 
tion with worker statements regarding the most positive 
aspects of their jobs. In contrast, the 1971 study by Sheppard 
and Herrick asked respondents if their jobs included a 
number of presumably desirable qualities (e.g., oppor 
tunities for growth, interesting work), and if they were 
bothered by the absence of any such qualities. The 
methodology of the latter study contained a much greater 
emphasis on intrinsic work rewards than the earlier Michigan
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study, and solicited negative rather than positive statements 
about work from its respondents. Predictably, Sheppard and 
Herrick's findings indicated a stronger role for the content 
of jobs in determining work satisfaction.
Table 4-2 Good Supervision Is At Least 






Having a supervisor who takes a personal 
interest in those he/she supervises and 
goes out of his/her way to praise good work 
(N = 1237)
Receiving adequate help, assistance, 
authority, time, information, machinery, 
tools and equipment to do the job 
(N = 1494)
Having a supervisor who does not super 
vise too closely (N = 1246)
Job content
Having autonomy in deciding matters that 
affect one's work (N = 1508)
Having a job with "enriching" demands 
(e.g., a job that demands that one learn 
new things, have a high level of skill, be 
creative, and do a variety of different 






Source: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, Survey of Working Con 
ditions, November 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 
432.
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It is not that there are "right" and "wrong" ways to 
gauge satisfaction in worker surveys. One simply must 
wonder whether research findings of this nature mirror the 
structure of surveys more than they reflect the attitudes of 
workers. The great majority of workers indicate they are 
satisfied with their work, but when asked if they would 
choose the same jobs again, the percentage of positive 
responses drops sharply. 20 Similarly, while good pay con 
tinues to correlate highly with job satisfaction, over three- 
fourths of all Americans say they would refuse to leave an 
enjoyable job for one that pays more. 21 Does this mean that 
workers are content, miserable, or merely resigned to their 
current roles? It depends to a great extent on how and what 
they are asked.
Some correlations between job satisfaction and 
demographic characteristics seem relatively clear satisfac 
tion generally increases with age and income, tends to be 
higher among whites than among blacks, and is less common 
among blue-collar workers above age 30 than among white- 
collar employees in similar age groups. As George Strauss 
notes, "there is [also] considerable evidence that, at least for 
some workers, dissatisfaction is directly related to short job 
cycles, surface-attention work, low autonomy and control of 
the pace of work, and the lack of challenge." 22 Beyond these 
basic principles, there is broad room for interpretation; yet 
any coherent and defensible view of work satisfaction must 
attempt to account for variations in survey results, and must 
be firmly rooted in realistic images of the nature of workers 
and their jobs in contemporary society.
A Look at Methodology
By necessity, work satisfaction surveys assume that the 
subjective responses of workers accurately reflect their 
thoughts and feelings regarding work. While there are few 
alternatives in exploring job satisfaction, this self-reporting
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of attitudes is plagued by methodological shortcomings. In 
particular, there is reason to believe that surveys on work 
satisfaction may (1) reflect attempts to maintain self-esteem 
rather than the actual feelings of workers; (2) fail to measure 
the full diversity of worker needs and expectations in gaug 
ing job satisfaction; and (3) assume causal relationships be 
tween work and personal satisfaction which are subject to 
question. These three general concerns provide a basis for 
understanding the apparent contradictions in recent research 
findings on satisfaction at the workplace.
The importance of work to self-esteem poses the greatest 
problem for survey methodologies. The instinct to protect a 
positive self-image can lead in many directions, depending 
on the structure and phraseology of survey questions. 
Workers may wish to seem generally satisfied at work, lest 
they offer appearances of failure or resignation; however, 
when asked about specific work attributes, a concern for 
self-esteem could bolster incentives to "blame" the job for 
not utilizing their full potential. Thus, many workers can be 
both content with their jobs and "bothered" by the lack of 
autonomy, responsibility or challenge at work. There is no 
real contradiction the knowledge that jobs are supposed to 
be satisfying, interesting, and challenging simply encourages 
us to react differently to questions of overall satisfaction 
than to inquiries regarding the adequacy of specific job at 
tributes.
The limitations of subjective indices of work satisfaction 
have been acknowledged by most analysts, although usually 
in attempts to disarm their critics. A cogent treatment of the 
problems inherent in self-reporting is found in George 
Strauss' critique of research on work satisfaction:
There is no reason to believe that attitude questions 
are answered with complete honesty or that con 
scious or even unconscious attitudes accurately 
reflect a worker's objective situation. When a
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worker reports that he is 'satisfied' with his job, it 
may mean only that his self-respect forces him to 
answer this way; . . . This is not an attempt to 
deceive the interviewer; one's need for mental 
balance (to reduce cognitive dissonance) may re 
quire one to believe that he is really satisfied. 23
Depending on the question posed, the link between work and 
self-esteem can create an exaggerated sense of satisfaction at 
the workplace, or an underestimation of worker content 
ment with uninteresting or unchallenging tasks. The observa 
tion that feelings are "escape routes," ways of coping with 
and manipulating one's environment, has profound implica 
tions for the study of work satisfaction. 24
In a similar manner, the usefulness of surveys in gauging 
work satisfaction is limited by the inability to incorporate the 
diversity of personal expectations and needs into a useful 
research methodology. The discovery that many jobs are 
repetitive, unchallenging, or devoid of opportunities for per 
sonal growth in itself tells us nothing about the satisfaction 
of workers they may expect nothing more from their jobs, 
or actually appreciate the absence of strenuous demands. 
There are many substitutes for an appreciation of the intrin 
sic nature of one's work, ranging from social life in a com 
munity of workers to economic security and the pursuit of 
leisure. The fundamental determinant of work satisfaction is 
the degree of harmony between job attributes and worker ex 
pectations, with both perceptions of the nature of work and 
the hopes or needs of workers varying tremendously. 
Analyses which portray the workforce as filled with aspiring 
psychologists and sociologists project a set of values which 
ignores the true richness and diversity of human aspirations.
The temptation to view all workers as seeking fulfillment 
or self-actualization stems from a misinterpretation of the 
work of Maslow, and perhaps even from flaws within the
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original theory itself. Contrary to the concept of a self- 
propelling hierarchy of needs, David McClelland and others 
suggest that people differ considerably in their needs and 
priorities. They do not necessarily pursue "higher order" 
needs when more immediate ones are reasonably satisfied, 
and studies reveal that many workers prefer working with 
their hands rather than their heads. 25 Yet the methodology 
implicit in work satisfaction survey data does not respond ef 
fectively to this diversity of workers. Even when research 
designs have attempted to assess worker expectations and 
disappointments, the survey questions are biased again, to 
ask if one is bothered by the limitations of a job or hoped for 
more is to touch upon one's self-image and provoke a defen 
sive response.
Finally, assumptions of causality also render the 
methodology of work satisfaction research vulnerable to 
criticism. Virtually all surveys assume that work attributes 
serve as a causal factor in determining levels of satisfaction 
in varying job roles, but it is equally plausible that an in 
dividual's level of satisfaction influences the choice of jobs 
or work roles. 26 Thus, the traditional assumption of causali 
ty which posits work satisfaction as the dependent variable is 
not self-evident; more importantly, a reversal of this
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assumption would invalidate most work satisfaction studies. 
While polling techniques can contribute to our knowledge of 
worker attitudes, these criticisms of survey methodologies 
suggest the need for considerable caution in the use and in 
terpretation of findings regarding work satisfaction.
A Realistic View of Work Satisfaction
The research of critics of the modern workplace has 
played an important role in updating the historical context 
for understanding worker needs, albeit at the risk of 
overstating the importance of job content and attributes. In 
an affluent society with large discretionary incomes and ris 
ing expectations, adequate pay and working conditions are 
no longer the sole factors influencing work satisfaction. A 
balanced and realistic view of work satisfaction, one consis 
tent with the bulk of current research findings, must 
recognize that there is no single determinant of relative con 
tentment at work. As we mighty guess, the evidence suggests 
that most Americans now bring a wide array of needs and ex 
pectations to the workplace, and their "satisfaction" is a 
composite of reactions and feelings to the many aspects of 
their job. Indeed, similar conditions have prevailed from 
time immemorial. Jacob's working conditions, the Bible tells 
us, were harsh and the wages were meager, but the 
nonpecuniary rewards of his labor were adequate to keep 
him on the job for 14 years.
This is not to say that the adequacy of salaries and wages 
has lost its importance in the labor market. To the contrary, 
there are strong indications that most workers continue to 
place a major emphasis on traditional work rewards, at least 
until reaching a level of considerable affluence. The data 
from the University of Michigan Survey Research Center 
showed that in every age, occupation, marital, or educa 
tional category, those with incomes under $5,000 (in 1969) 
were more than twice as likely to be dissatisfied as those with
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incomes above $10,000. Both the likelihood that men will 
work second jobs and that women will enter the labor force 
decrease as incomes rise, and workers' decisions to retire are 
based heavily on the adequacy of pension or other retirement 
benefits. Even industry quit rates reflect the significance of 
income as a factor in job satisfaction: in 1981, the three 
durable goods manufacturing industries with the lowest 
wages had the highest quit rates, preserving a strong inverse 
relationship between wage levels and quit rates which has 
held true in both durable and nondurable goods manufactur 
ing for many years.
Perhaps the most significant expressions of priorities from 
workers themselves suggest that pay has retained a dominant 
position among job attributes. While labor unions may 
underemphasize issues of work quality, wages nonetheless 
continue to be the central issue in most labor disputes in re 
cent years, almost two of three days lost in strikes were the 
result of battles over wages and benefits. In the same vein, a 
1977 opinion survey revealed that more than three-fourths of 
workers who responded would prefer a 10 percent raise over 
more interesting work. 27 Clearly, many workers have not 
reached an income level where they would be willing to trade 
higher wages for greater intrinsic rewards at work, causing 
union leaders to conclude, "If you want to enrich the job, 
enrich the pay check." 28
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The awareness that wages are important neither denies 
that many jobs are unrewarding nor asserts that workers 
holding unpleasant jobs are happy. It simply serves to ques 
tion the assumption that workers would sacrifice much of 
their pay for "better quality" work. This attachment of 
workers to what they perceive as a better standard of living 
must give pause to those who would "improve" work quality 
by shifting resources to work reform experiments.
In light of the truly "dehumanizing" nature of some jobs, 
particularly in machine-dominated industries, it is surprising 
that workers are able to derive any satisfaction from their 
work. Yet sociological studies of the most trying work set 
tings have shown that people can find pleasure at work, even 
when they fail to derive satisfaction from the content of their 
jobs. Workers frequently respond to the miseries of tedious 
or distasteful tasks by creating an informal community at the 
workplace, fulfilling social needs which may be at least as 
important as occupational goals. Goran Palm vividly por 
trays the phenomenon:
It is precisely when work is felt to be joyless and in 
human that the need for joy and human contact 
becomes so palpable that it breaks out where one 
least expects it. In the midst of drudgery. As a 
powerful counteracting force; as a means of protest 
and enduring; as unexpected dandelions on an 
asphalted road. 29
No doubt the search for community is a means of adapting, 
of adjusting and surviving. While not an argument for 
unrewarding work, this solidarity among workers does help 
explain why Americans are not abandoning factories in 
droves. Rather than emphasizing the nature of their jobs, 
workers will make family and friends the focus of their lives.
The capacity to adapt to repetitive or uninteresting work 
has been viewed by critics of the workplace with mixed emo-
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tions. Calling this capacity "remarkable," one perceptive 
analyst goes on to argue that the demands of work are prob 
ably fairly consonant with the values and aspirations of the 
blue-collar labor force, and that the typical worker with an 
"alienating" job is probably satisfied with a life organized 
around leisure, family and consumption. 30 Others take a far 
more pessimistic view of the capacity for adaptation, one 
which emphasizes necessity and oppression:
. . . the constant exercise of impersonal labor has 
resulted in the total depersonalization of the 
laborer. He has been shaped by his work, used by 
it, mechanized, and assimilated. 31
In this sense, the ability and willingness of workers to adapt 
to unrewarding work is both their salvation and their 
curse helping them to survive work which they have no 
choice but to accept, while also ensuring the continued 
presence of such work in the labor market by virtue of their 
willingness to accept it. With both the needs and the choices 
of many workers thus limited, harsh work is not soon to 
disappear.
The aggregate level of dissatisfaction in the labor force 
stemming from unrewarding work remains difficult to 
measure with any certainty. There are some horrible jobs to 
be filled, and no doubt there are many workers who are 
generally unhappy with their lot. Yet the case for viewing the 
American workforce as a teeming mass of discontent is un 
convincing. The great majority of American workers prob 
ably fall somewhere in the middle, feeling generally 
"satisfied" with their jobs and yet always finding aspects of 
work they would love to change. More importantly, these 
middle ranks are not likely to dwindle substantially the 
great diversity of needs and hopes brought to the workplace 
virtually guarantees reactions of partial fulfillment, and 
basic human ambivalence toward work ensures some degree 
of mixed feelings. Just as our imperfect labor market fails to
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provide work for all members of the labor force, it also falls 
short of a perfect match between worker expectations and 
job demands. And so the love-hate relationship with work 
continues.
Even if we reject images of a workforce burgeoning with 
discontent, the quality of work in America may still be a 
source of legitimate concern. If there were clear indications 
that work was becoming harsher or less challenging over 
time, that certainly would be cause for alarm. Furthermore, 
if the potential for redesigning jobs and reforming the 
workplace seemed great, humanitarian concerns alone would 
compel us to act. The critics of the modern workplace have 
made an important contribution to labor policy by raising 
these implicit questions. The future of their cause will de 
pend largely on whether we believe the problem is growing 
more serious, and whether we believe we can significantly 
change the outcome at costs society would be willing to pay.

5 The Changing Nature of Work
After you've done a thing the
same way for two years, look
it over carefully. After five
years, look at it with suspicion.
And after ten years, throw it
away and start all over.
 Alfred Edward Perlman,
former president of New
York Central Railroad
One way of examining whether the "problem" of work 
satisfaction is growing more serious is by assessing the ever- 
changing nature of work itself. Today's jobs are con 
siderably different from those of a century ago and even a 
few decades ago, with some work roles dwindling as new 
ones emerge. We have fewer farmers but more computer 
specialists than ever before. Even if the "habit" of working 
hasn't changed much, the experience of working and the 
demands of the labor market may have little in common with 
that of prior generations.
The nature of work constitutes only half of the work 
satisfaction equation, with the hopes and expectations of 
workers carrying at least equal importance. Yet trends in the 
content and structure of work including changes in the 
work environment, in skill requirements, and in the degree 
of worker autonomy and control do set limits for potential
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satisfaction at the workplace. If growing segments of the 
labor force are pushed into jobs characterized by repetitive 
or unrewarding tasks, the threat of growing discontent 
among workers must be taken seriously. In contrast, if skill 
requirements in the labor market are rising and employment 
in harsh or unpleasant occupations falling, claims of 
burgeoning dissatisfaction in the modern workforce become 
much less plausible.
The most visible trends in the nature of work, such as the 
overall shift toward white-collar and service employment, 
tell us surprisingly little about prospects for work satisfac 
tion among future generations of workers. Yet if we look 
beyond these generalizations, there are some encouraging 
signs the percentage of unskilled jobs has declined steadily, 
the most boring and punishing tasks have disappeared and 
those that survive are increasingly being done by machines 
rather than men. There also remain some disconcerting 
trends, including the lack of uniform gains in skill re 
quirements and the threat of displacement of low-skilled 
workers through automation and rapid technological in 
novation. These changes do not eliminate possibilities for 
satisfaction at the workplace, but they do threaten to disrupt
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the lives of many workers during a period of painful read 
justment.
The Growth of the Service Sector
Classic critiques of industrial work are increasingly 
misdirected, for they focus more on anachronisms than on 
current labor market conditions. By weight of numbers, 
secretaries now deserve more scrutiny than autoworkers. 
Public schoolteachers outnumber all the production workers 
in the chemical, oil, rubber, plastic, paper and steel in 
dustries combined. Just as the industrial revolution reduced 
the portion of American workers laboring on farms from 
over 40 percent to less than 3 percent, a contemporary 
transformation of work is steadily undermining the relative 
importance of manufacturing as a generator of jobs. The of 
fice is replacing the factory as the most common workplace, 
and employment is shifting to the service sector of the 
economy with ever-increasing speed (Figure 5.1).
These broad occupational trends are not newly 
discovered in fact, references to the burgeoning service sec 
tor have become so frequent as to seem trite. Agriculture, 
manufacturing and mining, which once dictated the basic 
structure of the labor market, no longer represent the typical 
workplace. A sizable and growing segment of the population 
does not have even a secondary relationship to the produc 
tion or distribution of goods, instead providing an array of 
services of unprecedented scope and diversity. In the United 
States, growth in the service sector accounted for 84 percent 
of all additional jobs created in the three decades following 
1950, and virtually every major industrial country in the 
world now has at least half its labor force in this tertiary sec 
tor. l These trends emphasize that, while the problems of the 
assembly line remain a source of concern, the nature of work 
in service industries will have a greater role in shaping future 
trends in job satisfaction.
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Figure 5.1 Employment Has Shifted Steadily 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Co 
lonial Times to 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 139; 
and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1981, pp. 
180-181.
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The shift toward service employment is in many ways a 
direct result of rising affluence and technological advance. 
With machine-supported manufacturing requiring a declin 
ing share of the nation's overall work effort, Americans have 
been able to purchase and to provide services which earlier 
generations never contemplated. No doubt, the surge of 
women into the labor force has strengthened this demand for 
personal services, but increasing affluence alone would have 
aroused a growing appetite for the many amenities of a ser 
vice economy. Aided by technological advances in fields 
ranging from health care to home entertainment, the growth 
of the service sector is now altering our most basic concepts 
of work and destroying traditional links between work and 
physical effort. Increasingly, we engage in "abstract" work 
with symbols instead of tools, producing reports rather than 
making bread. Only an affluent society could afford the lux 
ury of freeing so many of its workers from the production 
process.
Along with the shift from the manufacturing to the service 
sector, a parallel transformation of the labor market can be 
seen in the movement from blue-collar to white-collar 
employment (Table 5-1). Farming was the most common oc 
cupation in 1900 and blue-collar workers were most 
numerous in 1940, but by 1981 slightly more than half of the 
workforce held white-collar jobs. In 1900, unskilled laborers 
outnumbered managers and professionals, household ser 
vants were more common than professionals, and unskilled 
workers filled one-third of all blue-collar jobs. In contrast, 
managers and professionals today outnumber unskilled 
laborers five to one, professionals are 10 times more 
prevalent than household servants, and f craftsmen and 
semiskilled workers comprise nearly 90 percent of the blue- 
collar workforce. The long term trend is clear white-collar 
employment has grown dramatically at the expense of farm 
and unskilled blue-collar work.
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Table 5-1 Occupational Distribution 
from 1900 to 1981
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Part of this growth in professional and managerial ranks 
reflects the increasing size and complexity of organizations, 
as well as the growing importance of research and 
managerial functions in the use of advanced technologies. 
Yet some portion of this surge in white-collar employment 
must also be viewed as "non-essential" a host of vice 
presidents, special assistants and consultants once con 
sidered unnecessary now thrive in an affluent society. For ex 
ample, the ratio of nonproduction to production workers in 
manufacturing has doubled in less than four decades, from 
14 percent in 1943 to 28 percent in 1978, demonstrating that 
the requirement to mobilize for maximum production during 
World War II rendered substantial managerial layers ex-
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pendable. Staffing patterns in the military reflect a similar 
trend: with armed forces of 2.1 million, we now have more 
admirals and generals than during the last world war when 
our forces totalled 12 million. Of course, judgments regard 
ing "necessary" staffing levels are always relative, and the 
growth of professional and managerial ranks may generate 
qualitative improvements not easily measured through 
statistical data. Even in this context, however, the economy 
appears "featherbedded" with jobs which could not be sup 
ported by a less wealthy society.
Better Or Just Cleaner?
Intuitively, these trends toward white-collar jobs and ser 
vice employment seem to reflect improvements in the quality 
of work. Yet such quick reactions to the potential for job 
satisfaction stem more from our biases regarding social class 
and status than from any realistic assessment of changes in 
the nature of work. In particular, the terms "white-collar" 
and "blue-collar" offer no relative assessment of requisite 
job skills, and are a reflection of
... a system of social stratification that regards 
office work as a higher-status occupation than fac 
tory work, administration as more prestigious than 
manual labor, or, indeed, any occupation related 
directly to the production of goods. 2
A closer look at our "white-collar" and "blue-collar" 
categories reveals a wide range of skill levels, work en 
vironments and job attributes in both groups, telling us very 
little about the likelihood of job satisfaction in white-collar 
versus blue-collar roles.
Ultimately, the simplistic dichotomy of "white-collar" 
and "blue-collar" employment masks as much as it reveals. 
Neither term provides a meaningful basis for categorizing 
the nature of various jobs often the distinction reflects lit-
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tie more than the relative cleanliness of work settings. Many 
blue-collar jobs actually require more skill and provide more 
challenge than white-collar roles, and the shift toward white- 
collar employment may represent more of a lateral move 
ment than an improvement in work quality. While clerical 
workers may enjoy a more pleasant environment, the tasks 
of a skilled craftsman in the factory demand more talent and 
engender more pride. By their nature, classifications which 
lump together mailmen and physicists, tool and diemakers 
and sweepers, are not useful predictors of work content or of 
the potential for satisfaction on the job.
The shift toward the service sector offers even fewer clues 
regarding prospects for work satisfaction, again because of 
the broad range of jobs encompassed by the category. While 
many police detectives and haute cuisine chefs may be 
challenged by their work, the bulk of service jobs are not of 
such high quality. The legions of janitors, dishwashers and 
hospital attendants at the bottom of the wage scale normally 
perform the most unpleasant and tedious tasks, and the ad 
vantages of their lot compared to that of factory workers are 
hard to see. Certainly many service workers enjoy less status 
and lower pay than their counterparts on the assembly line, 
fulfilling roles associated with servility and held in low 
esteem. While more adequate wages for those in the worst 
service jobs would alleviate some of these concerns, employ 
ment in the service sector surely is no guarantee of a fate bet 
ter than that suffered in segments of blue-collar manufactur 
ing.
If increases in white-collar and service employment are 
poor indicators of prospects for job satisfaction, part of the 
reason may be that structural changes in the labor market 
point in many directions. A comparison of recent occupa 
tional shifts with past trends in job satisfaction by occupa 
tion provides a useful illustration (Figure 5.2). Within ex 
panding occupational sectors, professionals and managers
Figure 5.2 Employment Growth Is Occurring in Occupations with Both High and 
Low Historical Levels of Job Satisfaction
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Source: Average job satisfaction by occupation derived from Robert P. Quinn and Graham L. Staines, The 1977 Quality of 
Employment Survey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Survey Research Center, 1979), p. 306; employment growth data from U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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historically have enjoyed above-average levels of work 
satisfaction, while clerical and service workers have been 
relatively dissatisfied with their jobs. Occupations represent 
ing a dwindling share of national employment demonstrate a 
similar ambiguity laborers and unskilled workers have 
always expressed considerable dissatisfaction with their 
work, but farmers have consistently registered the highest 
contentment of any occupational category. On balance, the 
growth of professional/management roles and the decline in 
unskilled laborers probably are of greater significance than 
less promising trends, but the implications for overall job 
satisfaction are far from clear.
A more sophisticated way of evaluating changes in the 
nature of work is to look directly at shifts in aggregate job 
skill requirements over time. To avoid the vague assump 
tions implicit in the use of broad occupational categories, it 
is necessary to assess the combined effect of shifts in overall 
occupational distribution and in skill levels of specific oc 
cupations on aggregate job skill requirements. Following this 
approach, one study suggests that the distribution of skill re 
quirements narrowed between 1960 and 1976 both low- 
skilled and high-skilled jobs dwindled in this period, while 
those with moderate skill requirements increased. 3 Some un 
skilled positions have disappeared, enhancing the potential 
for satisfying work, but work roles have not uniformly im 
proved and the loss of high-skilled positions may clash 
sharply with rising expectations and education levels in the 
workforce.
The evidence of occupational shifts or fluctuations in skill 
levels fails to support claims of uniform improvements or 
deterioration in work quality. The economy has continued to 
generate stifling and menial work: in the four largest expand 
ing occupational groups (secretaries, of whom there are 5.0 
million; food service, 4.4 million; retail clerks, 3.1 million; 
drivers and delivery, 2.9 million), there are neither signs of
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rapid change nor hopes of immediate advances in work 
quality. Some jobs are now cleaner, safer or more in 
teresting, but others offer less freedom and require fewer 
skills. In this sense, accounts of the demise of blue-collar 
work or the emergence of a service economy are 
misleading they usually imply improvements in the quality 
of work or the potential for job satisfaction. A more realistic 
view recognizes that there is more continuity than change in 
the labor market, and that white-collar or service jobs are 
not necessarily "better" in offering hope for work satisfac 
tion.
Technology: Threat or Panacea?
If there is a driving force behind occupational change, it 
lies in the continuing process of technological innovation. 
From the invention of the wheel to the introduction of the 
computer, technological change has shaped the structure and 
content of work, moving the labor force from farm to fac 
tory to office. Invariably, the prospect of rapid technological 
advance has generated both hopes and fears ranging from 
Utopian visions of a workless society to modern-day Lud 
dites who bemoan the potential loss of skills and displace 
ment of workers. Even as the process of technological in 
novation generates steadily-rising levels of societal affluence, 
the debate over the impact of new technologies on work 
quality and the potential for job satisfaction persists.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the prophecies of 
"technological optimists" abounded. Technology, many 
believed, would free workers in fully automated plants from 
their former bondage to machines. Fewer workers would 
monitor the operations, and their direct control of the pro 
cesses would relieve the burden of rigid, repetitive operations 
and close supervision typical in machine-paced, mass- 
production industries. More responsible, highly trained in 
dividuals would be employed at broader, more rewarding 
tasks, and automation would make the factory cleaner, safer
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and more challenging. In this view, blue-collar work would 
tend to become "white-coated" if not white-collared, and 
implicitly more varied and creative as well.
iitnmatinn
No doubt, part of this rose-colored vision has indeed been 
realized. Present-day workplaces are better designed for 
safety and comfort, and automated technologies especially 
in the steel, construction and mining industries has sharply 
reduced requirements for physical labor. Yet the promise of 
a new day for blue-collar work in terms of skill, challenge 
and interest is far from having been realized. As previously 
discussed, skill levels in the labor market have not uniformly 
improved, and the automation of industrial processes has 
even decreased opportunities for creative work in some set 
tings. While challenges in the design stages of new processes 
or products have expanded, required skills are usually 
mechanized at the manufacturing stage for maximum effi 
ciency and production jobs rarely emerge improved. The ef 
ficient manufacture of standardized products simply has not 
lent itself to jobs which are variable, creative, or demanding 
of high skill levels.
In the meantime, however, the terms of the debate have 
also changed. As recently as in the early 1970s, the prospects 
of a dramatically new type of technology were not as ap-
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parent as they are a mere decade later. Rather than an 
ticipating incremental advances, futurists are increasingly 
discussing the onset of a sweeping technological revolution, 
one which would rival or surpass the Industrial Revolution 
of the 19th century in importance. Although the new social 
order which is envisioned has been given many 
names "postindustrial," "technetronic" or " informa 
tion" society the sense of impending transformation as a 
result of technological change has come to dominate discus 
sions of the future of work. Any view of approaching 
changes in work quality or job satisfaction rests (consciously 
or otherwise) on judgments of the strength of this claim that 
a technological revolution is in the offing.
Silicon Chips and Robots
At the center of this flurry of interest in technological 
change is the microprocessor. While computer technology 
has made widespread automation theoretically feasible for 
more than a decade, barriers of size and cost have blocked 
the economical application of computer capabilities in most 
work settings. Large and expensive computer systems could 
produce cost savings only in the most massive industrial set 
tings, and automated machinery could not be easily adapted 
to serve various production functions. Yet, with the develop 
ment of the microprocessor, these obstacles have been over 
come and the potential uses of computerized machinery at 
the workplace have dramatically increased.
Microprocessor technology is best symbolized by the 
silicon chip, a miniaturized system of integrated circuits 
which can direct electrical current and thereby generate vast 
computational power. With current technology, a silicon 
chip the size of one square centimeter can perform millions 
of multiplications per second, and has the capacity to store 
the complete texts of the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, and a few chapters of the Federalist Papers. 
Technological advances are expected to result in at least a
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fourfold expansion of these capabilities within a decade, so 
that the microprocessors of the future will be extremely 
powerful computers on a single silicon chip or combination 
of chips. The reduction is size is astounding today's hand 
held programmable calculators have more computational 
power than the first full-scale computers built during World 
War II, computers which could have been "hand held" only 
by juggling 18,000 different vacuum tubes.
This unprecedented miniaturization of computer 
technology is particularly important because it has been ac 
companied by dramatic cost reductions, making 
microprocessors economically competitive in a wide range of 
industrial applications. Once designed, silicon chips can be 
mass produced at a very low cost, and even further price 
declines are anticipated as volumes rise. As a result, a 
calculation which cost 80 cents to perform in the early 1950s 
now costs less than one cent, after adjusting for inflation. 
The combined reductions in size and cost of microprocessor 
technology have triggered renewed interest in prospects for 
automation and in the broader possibility of a wholesale 
transformation of modern society driven by these new 
technological capabilities.
The silicon chip is particularly important to economical 
automation because it provides the basis for fully integrating 
computer and machine. In industrial settings, the 
microprocessor makes possible the development of manufac 
turing machinery with unique adaptability. One author 
observed:
This flexibility is of fundamental importance. Until 
now, automation has been largely restricted to fac 
tories that turn out thousands of identical pro 
ducts, because it has been too costly to retool 
machines at frequent intervals to perform new 
tasks. But the development of reprogrammable 
machinery makes it economically feasible to 
automate production processes that involve short
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production-runs and frequent changes in machine 
settings. 4
The great majority at least 75 percent of all manufac 
tured goods fall into the category of shorter, lower-volume 
production runs, with only the most basic industries continu 
ing to fit the mass-production stereotype. Technological ad 
vances in microelectronics, therefore, were an essential 
precondition to widespread automation, and the expanding 
use of reprogrammable machinery has triggered today's in 
tense debate regarding the future of industrialized societies.
The potential impact of microprocessors is heightened by 
their seemingly endless number of applications. This new 
technology promises to alter not only the factory, but the of 
fice as well. Sophisticated word processors and computerized 
information storage and retrieval systems are becoming in 
creasingly cost-effective, and because this new technology 
does not require knowledge of specialized computer 
languages, their growing use may raise traditionally low pro 
ductivity among office workers. As in the case of factory 
technologies, these office innovations are seen by many as 
qualitatively different from previous office equipment which 
"mechanized" or "automated" routine tasks for example, 
an American association of office workers views 
microprocessor technology as a dramatic new force 
"because the new technology is being developed to com 
puterize the very flow of work in the office." 5 While 
memory typewriters made an office worker's tasks easier, 
emerging computer technologies may change the means by 
which information is transcribed and made available to 
others. Again, only with the silicon chip has this decentraliz 
ed use of computer technology at affordable cost become 
possible.
The use of the microprocessor to automate production 
functions is epitomized by the development of the robot. 
Prior to the last decade, robots were confined to the domain 
of children's stories and science fiction their practical and
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efficient application in work settings was virtually in 
conceivable given the state of computer technology. Yet the 
silicon chip has thrust robots from fantasy to reality, and the 
technology is being pursued with remarkable speed and 
vigor. A number of top computer companies are now con 
sidering entry into the robot market, and several large U.S. 
corporations have made major commitments to purchase 
robots which are already available. The use of robots in 
manufacturing has nearly quadrupled in a mere two years 
between 1979 and 1981, and most analysts expect the sales 
curve to shoot even higher during the next few years. 6 Most 
importantly, microprocessors seem to be in a prime position 
for the implementation of "learning curve pricing" 
strategies in which firms lower prices in anticipation of rising 
volumes and declining unit costs. The entry of large com 
puter companies into the robot market could ensure this ag 
gressive marketing stance and trigger a sharp rise in robot 
sales by 1990.
Today's robots bear little resemblance to the creations of 
screenplay writers and science fiction authors. Rather than 
being a form of mechanical humanoid, industrial robots are 
characterized by mechanical arms linked to reprogrammable 
computers. An exact definition of a robot, as distinct from 
other automated machinery, eludes even industry represen 
tatives; the Robot Institute of America, an industrial trade 
group, stresses that it is the "reprogrammable and 
multifunctional" character of robots which is unique, allow 
ing them to perform a variety of tasks. 7 And the emerging 
versions of robots certainly are varied the more ex 
travagant include a "bureaucratic robot" which stamps 
signatures on letters, a robot "nurse" to assist people in 
wheelchairs, a robot "janitor and guard dog" for the home, 
and "talking robots" which would advertise products or give 
job training to illiterates. In other fields of endeavor, 
microprocessors are revolutionizing design methods for the 
development of new manufactured goods, and have become 
an integral part of nearly all modern research equipment so
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as to expedite lengthy data analysis. 8 Innovations such as 
voice-sensitive computers which can directly transcribe dicta 
tion into written text may be marketable within just a few 
years.
"/ think we Ve taken this 
robot business too far!"
It is this overwhelming diversity of applications for 
microprocessor technology which distinguishes it from less 
significant innovations and which has led futurists to predict 
a societal transformation "comparable with the agricultural 
revolution that began about 10,000 years ago and with the 
industrial revolution." 9 Yet many of these same authors pro 
vide no sense of the nature of work in such a 
"postindustrial" society. Will microprocessors bring a wave 
of automation so sweeping as to leave millions without 
meaningful work roles? If new jobs are created to replace 
those lost through automation, will they provide more or less 
satisfaction to workers? And finally, if we are in the midst of 
a broad transformation of the workplace, how will we cope 
with the displacement of workers caught in the transition?
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These fundamental questions cannot be ignored amidst rapid 
technological advance.
Will Robots Make Us Obsolete?
There is little consensus as to where the "robot 
revolution" is heading and how far it will go. The 
technology itself may be refined to such an extent that most 
factory work could be carried out by robots and automated 
machinery for example, a study conducted at Carnegie- 
Mellon University asserts that the current generation of 
robots has the technical capability to perform nearly 7 
million existing factory jobs one-third of all manufacturing 
employment and that sometime after 1990 it will become 
technically possible to replace all manufacturing operatives 
in the automotive, electrical equipment, machinery and 
fabricated metals industries. 10 Yet these theoretical estimates 
of the potential for automation, which reach as high as 65 to 
75 percent of the factory workforce, do not reflect the rate at 
which the new technology will actually be introduced to the 
workplace. The pace of innovation will depend on the 
relative costs of labor and computerized technologies, as well 
as on broader levels of supply and demand for goods and 
services. Predictions of this nature are infinitely more dif 
ficult than abstract assessments of future technological 
capabilities.
The automobile industry offers an interesting case study, 
because it is probably the first manufacturing industry to ag 
gressively pursue the use of robots in automated processes. 
The push toward automation in the auto industry is a 
response to both rising labor costs and growing concerns for 
quality control and competitiveness in international markets. 
As Senator Lloyd Bentsen recently noted, auto manufac 
turers already find it possible to operate robots for $6 per 
hour, well below the $20 per hour required for the pay and 
benefits of a skilled worker. 11 With an awareness of the 
growing use of robots by Japanese auto makers, General
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Motors now predicts that by 1987, 90 percent of all its new 
capital investments will be in computer-controlled 
machines. 12 A 1980 survey conducted by the American Soci 
ety of Manufacturing Engineers predicted that robots will 
replace 20 percent of existing jobs in the auto industry by 
1985, and that 50 percent of automobile assembly will be 
done by automated machines (including robots) by 1995. 13 
Even the United Auto Workers anticipates a 20 percent 
decline in membership by 1990 and has successfully obtained 
advance notice and retraining rights from auto manufac 
turers in a growing effort to gain protection from sweeping 
automation. Yet few of these estimates include any con 
sideration of the extent to which capital shortages confront 
ing robot manufacturers and purchasers may limit the speed 
with which the new technology is adopted.
Projections of the impact of microprocessors on office 
employment are even more problematic, with analysts more 
frequently predicting the number of office jobs "affected" 
rather than eliminated by automation. The Carnegie-Mellon 
study argued that 38 million of 50 million existing white- 
collar jobs would eventually be affected by automation, 
while a vice president for strategic planning for Xerox Cor 
poration offered the more conservative guess of 20-30 
million jobs affected by 1990 (Table 5-2). 14 There is a general 
recognition that office technologies will be changing rapidly, 
but little sense of whether the result will be reduced office 
employment, shifts in future employment growth, or simply 
higher levels of productivity in white-collar settings.
A 1981 study prepared for the International Labour Office 
found that microelectronic technology has not caused 
widespread displacement of office workers, but perhaps only 
because of the impact of poor economic conditions on the 
rate of diffusion of the new technology in office settings. 
Selected case studies of the banking and insurance industries 
suggested that new job opportunities were being created, but 
that the skills made redundant by new technologies were
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Table 5-2 Robots and Computers Will Affect 
Workers in Both Factories and Offices
 Number off 
In factories employees
Assemblers 1,289,000
Checkers, examiners, inspectors, testers 746,000
Production painters 185,000
Welders and flame-cutters 713,000
Packagers 626,000
Machiner operatives 2,385,000















Source: The Impacts on the Workforce & Workplace, Carnegie-Mellon University; 
Booz, Alien & Hamilton, Inc.
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generally inappropriate for those emerging opportunities. 
The ILO report stressed that this trend poses special threats 
to future employment prospects for women, and called for 
additional education and training efforts to close the "skill 
gap" caused by the use of microprocessors in office jobs. 15
Perhaps the greatest fears that automation will lead to 
widespread unemployment have been voiced, not in the 
United States, but in Western Europe. For example, two 
British authors have predicted nothing short of the collapse 
of work as a social institution in an era of microprocessors, 
writing:
It is impossible to over-dramatize the forthcoming 
crisis as it potentially strikes a blow at the very core 
of industrialized societies the work ethic. We 
have based our social structures on this ethic and 
now it would appear that it is to become redundant 
along with millions of other people. 16
In West Germany, studies of the impact of automation on 
future employment levels commissioned by the Bonn govern 
ment projected that the number of jobs in 1990 will at best be 
marginally above 1977 levels a pessimistic view in light of 
anticipated population growth. The issue of technologically 
induced unemployment increasingly is capturing the atten 
tion of West European leaders, and unions in Italy, Ger 
many and elsewhere are responding with demands for 
shorter workweeks to protect employment levels. Perennial 
fears that machines would replace men have never been 
fulfilled, but European futurists insist that it will be different 
this time.
The distinction between the "robotic revolution" and 
earlier waves of technological innovation is not devoid of ra 
tionality. While the impact of automation in the past has 
been offset by the emergence of new industries and by 
growth in the service sector of the economy, these avenues 
for employment growth may indeed be less open in an era of
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microprocessors. The electronics industry which supports 
this computerized technology certainly will experience rapid 
growth in the coming decade, but a 1979 survey of the world 
electronics industry prepared for the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development revealed that the 
internal use of its own technology will keep employment 
growth in this sector to a minimum. 17 It is this "reproduc 
tive" potential of computerized technology the prospect of 
robots building robots which challenges traditional pat 
terns of employment growth through new industries. And to 
the extent that the microprocessor will affect service as well 
as manufacturing industries, even the recent trend of ex 
panding service employment may fail to provide jobs for all 
who seek them.
In spite of these relatively unique characteristics of 
microprocessor applications, predictions of immediate and 
massive job losses tend to ignore the market forces which 
slow the pace of technological change. As stressed in recent 
research by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, many factors 
limit the speed of diffusion of technological change and 
thereby mitigate possible employment implications. The size 
of required investment, the rate of capacity utilization and 
the institutional arrangements within industries all can act as 
"economic governors" which slow the adoption of 
automated technologies. 1 8
Virtually all capital-intensive industries have a massive in 
vestment in existing plant facilities, and they cannot afford 
to squander these resources through the wholesale replace 
ment of working machinery. More importantly, the financial 
constraints on capital formation necessarily limit the rate at 
which new technologies are introduced. In this context, 
Joseph Engleberger, president of Unimation, Inc. (the na 
tion's largest robot manufacturer), has dismissed predictions 
of galloping automation, noting that even the replacement of 
5 percent of all blue-collar workers in Western industrialized 
nations would require investments totalling $3 billion in each
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of the next 40 years. 19 While microprocessor technology may 
be promising in its flexibility and potential efficiency, in 
dustries must be able to afford the new acquisitions in order 
to use them.
A less tangible but perhaps equally important force 
limiting the expansion of computer technology lies in the at 
titudes of both workers and consumers. While a computer 
may be able to diagnose medical problems, its bedside man 
ner may be less than comforting. Similarly, word processors 
and telephone answering systems may alter clerical roles, but 
most executives will not want to forego the convenience of 
fered by their personal secretaries. Even on the assembly 
line, where robots may be perfectly suited for production 
processes, the aversion of managers and workers to such un 
familiar companions may hamper their smooth and rapid 
assimilation at the workplace. These psychological barriers 
cannot be factored into equations of economic efficiency, 
but they are likely to slow the pace of technological change 
nonetheless.
The picture which emerges when the functioning of capital 
markets and work organizations are considered is one of 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. With annual 
sales of robots well below even a figure as modest as 10,000 
in an economy supporting a labor force of more than 100 
million, it will be some time before computerized 
technologies make a major dent in aggregate employment 
levels. This perspective is emphasized by Robotics Interna 
tional, a professional group which polled 100 users and 
manufacturers of robots. Based on the responses, the group 
concluded that robots are likely to replace 440,000 rather 
than a million workers by 1990, and that all but 5 percent of 
those would be retrained rather than dismissed. 20 The 
relative lack of union concern in the United States over ag 
gregate job losses through automation also stems from this 
belief that the pace of innovation has been exaggerated. 
William Winpisinger, president of the International Associa-
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tion of Machinists, has argued that the replacement of 
human skills with computerized machinery will occur slowly 
and that a shortage of skilled workers will remain our most 
pressing manpower problem. 21 No doubt guarantees of job 
security will continue to be sought in some industries and 
collective bargaining may gradually extend to include 
management investment decisions, but the workplace will 
not be transformed overnight.
In the more distant future, no one can be sure where new 
employment growth will occur. Expectations of a workless 
society still linger; as described in one forecast:
Earning a living may no longer be a necessity but a 
privilege; services may have to be protected from 
automation, and given certain social status; leisure 
time activities may have to be invented in order to 
give new meaning to a mode of life that may have 
become economically useless for a majority of the 
populace. 22
The literature in recent decades has been replete with 
speculations on how people would cope with the loss of 
meaningful work roles, or how society would allocate and 
distribute wealth in the absence of strong ties between work 
and income. 23 Even for those who reject such forebodings, 
the belief in continued employment growth admittedly con 
tains as much faith as foresight.
Still, there seems little likelihood that the worker will 
become obsolete in the foreseeable future. In one sense, past 
waves of automation have created dislocations, but these 
have been distributed throughout the labor force in the form 
of benefits and social progress shorter workweeks, more 
vacation time, longer training and education, earlier retire 
ment, child labor laws, and welfare and unemployment 
payments. We can expect this trend to continue, particularly 
as labor seeks assurances of job security. Assuming a healthy 
rate of economic growth during a period of innovation and
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increasing automation, it is also likely that levels of ag 
gregate demand will support the emergence of new goods 
and services, including some presently beyond imagination. 
Rising expectations alone will cause Americans to translate 
productivity gains into higher standards of living instead of 
less work, a pattern which has held for centuries. The period 
of adjustment which lies ahead may not be painless, but it 
seems that work is here to stay. And we might add hurrah to 
that prediction.
Work Quality Amidst Automation
If people continue to spend a substantial portion of their 
waking hours at work, will they find work amidst robots and 
computers significantly different and less satisfying? The 
answer depends largely on the extent to which specific 
technologies leave room for challenging human tasks. It does 
not appear that automation will have a uniform impact on 
the quality of work. The worst jobs may disappear as robots 
march into factories, but workers may find as much to com 
plain about in their new computerized world.
The promising aspects of microprocessor technology are 
certainly significant. Robots usually assume the most 
dangerous and unpleasant work tasks, including those in 
volving hazardous substances, heavy materials and repetitive 
functions. Computerized technology can create the potential 
for significant job upgrading as well, freeing workers from 
mundane responsibilities and allowing them to take on more 
challenging roles. In industrial settings, automation can pro 
vide workers with greater freedom at the workplace, par 
ticularly allowing a kind of physical mobility seldom possible 
in more traditional assembly-line factories. Finally, new 
technologies whether word processors or sophisticated 
manufacturing tools can enhance workers' sense of power, 
allowing them to master more complex machinery and feel 
more productive or effective in their jobs.
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These gains in potential satisfaction will not occur 
automatically. Many of the improvements in work quality 
are as much a function of management decisions as of the 
new technologies, and automation can as easily produce 
work situations which are worse instead of better. Button 
pushing and machine watching, like bolt tightening, hardly 
lift the spirit or challenge the intellect. Automated systems 
can decrease the importance of human talents, placing the 
"skill" in the machine as part of efforts to control and stan 
dardize quality. Computerized technologies also give 
managers and supervisors greater ability to monitor worker 
performance, thereby increasing job pressures and the 
potential for work dissatisfaction. While improving worker 
safety, automation can create totally new health hazards 
(e.g., eye strain and nerve disorders caused by computer ter 
minals). Finally, the basic insecurities aroused by change, by 
the lack of familiarity with new and complex equipment, 
provide a source of psychological discomfort for workers,
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especially in their later years. To the extent that stability and 
knowledge engender feelings of control and satisfaction, 
even generally positive innovations can undermine subjective 
perceptions of work quality.
Without question, the most serious threat to work 
satisfaction posed by the age of robots and microprocessors 
is the prospect of growing disparities between worker skills 
and labor market demands. The total number of jobs may 
not diminish, but it seems increasingly likely that the skills of 
workers in declining industries will be poorly suited to the 
manpower requirements of new growth sectors. Those 
displaced workers who are fortunate enough to find work in 
growth industries may discover that their interests and 
talents are not easily adapted to their new work roles, leaving 
them feeling overwhelmed and incompetent. And the less 
fortunate may become little more than relics of a past era, 
accepting jobs which represent the dregs of the labor market 
or falling victim to the plight of the structurally unemployed. 
Virtually all contemporary reviews of robotics and automa 
tion make at least passing reference to the problem of worker 
displacement, and call for innovative training efforts to 
cushion the impact of technological change.
The severity of the worker displacement problem will de 
pend partially on future trends in productivity and employ 
ment growth. Thus far, labor unions have sought guarantees 
of retraining and placement in new jobs for workers displac 
ed by automated technologies, and the numbers have been 
small enough that companies such as General Electric have 
been able to observe a no-layoff policy without incurring 
unacceptable costs. However, as the pace of innovation ac 
celerates and in the absence of significant jumps in produc 
tivity, this appeasement of union concerns may become con 
siderably less palatable; management typically justifies the 
capital costs of automation by citing reduced labor costs, 
and labor demands for job security are fundamentally at 
odds with that result. As robots move into more attractive
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jobs, the potential for conflict over automation can only 
escalate.
Organized labor may find that it has more at stake than 
merely the job security of its members. Automated 
technologies can eventually undermine the leverage and 
power of unions, permitting aspects of production to pro 
ceed during labor disputes with minimal supervision by 
management personnel. More importantly, union participa 
tion in decisions concerning the use of new technologies may 
be the only way to ensure that automation offers protection 
to displaced workers and to prevent increasing hierarchical 
control and supervision over workers. Geographic shifts of 
high technology to the Sunbelt region where unions are 
weakest will further aggravate the problems of displaced 
workers as they cope with technological change. These issues 
surely will test the stength of organized labor in sectors of 
rapid innovation and declining employment.
Perhaps most discouraging is the realization that, even if 
union efforts to ensure worker retraining are successful, 
automation may spell trouble for new, unskilled entrants to 
the labor market. By seeking to avoid layoffs, prospects for 
job creation and the training of inexperienced workers in 
automating industries are diminished simply stated, 
4 'Young people with limited skills are likely to find it harder 
to get work in an automated society if new jobs are preferen 
tially given to those who have become redundant." 24 Again, 
there is reason to believe that new areas of employment 
growth will emerge to dispel fears of widespread unemploy 
ment. Yet the problems of teenagers and other unskilled 
labor force participants, already growing serious in the 
United States, may suffer from relative neglect as 
policymakers focus attention on the needs of workers 
displaced by new technologies.
In summary, robots do not portend disaster for labor 
market operations. Their introduction will be relatively slow, 
and most of their early tasks will be cheerfully forsaken by
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labor. Much of the subsequent impact of automation on the 
quality of work will depend on the success of workers in ob 
taining a voice in the introduction and control of new 
technologies robots and computers will not necessarily 
diminish job satisfaction, but they increasingly will provide 
the context for labor-management battles over the quality of 
work. Adjusting to the age of robots and computer 
technology in a way which meets the needs of displaced 
workers must be a first priority as this debate continues.
The Challenge of Adjustment
Even assuming that changes in the nature of work do not 
negate the prospects for job satisfaction among tomorrow's 
workers, they do threaten to wreak havoc upon today's labor 
force participants who may be caught in their path. Both 
current occupational shifts and the technological changes by 
which they are driven necessarily eliminate the work roles of 
thousands of Americans, many of whom are ill prepared for 
the transition to new jobs. The ordeal of change, to borrow 
Eric Hoffer's phrase, is inherent in the continuing evolution 
of work, and yet the adjustments to current changes in the 
workplace may be especially difficult due to the scope of 
technological change. While the quality and availability of 
work may not suffer in the transition, a sizable portion of 
the modern labor force certainly will.
Some of the reasons why the challenge of adjustment 
looms so large have already been discussed. In our "infor 
mation society," knowledge of innovations spreads 
throughout the labor market with unprecedented speed, so 
that shifts in both the demand for labor and the technology 
of the workplace have accelerated. In addition, the nature of 
technological change now is distinctly different from prior 
eras as the microprocessor is altering work processes in a 
wide range of manufacturing and service industries. Workers 
with few intellectual and technical skills necessary for suc 
cessful adaptation are particularly vulnerable; the changes
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threaten their very livelihood and tend to diminish their pros 
pects for satisfaction at the workplace.
Yet the transitional problems facing the contemporary 
labor force are also exacerbated by the growing size and in 
terdependence of today's markets. With dramatic advances 
in transportation and communication technologies during 
the past few decades, the world has become a much smaller 
place and individual communities or even nations have lost 
some measure of control over their own destinies. The ero 
sion of blue-collar work in declining manufacturing in 
dustries is a reflection not only of technological innovation 
and shifts in aggregate demand, but also of the inability of 
American industries to compete in international markets for 
the production of durable goods. International trade has 
become an increasingly important part of the American 
economy, growing dramatically as a share of our GNP in re 
cent years. This movement toward a world economy will 
continue to reshape the structure of domestic industries, and 
will restrict the ability of national public policy to control or 
limit change in the domestic labor market.
Examples of work trends driven by forces of international 
competition are plentiful. Employment in the American 
automobile and steel industries has fallen steadily because 
domestic manufacturers have been increasingly unable to 
compete with foreign producers. Similarly, even if we were 
to conclude as a nation that the use of robots would diminish 
unacceptably the quality of work, it would prove virtually 
impossible to ban them from American workplaces and still 
protect employment levels in the face of foreign competition. 
Our rising levels of wages and societal affluence have given 
us a comparative advantage in the production of high 
technology goods and the delivery of sophisticated services, 
while at the same time leaving us less and less able to produce 
labor-intensive durable goods at favorable prices. In all of 
these areas, any attempt to halt patterns of occupational and 
technological change not only would impose costs through a
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reduced standard of living but would also jeopardize the very 
employment it was intended to preserve by undermining our 
international competitiveness.
Thus, our options for responding to the problems of 
displaced workers have become narrower, at least in terms of 
the ability of unions or government to maintain artificially 
high employment levels within given industries. The only ra 
tional and appropriate course for public policy in responding 
to the challenges of adjustment is to attempt to facilitate and 
accelerate the transition for workers themselves through 
retraining and placement efforts rather than through trade 
barriers and protections for declining industries. This ap 
proach certainly has not yet been embraced by the Reagan 
administration, which continues to hope that economic 
growth will somehow relieve the strains of adjustment facing 
displaced workers. Unfortunately, if more direct assistance 
is not provided to those affected by occupational shifts and 
technological change, the price of progress in terms of work 
opportunity and satisfaction will remain frightfully high.

6 A Portrait of 
Tomorrow's Worker
Every man's work, whether it be
literature or music or pictures
or architecture or anything else,
is always a portrait of himself.
 Samuel Butler 
The Way of All Flesh
As the content of work changes, the characteristics of 
those who hold jobs and the hopes and expectations which 
they bring to the workplace also undergo constant revision. 
We often refer to "rewarding jobs" as though every task of 
fered some predetermined level of fulfillment, and yet work 
satisfaction is inherently subjective in nature. For this 
reason, the evolution of the labor force cannot be ignored in 
gauging the likelihood of future contentment at work.
Past trends demonstrate that job satisfaction is neither ob 
jective nor absolute. In any objective sense, the quality of 
work has improved considerably in recent decades real 
wages have risen dramatically, considerable gains in worker 
health and safety have been achieved, and the proportion of 
the labor force in skilled or professional roles has steadily in 
creased. Nonetheless, by all available measures, overall job 
satisfaction among workers has remained constant, with 
worker expectations rising at least as fast as tangible work
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gains. What constitutes "good pay" or "dignifying work" 
changes over time, and the yardstick by which we measure 
work quality gradually lengthens. Today's job may have 
been yesterday's wildest dream, but there is no guarantee 
that tomorrow's worker will be satisfied with it.
The composition of the workforce serves as an important 
variable in the job satisfaction equation. The educational at 
tainment and affluence of labor force participants, as well as 
their age, sex and race, all affect their expectations at the 
workplace and their aspirations for future jobs. These 
characteristics of the American workforce have changed 
significantly in recent decades, with workers becoming in 
creasingly educated, affluent, young and female. When com 
pared to changes in the nature of work itself, the implica 
tions of these trends for potential job satisfaction seem more 
predictable and at least as important.
The Educated Workforce
While today's workers may not be brighter than their 
predecessors, they certainly bring longer schooling to the
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workplace. Through major public investments in a com 
prehensive educational system spanning from kindergarten 
to postgraduate programs, the United States has achieved 
impressive advances toward the goal of a universally 
educated population. The median educational attainment of 
8.7 years that a worker brought to the job in 1940 rose in 
four decades to 12.7 years (Figure 6.1). The greatest gains in 
education have accrued to those who formerly had the least 
schooling, and the segment of the labor force with less than 
three years of high school is expected to continue its sharp 
decline throughout the 1980s.
Typically, we view education as an unqualified good, and 
from a societal viewpoint these rising education levels may 
indeed bode well for our cultural development and for the 
vitality of our democratic system at least that's the hope. 
Yet in a narrower sense, more schooling does not necessarily 
foster greater contentment among workers. As Americans in 
all occupations enter the labor market with more education 
than ever before, the prospect of educational gains outpac 
ing skill requirements becomes more threatening. If the ris 
ing educational attainment of workers was accompanied by 
an increase in the number of demanding and challenging 
jobs, there would be cause fbr optimism. Unfortunately, the 
evidence suggests that the extra certificates and diplomas 
may produce little more for modern workers than higher 
goals and more frequent disappointments.
Before World War II, employers had few formal entry re 
quirements employees needed only some basic reading and 
writing skills and elementary mastery of ciphers to qualify 
for most jobs. Wartime production did increase the demand 
for technical and craft skills, and the subsequent eras of 
computers and microprocessors have maintained re 
quirements for specialized training in fields of rapid 
technological advance. However, most of the increase in 
education levels has occurred independently of the technical
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Figure 6.1 Educational Attainments off the
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requirements of the labor market, with more highly educated 
workers performing essentially the same functions as their 
less schooled predecessors. During the 1970s, the portion of 
professional and technical workers who were college 
graduates rose from 61 to 71 percent among men and from 
54 to 63 percent among women. The share of sales and 
clerical workers with college degrees nearly doubled in the 
course of that decade, as did the percentage of blue-collar 
and service workers with one or more years of college.' With 
one of every five salespersons college-educated, it is difficult 
to interpret further gains in formal education as a response 
to skill requirements in the labor market.
There are rational explanations for the continuing rise in 
educational attainment. For the individual worker, educa 
tion continues to pay off. Estimates prepared by the Bureau 
of the Census (adjusted for 1981 dollars) indicate that a 
worker with only 8 years of education could anticipate 
lifetime earnings of $850,000; in contrast, workers with 12 
years of education can hope for $1.2 million, those with 16 
years can anticipate $1.8 million, and those with 17 or more 
years of schooling will earn an estimated $2.1 million during 
their lifetimes. The income advantage enjoyed by college 
graduates is not as great as it used to be as colleges and 
universities award increasing numbers of degrees, the 
relative pecuniary worth of a sheepskin declines. Yet it still 
makes sense from an individual's perspective to seek a col 
lege education, for it broadens employment options and 
enhances personal earning potential.
The uncertainties of the hiring process add to the incen 
tives for furthering one's education. Employers frequently 
rely upon formal education as a screening device, using these 
credentials to rationalize the allocation of jobs even when the 
work itself does not require the added training. Thus, if a 
college and a high school graduate compete for the same 
position, an employer usually will hire the former because
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that person is "better qualified" a strength not necessarily 
related to the ability to perform required job tasks in a 
satisfactory manner. This screening activity becomes par 
ticularly pronounced during periods of high unemployment, 
when college-educated workers are more likely to accept 
positions for which they are "overeducated" as a preferable 
alternative to joblessness. The rise in educational attainment 
eventually creates a spiral which builds on itself. The grow 
ing number of college graduates forces others to seek higher 
education in order to compete for scarce jobs, and the 
average education level among workers creeps upward, even 











More education is a response to the threat of unemploy 
ment in another sense as previously mentioned, extended 
education is one of the ways in which society "allocates" or 
"distributes" joblessness. By absorbing large numbers of 
young people, institutions of higher education delay their en 
try into the labor force and provide an "aging vat" which 
prevents further strains in the labor market. Along with the 
armed forces, colleges and universities offer a socially ac 
cepted alternative to unemployment, one which public policy 
actively encourages and financially supports. The matura 
tion of the "baby-boom" generation and the rise in college 
enrollments during the late 1960s and early 1970s were hard 
ly coincidental, but rather a predictable response to a labor 
surplus. While tighter labor markets in the future would in 
crease the attractiveness of work as opposed to longer 
schooling, the recent inability of the economy to generate an 
adequate supply of jobs for youthful workers suggests that 
higher education will continue to provide a useful "holding 
tank" for both the individual and society.
Were it not for the expectations engendered by higher 
education, the increasing diversion of our youth to colleges 
and universities might offer an ideal way of coping with in 
sufficient aggregate employment. Yet more schooling in 
variably raises hopes of higher earnings and greater career 
advancement, setting the stage for worker disillusionment 
and discontent should labor market opportunities lag behind 
such expectations. Job satisfaction surveys have identified 
the combination of longer schooling and low pay as one of 
the most potent formulas for dissatisfaction at the 
workplace, reflecting the belief education credentials im 
plicitly promise or guarantee future success. In sending them 
to school for longer stints, we prepare a veritable "powder 
keg" of expectations among new entrants to the labor force, 
who by virtue of youth and inexperience are the most likely 
to suffer from the inadequacies of the labor market.
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Signs that labor market requirements have not kept pace 
with the expectations of an educated workforce abound. In a 
landmark study, Ivar Berg estimated that in 1970, one-fifth 
of all college graduates held jobs which did not require their 
level of educational attainment. 2 Workers' own assessments 
of the match between their academic credentials and actual 
job requirements have reinforced that finding; the University 
of Michigan's 1970 Survey of Working Conditions found 
that more than one in three workers believed they had more 
education than their jobs required. 3 Finally, the data on in 
itial job placements of college graduates in more recent years 
suggest that the correlation between educational attainment 
and jobs has not improved almost 90 percent of college 
graduates entering the labor force between 1962 and 1969 
assumed professional, technical, managerial or ad 
ministrative roles, while less than two-thirds of those enter 
ing between 1969 and 1976 succeeded in obtaining similar 
positions (Table 6-1).
The potential for a growing mismatch between skill re 
quirements and workers' educational attainment is a source 
of increasing concern among labor market analysts. Accord 
ing to one estimate, college graduates entering the labor 
force are likely to exceed job openings in professional and 
managerial categories by some 2.7 million over the next 
decade, leaving 2.5 graduates to compete for every choice 
job. 4 A detailed study of changes in general skill re 
quirements and educational attainment among workers dur 
ing the period from 1960 to 1976 confirmed that the in 
cidence of overeducation in the labor market had increased. 5 
With employment growth likely to occur primarily in low- 
skilled clerical, retail trade and service jobs, this pattern of 
widening disparities between job opportunities, educational 
attainment and worker expectations seems certain to persist.
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Table 6-1
Between 1962 and 1969, Four Million 
College Graduates Entered the Labor 
Force Compared with Eight Million 
Graduates During the Succeeding Seven Years
1962-1969 1969-1976
Professional and technical 72.6% 46.1%





Nonfarm laborers 0.1 1.0
Service 0.5 4.6
Farm workers 0.2 1.2
Unemployed 0.1 4.7
Source: "Entry Jobs for College Graduates: The Occupational Mix is Changing, 
Monthly Labor Review, June 1978, p. 52.
The problems arising from the overeducation of the 
workforce are not easily catalogued, but the possibilities are 
disturbing. Worker dissatisfaction with jobs which fail to 
utilize this education is the most obvious of possible results. 
Yet the consequences of a mismatch between education and 
jobs may reach much farther to include deteriorating mental 
and physical health, falling productivity, and rising frequen 
cy of disruptive behavior among workers. The current trends 
in turnover, absenteeeism, and other outward manifestations 
of worker attitudes are as yet unconvincing in this regard, 
but our apparent inability to provide suitable opportunities 
for more educated workers must be a source of serious con 
cern. Collectively at least, we may not be doing our children 
any favors by sending them off to college and graduate 
school unless labor market conditions improve in the years 
ahead.
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How much we as a society should invest in education re 
mains a normative decision one based more on the value 
we place on an educated populace than on narrow measures 
of the economic returns reaped from more schooling. In this 
sense, it is possible that we can never have an 
"overeducated" workforce, that the concept by definition 
ignores the presumed societal benefits of universal educa 
tion. Yet we must still address the possibility of rising 
dissatisfaction at the workplace which has led a major union 
leader to conclude, "America has to start worrying about 
turning out Ph.D.s who end up as cab drivers and start train 
ing for the kind of jobs that are really needed in society." 6 
If, as critics charge, higher education is becoming nothing 
more than longer education providing few skills and opening 
few occupational doors, it should not be surprising to find 
our more educated workers less satisfied with the jobs in 
which they are eventually placed.
Having More and Expecting More
Along with the educational upgrading of the nation's 
workforce, growing affluence has had an equally pervasive 
influence on work attitudes. By impressive margins, 
American workers have more money than ever before, and 
until the mid-1970s, this relative personal wealth continued 
its steady upward climb. For nearly three decades following 
World War II, average real wages moved upward in an un 
broken record of annual gains. Even the disastrous setbacks 
of the 1930s only arrested temporarily the growth of real per 
sonal income, but failed to alter the long term pattern of im 
proved economic status of employed workers (Figure 6.2). 
While these average real wage increases have not solved the 
problems of relative poverty and unequal distribution of 
wealth, they have represented great gains for the majority of 
workers.
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Figure 6.2 Average Annual Compensation Per 
Full Time Equivalent Employee Rose 
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These income gains alter the nature of worker expectations 
and demands on the job. At least some workers begin to 
climb Maslow's needs hierarchy (assuming that it exists), 
satisfying to a large extent the more basic needs that good 
pay can fulfill and moving on to seek "higher-order" social 
and psychological rewards at the workplace. While financial 
compensation remains important to most workers, it is more 
easily taken for granted in an affluent era. Real incomes 
which would have seemed like a king's ransom fifty years 
ago now are accepted as a matter or course, and in 
themselves are sometimes insufficient inducements for 
lasting job attachment.
Attitude Changes Magnified by Youth
In addition to bringing higher expectations to the 
workplace, more affluent workers have a greater number of 
options with regard to work. They are better able to assume 
the risks of rejecting their current jobs; particularly as the 
number of two-income households swells, it becomes easier 
for workers to bear the costs of job transitions. Workers 
with higher real incomes are also able to trade income gains 
for leisure, taking longer weekends and vacations to escape 
from unpleasant jobs. Thus, even if levels of worker 
dissatisfaction have not increased in recent years, it is more 
likely that today's workers will act upon their feelings of 
discontent.
By the early 1970s, the prolonged rise of real incomes had 
visibly altered worker attitudes. Young workers were part of 
a generation untempered by the fire of mass unemployment 
and falling wages, and they were more likely to risk the 
displeasure of their employers because they assumed other 
work would be available at the same or better wages. When 
the automobile industry was booming, the story was told of 
a young autoworker who, although usually a model 
employee, never appeared for work on Fridays. He was
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finally accosted by his supervisor, and explained his habit of 
working only four days a week with the reply, "I don't make 
enough to live on three day's wages." Although this defiant 
attitude would take more courage amidst the layoffs and 
concessions of the early 1980s, the pattern of valuing job 
security less while demanding greater rewards or freedom 
from work stems directly from the nation's uninterrupted 
rise toward affluence.
It is not yet clear what impact the stagnant economy and 
declining real incomes beginning in the mid-1970s will have 
on worker attitudes. Workers have not become blind to 
harsh economic realities in spite of rising expectations, and 
the importance of job security in hard times is already ap 
parent in union concessions in 1982 collective bargaining 
agreements. Yet these union "give-backs" may prove to be 
temporary and limited in scope, reflecting short term ad 
justments rather than long term shifts in worker attitudes. 
The permanence of changes in the outlook of workers ac 
customed to prosperity will depend largely on the severity of 
economic conditions which lie ahead.
Even if rising expectations are dampened by periods of 
economic hardship, the potential for restlessness and 
dissatisfaction among young workers seems particularly 
high. Concentrated in the lowest paid, lowest skilled jobs, 
younger workers are also the most educated in terms of years 
in school and exposure to news media ideas and information. 
The young are the least satisfied with the status quo, the least 
likely to be financially burdened, the least tempered by the 
knowledge of economic depression and the least impressed 
by value of job security. Unfamiliar with the nagging suspi 
cion that all boom times must end, the younger worker has 
less inclination to buckle down or to provide for the future. 
While restrained by periodic recessions, today's younger 
worker still tends to assume that there will be a way to "get 
by no matter what."
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The emergence of new work attitudes has been more vis 
ible in recent years because young workers represent an in 
creasing percentage of the labor force. In 1960, only 16 per 
cent of all workers were under age 24, compared with 24 per 
cent two decades later. Of course, the proportion of youthful 
workers in the labor market will dwindle as the century 
draws to a close. In the meantime, however, younger 
workers will exert a major influence on work attitudes, ex 
hibiting the rising expectations and growing impatience 
characteristic of the "new worker." Their actions and at 
titudes are wisely viewed as a barometer of broader changes 
working their way through society, changes which will even 
tually touch all segments of a rich and democratically 
educated society.
COMPUTER GAME ROOM
' 'Don't worry ' They 'II grow up 
to be great computer programmers!"
In the 1970s, the portrait of the "new workers" often serv 
ed as the focal point for discussions of the "decaying work 
ethic." A decade later, it seems far less likely that younger
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workers will become a force for reform at the workplace. 
The young may be the least patient with unrewarding work, 
but they remain concerned with their success in the labor 
market. If their affluence and extended education leave them 
with high expectations, the result more frequently is a 
heightened interest in "good careers" rather than a rejection 
of occupational goals. The most volatile segment of tomor 
row's workforce surely will not be filled with the graduates 
of medical, business and law schools so popular among to 
day's youth. It will be comprised of those groups who have 
not shared in the affluence which raises expectations, whose 
most basic hopes have remained unfulfilled.
Discrimination and Broken Promises
For the young, the implicit promises of the educational 
system heighten their sense of disappointment with labor 
market realities. For minority and female workers, the pro 
mises themselves have been more explicit including 
assurances of equal opportunity and greater advancement to 
correct past patterns of employment discrimination. While 
government efforts to end discrimination have brought some 
gains in this area, the pace of progress has been relatively 
slow and almost surely unequal to the rise in expectations 
triggered by these initiatives. This disparity between promise 
and reality maintains race and sex, like age, as significant 
variables in job satisfaction trends.
The advances of blacks and women in the labor market 
over the past two decades are noteworthy (Table 6-2). The 
proportion of black professionals and managers has doubled 
in the last 20 years, while the relative number working as 
laborers or in service industries has dropped considerably. In 
1960, more than two-and-a-half times as many blacks were 
blue-collar workers as white-collar, but now this ratio is 
nearly equal. The gains of women in the labor force are 
masked to some extent by their increasing participation in re-
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cent years, but they have been significant. While the size of 
the female workforce jumped by 25 percent during the past 
two decades, the number of women managers increased by 
44 percent. The percentage of female professionals has 
grown since 1960, while the proportion of women working in 
service industries has fallen.
The distribution of jobs in the economy remains skewed to 
the detriment of blacks and women, however, reflecting the 
legacy of traditional patterns of employment discrimination. 
Blacks, though comprising only 11 percent of the labor 
force, hold 15 percent of all operative, 18 percent of laborer, 
and 20 percent of service jobs. Even the shift from blue- 
collar toward white-collar work by blacks has been achieved 
primarily through growth in relatively low-paid sales and 
clerical fields. The traditional divisions of labor are equally 
apparent in the employment of women they remain heavily 
concentrated in clerical and service roles, which constitute 
more than half of total female employment. While cultural 
biases keep women underrepresented in menial blue-collar 
jobs, they also have less than their share of managerial posi 
tions and break into professional roles primarily in the sex- 
typed occupations of nurse and schoolteacher. Some of the 
aggregate data on female employment may seem encourag 
ing, but cashiers, waitresses, bookkeepers, secretaries and 
typists continue to dominate the ranks of working women.
In addition to a narrower and less attractive range of oc 
cupational choices, minorities and women are more likely to 
suffer from fluctuations and uncertainties in the labor 
market. Invariably, relatively more blacks than whites and 
more women than men are pushed onto the unemployment 
line during recessions, and even in periods of healthy 
economic growth, a disproportionate share of blacks and 
women are unable to find work. When employed, they 
receive an average wage well below that of their white, male 
counterparts. And not surprisingly, minorities and women 
are heavily represented among Americans living in poverty,
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either because they cannot obtain jobs or because their pay is 
too meager to support themselves and their families.
For studies of work satisfaction, these facts offer one 
basic lesson in an era of presumed enlightenment and equal 
opportunity, even gradual improvements may lead to in 
creased frustration and bitterness if accompanied by more 
rapid rises in expectations. Current data on expressed 
dissatisfaction reflect this gap between expectations and the 
labor market realities of groups suffering continuing 
employment discrimination, with blacks on the average 
almost twice as likely to be dissatisfied with their jobs as 
whites and women more than one-and-a-half times as likely 
to be displeased with their work roles as men. These relation 
ships weaken when the analysis accounts for variables such 
as income, but the earnings potential of blacks and women 
are an integral part of the discrimination problem and not 
usefully separated in this manner.
It is unclear to what extent black and female workers 
found hope in government initiatives to combat discrimina 
tion at the workplace, or how much their rising expectations 
have outdistanced actual improvements in the labor market. 
Yet certainly minorities and women have been affected by re 
cent gains in educational attainment and by the growing 
awareness of an "information society," leaving them more 
likely than ever before to be conscious of the disparities be 
tween their plight and the successes of others. The longer 
that equal employment opportunity remains a goal instead 
of a reality, the greater the chance that black and female 
workers will be disillusioned by seemingly broken promises.
The Impetus for Change
It is premature to argue that a radical transformation is 
underway at the modern workplace. The feared decay of the 
"work ethic" has not unleashed an exodus of workers from 
their jobs, and the data on worker satisfaction suggest a
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prevalence of mixed emotions regarding work more than 
widespread disaffection. Yet the cumulative impact of 
changes in the labor market on work satisfaction in the years 
ahead cannot be as easily dismissed. Even if the quality of 
work does not deteriorate, tomorrow's workers may expect 
and demand more from their job and be more impatient in 
awaiting results.
Current changes in the labor force are particularly impor 
tant because they are unique to this era and not likely to be 
reversed. Despite lags in real income growth during the late 
1970s, the most likely scenarios for America's future include 
ever richer, better educated and more sophisticated workers. 
This outcome is neither inexorable nor preordained, as 
ecological, political, economic or military catastrophes could 
overturn this progress. Yet should these trends of affluence 
and education continue, they may shape a workforce more 
volatile than known in any prior generation.
A steady rise in societal affluence will have a particularly 
adverse impact on labor force participants who do not 
receive a portion of its benefits. Already, poor prospects in 
the regular labor market have forced disadvantaged workers 
out of the mainstream of American society and into the 
underground economy. 7 Of course, much of this "black 
market" work arises out of efforts to avoid taxation, but a 
substantial portion must also be linked to the failure of the 
legal economy to generate sufficient jobs paying adequate
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wages. Such shifts toward the underground economy are 
consistent with dual labor market hypotheses, and are yet 
another indication of the possible polarization of American 
society in the absence of efforts to provide legal work for the 
least fortunate.
Current labor market trends, therefore, suggest that the 
impetus for change at the workplace will come from two very 
different directions. Persons employed in desirable jobs are 
likely to take past gains for granted and to seek im 
provements (in both wages and job content) to meet their ris 
ing expectations. In contrast, individuals in poor jobs or 
without work are likely to become increasingly disenchanted 
with the disparity between their fate and the advantages en 
joyed by others, reacting either with resentment or 
withdrawal. The demands for change among the fortunate 
will be felt most strongly by employers themselves, while 
pressures for action from disadvantaged workers will be 
focused on public policy. In either case, the call will be for 
both work "reform" and for steps to meet the more basic 
goal of a job for all who desire one.
7 Work Reform 
in Perspective
Distribute the earth as you
will, the principal question
remains inexorable Who is
to dig it? Which of us, in
brief word, is to do the hard
and dirty work for the rest ....
 John Ruskin 
Sesame and Lilies
The concern for workers' satisfaction has culminated in 
attempts to reform work. Basing their proposals on concepts 
of alienation, analysts of the workplace have advocated a 
wide-ranging redesign of work roles and organizations. Re 
jecting the view that technology and efficiency mandate nar 
row and unsatisfying jobs, these reformers assert that re 
warding work roles are not only consistent with efficient 
organization but actually stimulate higher productivity. 
Presumably, everyone gains under these enlightened ap 
proaches to the form and substance of work.
The dominant concerns of work reformers have changed 
over time. The debate of the 1960s and early 1970s focused 
primarily on narrower issues of job redesign and work 
organization, while more recent proposals have addressed 
broad themes of worker participation in "quality-of-
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worklife" programs and "quality circles." Many work 
reform concepts have evolved over a much longer period, 
and the rediscovery of the quality of work is often akin to the 
proverbial old wine in new bottles. On a practical basis, 
unions and employers have been dealing with issues of work 
satisfaction for as long as they have been in existence, and 
the array of sociologists, psychologists and business con 
sultants who now advocate work reform are relative 
latecomers to the scene. The modern critics of work may 
shift the emphasis of the work quality debate, but their 
claims are no more vital to workers than the traditional con 
cerns of labor and management.
It is important to place work reform efforts in a historical 
perspective before judging the latest collection of proposals. 
Few methods of work organization have gone untried, and 
few suggestions for changes in the design of work are 
without precedent. Some very direct and meaningful im 
provements in the quality of work won through union ac 
tivism are totally ignored by contemporary analysts, who 
sound as though gains in compensation, health and safety 
are somehow less significant than the more abstract goals of 
interesting and rewarding job tasks. Management initiatives 
in work reform parallel this long record of union activity, as 
employers in even the earliest stages of industrialization at 
tempted to cope with an unruly and turbulent labor force. 
Both union and management attempts to raise the quality of 
work have brought successes, but they also illustrate the 
limitations of work reform which plague such efforts in a 
modern era.
Union Role in the Design of Work
Since the inception of the organized labor movement, 
work has been affected by the continuing efforts of workers 
to combat and compromise the power of their employers to 
determine working conditions and job content. The battle
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has been waged on many fronts from the most basic terms 
of compensation to the establishment of work standards, the 
protection of worker health and safety, the introduction of 
new production technologies and the protection of in 
dividual rights. Years of bargaining have gradually given 
workers a voice in some aspects of work content and job 
design, and the evolved system of industrial jurisprudence 
has established a set of worker rights which limit the 
prerogatives of management to seek maximum output and 
efficiency. Though technological and market forces have 
largely dictated the tasks that must be performed, the collec 
tive pressure of organized workers has channeled, directed 
and at times even controlled the use of human labor in the 
modern workplace.
The historic role of unions in the design of work has been 
an important part of the work reform movement. Those who 
suggest that union leaders are out of touch with discontented 
memberships and have been slow to join the bandwagon for 
work reform are ignoring the traditional union ac 
complishments. The pay, leisure (including rest periods), 
fringe benefits and work standards on which union 
bargainers have concentrated are not peripheral to the 
"quality of work"; to a large extent they determine this 
quality. There is some reason to believe as discussed in the 
next chapter that unions may underemphasize less tangible 
aspects of work satisfaction in traditional collective bargain 
ing efforts. Yet, on the whole, labor leaders have not been 
insensitive to the desires of their members they simply 
recognize that unpleasant tasks will not disappear through 
work reform, and they seek the best possible combination of 
benefits and working conditions while accomplishing these 
tasks. The result has been some very significant advances in 
the lot of American workers, and the process continues.
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Health and Safety
The most direct contribution of union bargaining to the 
quality of work has come in the area of occupational health 
and safety. Although managements have often been free to 
establish what work will be done, the line has generally been 
drawn at jobs which are particularly dangerous or 
unhealthy. In the early years of this century, organized labor 
was instrumental in outlawing the use of phosphorus and 
lead in manufacturing processes. Over the years collective 
bargaining has sought changes in job methods and pro 
cedures to limit dangers in high-risk occupations. The 
elaborate rules which govern mine safety and the various 
precautions required in construction and heavy manufactur 
ing are the best examples of union-initiated improvements in 
industries where management had neglected the adoption of 
health and safety standards. Organized labor's goal of 
uniform standards was realized in large measure in 1970 with 
congressional approval of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, which covers all but the smallest workplaces and 
also provides for federal enforcement of these newly-won 
guarantees.
"Back before the safety laws, 
we had some real horror stories
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In addition to this concern for overly dangerous or 
unhealthy working conditions, unions, particularly at the 
shop level, have been continually concerned with improving 
unpleasant or uncomfortable working conditions. Ventila 
tion, lighting, cleanliness, bathroom facilities, cafeterias, 
parking, and innumerable other factors related to the 
workplace have been the object of union negotiations. 
Although such improvements cannot change the nature of 
jobs, collectively they may significantly raise the quality of 
work.
Pay and Work Standards
While the scope of labor-management negotiations has 
been broadened considerably over the years, the system of 
collective bargaining was originally conceived as a 
mechanism for obtaining a fair price for labor. The steady 
rise in real wages enjoyed by American workers provides the 
most concrete evidence of the effectiveness of union efforts, 
but pressures from organized labor have also had a direct in 
fluence on work standards. Whether the pay is by the piece 
or by the hour, the issues of compensation and production 
standards are frequently inseparable normal work methods 
and speeds are an important variable in determining fair pay 
rates, and conversely, the pay rate dictates how much and 
how quickly work must be done. For this reason, unions in 
quest of higher wages continually attempt to keep work 
norms at the lowest possible level, challenging the 
employer's right to demand maximum effort for minimum 
wages. These struggles over standards of work unques 
tionably affect the quality of work, and work rules 
negotiated by unions continue to be a major source of labor- 
management conflict in manufacturing industries.
Again, the concern for work standards and quality is hard 
ly new. In 1914, unions forestalled the adoption of Frederick 
Taylor's "scientific management" and succeeded in putting
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"Taylorism" on the defensive by securing legislation which 
outlawed for a time the use of "a stop-watch or other time- 
measuring device, or a time study of any job" in federal 
facilities. 1 Four decades ago, production standards in the 
auto industry were not subject to the grievance procedures, 
but repeated strikes by workers who felt their interests were 
at stake have made this a subject of mutual negotiation. In 
1946, a presidential conference aimed at avoiding strikes fail 
ed because management rejected the contention that unions 
should participate in the selection of production 
technologies, work standards and plant location. Yet in spite 
of a continuing ideological battle over appropriate labor 
roles, unions have had an undeniable impact on the design 
and quality of work.
Of course, the other way in which organized labor has 
bolstered compensation is through the regulation and reduc 
tion of work schedules. The most notable success has been 
the establishment of the 40-hour workweek, which has 
released workers from the endless cycle of dawn-to-dusk toil 
and fatigue. Additional leisure time has also been won 
through negotiated contracts guaranteeing vacation and sick 
leave rights, pensions that provide for earlier retirement, and 
more liberal lunch and break periods while on the job. Final 
ly, unions have exacted premiums for overtime or shift dif 
ferentials, thereby encouraging regular and convenient 
working hours. The cumulative effect of these changes in the 
quantity and scheduling of work has been jobs which are bet 
ter paid, which offer greater freedom at the workplace and 
which require workers to spend fewer hours at the call of 
employers.
Technology
Organized labor has also fought to control the introduc 
tion of production technologies which not only threaten job 
security but frequently alter job content and the basis for
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determining fair compensation as well. Thus, as new and 
faster machines have come into use, unions have attempted 
to establish rules governing their operation and output. 
Though the number of workers rather than the quality of 
work is most often at issue, resistance to new technology cer 
tainly has affected the evolution of jobs, particularly in 
manufacturing sectors.
"Down with Machines"
In many cases, unions have sought to prevent or delay the 
introduction of new methods or machines. Automatic 
glassmaking machines, stitchers and lasters in shoe manufac 
ture, cigar rollers, paint sprayers, recorded music, automatic 
typesetters, and countless other innovations were vigorously 
resisted by unions because they decreased the skill or 
numbers of workers. In a few cases, the decline in the quality 
of work caused by new machinery was sufficient to lead 
unions to permanently limit the use of the new equipment. 
For example, the use of the hand granite surfacer, which was 
faster but more dangerous, was greatly restricted by the 
granite cutters' union. 2 Unions have rarely succeeded in 
preventing the use of a machine or process. More commonly, 
unions use wage and job security issues to limit the extent to 
which jobs are redesigned in response to new production 
technologies, thereby preserving some continuity in employ 
ment.
The mechanisms through which technological innovation 
and related production standards are controlled vary across
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industrial sectors. In the clothing industry, union- 
management councils establish the price per garment, effec 
tively setting the work standards which must be maintained 
to afford decent wages. In other industries, management and 
unions negotiate the number of workers who must be 
employed to perform certain jobs without regard to 
need the retention of firemen on diesel and electric trains 
many years after their work roles were rendered obsolete is a 
classic example. More commonly, companies offered no- 
layoff pledges to preempt union opposition to the introduc 
tion of computerized technology or similar innovations. 
Although these negotiations sometimes seek simply to 
preserve employment, more often they determine the quality 
of work as well. The number of workers on an assembly line 
makes a difference in work pressures, dictating the frequen 
cy of relief breaks, the intervals of repetition, and the speed 
with which operations must be performed.
When viewed collectively, the historic involvement of 
unions in shaping occupational safety and health, pay, work 
standards and technological innovation belies claims that 
organized labor has ignored issues of work quality. No 
doubt the reluctance of unions to embrace new and sweeping 
proposals has frustrated many contemporary work reform 
advocates, and there remains a fundamental conservatism in 
the attitudes of many union leaders. Yet the critiques of 
academics and management consultants may also prove less 
than objective; as one UAW representative observed, "It is 
easier to worry about boredom and forget noise, to write 
about monotony and ignore dust, to fret about dull jobs and 
not mention fumes on the job." 3 Even if the traditional goals 
of organized labor seem mundane and intellectually 
unstimulating, they remain meaningful and compelling on 
the shop floor.
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Management and the Redesign of Work
The historical interest of organized workers in the quality 
of their work has been paralleled by similar concerns on the 
part of management. For employers, an apathetic or 
discontented workforce threatens productivity, no matter 
how efficient the technology or the work organization. The 
issue is less sociological or humanitarian than practical: How 
do you elicit maximum effort from workers when neither the 
job itself nor its monetary incentives inspire this commit 
ment? Workers are approached as motivational problems, 
and improvements in work quality are contemplated as solu 
tions. In contrast to the perspective of unions, enhanced 
satisfaction is seen primarily as a means rather than an end in 
itself.
Sophisticated management science in recent years has 
argued against such distinctions between union and manage 
ment concerns, claiming that they both seek the efficient use 
of individual capabilities. According to modern theories of 
work reform, the most productive and profitable use of 
human labor necessarily implies structuring jobs which 
challenge and satisfy workers. In practice the distinction is 
not so easily erased, reflecting a tension between goals of 
work satisfaction and profit maximization which renders 
cooperative labor-management initiatives in work reform 
tentative at best. Particularly in the case of factory 
technology, efficient production and human fulfillment rare 
ly ride along the same set of rails and, when they do, they 
may easily collide.
Regardless of its distinct emphasis, however, active 
management interest in aspects of work quality and satisfac 
tion also has a history much longer than commonly 
understood. The earliest management efforts to raise pro 
ductivity and profits through greater attention to the motiva 
tion of workers are now taken for granted they include 
detailed studies of worker efficiency, improved amenities at
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the workplace, and institutionalized approaches to overall 
personnel management. These adaptations in management 
styles have provided the foundation for the much more 
elaborate concepts of work reform currently under con 
sideration.
MOTIVATION - V JOB SATISFACTION
Specialization and Scientific Management
Throughout most of the industrial era, factories were 
designed with the goal of maximizing output per input units 
of labor and materials, but with little regard for the treat 
ment of the individual worker. During this period, 
specialization and minute subdivision of tasks were adopted 
as the guiding principles in designing jobs, primarily because 
simplified jobs allowed the use of unskilled, low-paid 
workers. Moreover, specialization entailed less waste of time 
and materials in training and increased productivity because 
workers could become more proficient at their small tasks. 
Each worker could accomplish more because the wasted 
transition time between tasks and tools were eliminated. 
These efficiencies were, and remain, valid arguments for 
specialization; subdivided tasks continue to offer the poten 
tial for reducing production costs in many work settings.
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The pattern of neglecting workers in the search for op 
timum efficiency in production systems persisted into the 
twentieth century. A pool of workers ready to accept harsh 
factory employment was always available, and more could 
be imported, as needed. Managers found little incentive to 
worry about motivating workers or improving the quality of 
work. In the crudest terms, most employers considered 
workers to be no more than cheap alternatives to machines. 
Only with a series of engineering innovations championed by 
Frederick Taylor and others did the role of the worker in the 
efficient design of work begin to receive serious attention.
Taylor, a worker turned engineer, had long analyzed im 
pediments to efficiency resulting from the inherent conflicts 
between managers and workers. As one who had been on 
both sides of the fence, Taylor was convinced that owners 
and workers share a common interest in maximizing produc 
tion. Calling his system "scientific management," Taylor 
analyzed the most efficient methods of performing tasks, us 
ing time and motion studies to determine the quickest way to 
accomplish the most work. Linking these redesigned work 
methods with incentive payments for increased output, he 
believed he could increase wages and improve the lot of 
workers while simultaneously increasing production and 
profits. By ensuring that workers performed their jobs with 
the utmost physical efficiency and were paid in ways which 
encouraged maximum effort, Taylor argued that the goals of 
both management and labor could be served. 4
Taylor failed to recognize the uses to which his rigorous 
analysis of tasks would be put, and he overstated the con 
sonance between individual and corporate goals. Rather 
than aiding workers, Taylor's engineering analysis became 
an extension of efficient work organization, in which 
specialized tasks were rigorously analyzed and further divid 
ed. Individual work roles became narrower, more controll 
ed, and less satisfying than ever. Still, he was one of the first
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practical designers of work who was concerned with human 
variables in work. Although his name has since been 
associated by some with "inhuman" work arrangements, 
Taylor's own aims included the design of jobs which 
challenged and motivated workers and paid them higher 
wages.
Employee Welfare
Taylor's methods of scientific management were widely 
adopted during the first two decades of this century because 
they contributed directly to increased efficiency. So-called 
"welfare management," which came into vogue at about the 
same time, was less profitable. According to the Labor 
Department's description, welfare management was 
"anything for the comfort or improvement, intellectual or 
social, of the employees, over and above wages paid, which 
is not a necessity of the industry nor required by law." 5 
These benefits might include subsidized or free cafeterias, 
libraries, athletic fields, beautified work surroundings, 
medical and dental care, safety programs, social organiza 
tions, company housing, or whatever other amenities might 
help to obtain the loyalty and support of employees.
Diverse factors contributed to the institution of these 
"welfare" programs. In some cases the humanitarian in-
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clinations of the owners were being carried out; in others 
welfare work was a public relations gambit and, frequently, 
an effort to combat union organizing drives. Most often, 
however, the systems were founded on the hope that con 
tented workers would be docile and more productive. In 
creasingly, companies viewed their workforces as in 
vestments to be protected and nurtured. During World War 
I, labor force turnover had risen to astounding proportions 
among factory workers, averaging above 8 percent per 
month. 6 Faced with labor discontent and militant unions, 
companies logically sought to co-opt workers by providing 
them with conspicuously improved working conditions and 
benefits.
Welfare management was never widely adopted. The 
decreasing number of immigrants (who had been the most 
receptive subjects for these blandishments) and the rise of 
organized labor limited the success of corporate attempts to 
obtain the allegiance of their workers. More importantly, a 
rise in unemployment in 1921 dropped turnover drastically 
and eliminated much of the reason for the "coddling" of 
workers. Many companies cut back sharply on their frills, 
and such broad corporate responsibility for employees' 
welfare was seldom reimplemented on this scale. The benefit 
packages of major corporations today bear a superficial 
resemblance to the "welfare" policies of sixty years ago, but 
the intent now is as much to attract workers as to co-opt 
them.
Personnel Management
The corporate awareness of the need to adopt more 
sophisticated and effective ways of dealing with workers did 
not vanish with welfare management. The worker had been 
discovered as a variable factor in the efficiency of an 
organization, one which employers attempted to influence 
and control through elaborate personnel policies. Separate
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personnel departments became the rule in large organiza 
tions, and employee relations emerged as a major concern in 
corporate management.
Throughout the next fifty years, personnel policies were 
steadily designed and refined in an attempt to ensure smooth 
organizational functioning and maximum productivity. Pro 
cedures for screening, testing, and training workers were 
combined with a variety of welfare benefits designed to 
stimulate company loyalty. Supervisory techniques and 
organizational relationships were analyzed to ease conflict 
and friction among workers and to promote efficient realiza 
tion of corporate goals. Job evaluation techniques were pur 
sued to give structures and pay differentials an aura of objec 
tivity. All of these steps reflected a concerted effort to in 
stitutionalize responses to potential worker discontent and to 
include the worker in equations for efficient production 
systems.
These early peripheral adjustments in workplace amenities 
and management techniques seldom extended to the actual 
design of work tasks. While a variety of devices were used to 
mitigate problems of worker dissatisfaction and to suppress 
unrest, the primary motivator and satisfier of the workforce 
remained wage payments. Whatever the effect of work upon 
the worker, it was still assumed that a decent wage, tolerable 
working conditions, and a minimum of fringe benefits could 
buy a tractable workforce.
Modern Concepts of Work Design
Changes in the workforce and the structure of the modern 
corporation led to a reevaluation of traditional management 
styles. Following World War II, the growth of applied 
science in industry brought increasing numbers of scientists, 
engineers and other specialists into corporate environments. 
Similarly, the continuing expansion of corporate structures 
to produce, market and distribute huge quantities of goods
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increased the proportion of professionals, managers and 
other white-collar workers on corporate payrolls. When 
coupled with rising educational attainment in the labor force 
and the organization of workers in stable unions, many com 
panies found themselves confronting a more ambitious and 
demanding workforce which resisted established personnel 
practices.
Today's employers have ample opportunity to respond to 
these shifts in the composition of their workforce. Attention 
devoted to worker motivation and improved personnel 
management may have always been justifiable, but it has 
become affordable only with the increasing affluence which 
now supports a plethora of administrators and consultants. 
Within recent years the swollen ranks of corporate manage 
ment have emerged as a prime audience for the legion of in 
dustrial sociologists and psychologists who have joined the 
longstanding debate on the ideal organization of work. 
Rather than seeking simply to placate employees, 
"sophisticated" corporate executives are now assigned to 
pursue some of the finest nuances of work satisfaction and 
innovative management techniques.
Modern advocates of work reform have attempted to shift 
management attention from traditional adversarial postures, 
focusing instead on adapting work organizations to meet 
human needs. Their approach is decidedly optimistic, reject 
ing common notions that efficiency requires specialized jobs 
or that production technologies necessarily dictate work 
roles. As an alternative, modern concepts of work design 
claim that work environments and roles can be shaped to 
maximize worker satisfaction, and that the effort will actual 
ly enhance management goals of productivity and profit. 
Management and worker interests presumably can follow 
parallel paths.
The optimism of modern work reformers is also reflected 
in their views of human nature and work motivation.
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Without stopping to offer evidence, most contemporary 
theorists portray the worker as an individual with great 
potential and, implicitly, with capabilities untapped by ex 
isting modes of work organization. Their concepts of in 
dividual needs and motivation arise largely out of the work 
of Maslow, Herzberg and McGregor, with an emphasis on 
the importance of appealing to higher-order needs for 
challenge and responsibility. Ultimately, the proposed 
models for improving work have been very similar, based on 
the following principles:
1. Jobs should allow the individual as much responsibili 
ty and autonomy as possible, including participation 
in decisionmaking with minimal authoritarian super 
vision.
2. Jobs should include tasks of meaningful size which 
provide each individual the opportunity to use broad 
and varied skills.
3. Workplaces should offer integrated social en 
vironments with room for personal interaction in 
healthy, pleasant surroundings.
The more obvious standards that workers value good pay 
and substantial benefits are sometimes implied but rarely 
dwelled upon.
As discussed earlier, it is not clear that all workers have the 
drive for fulfillment of higher-order needs which modern 
theories of work design project. The diversity of worker 
needs raises troubling issues for would-be work reformers, 
diminishing hopes of achieving job designs optimal for all 
individuals. Yet despite this limitation, the underlying 
assumptions of Maslow, Herzberg and McGregor have 
found their way into most modern critiques of work 
organization, applied not only to managerial and profes 
sional employees but to virtually all workers. Even if the 
more traditional rewards of pay and benefits are 
acknowledged to be important, critics of the workplace con-
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tend that it is the higher-order needs of workers which have 
suffered the most serious and costly neglect.
In the early 1970s, it was relatively easy to catalogue scores 
of significant experiments which advanced innovative forms 
of work redesign. The primary focus of these efforts, at least 
in theory, was the scope and structure of individual jobs. By 
the close of the 1970s, however, the emphasis had shifted 
from job restructuring to much broader attempts at worker 
participation, and management interest in work reform had 
grown dramatically. Literally hundreds of major U.S. cor 
porations now have instituted some sort of work reform 
focusing on worker participation, real or illusory. The ef 
forts are sold under different guises, but their major appeal 
to management lies in the hope that new work designs would 
help reverse recent declines in productivity and will also serve 
as an antidote to periodic labor unrest and discontent.
Enlarging and Enriching Jobs
The earlier ideas of modern work reformers stemmed 
from the belief that specialization had progressed beyond the 
point of maximum productive efficiency. Citing rising 
educational attainment and worker expectations in the labor 
force, the critics of the 1960s argued that narrow work roles 
failed to utilize worker skills and even discouraged work ef 
fort through monotony and close supervision. As an alter 
native to such confining methods of assigning or ac 
complishing work, reformers sought to instill a sense of per 
sonal achievement by expanding the number or kinds of 
tasks required in each job. This approach to work reform, 
often termed job "enlargement" or "enrichment," ultimate 
ly attempts to improve the match between job requirements 
and individual capabilities and thereby to enhance overall 
productivity among workers.
158
The most drastic of these innovations is the replacement of 
assembly-line manufacture with benchwork arrangements. 
Workers with small, highly fractionated jobs are given 
responsibility for a series of operations, or occasionally a full 
assembly and testing process. An example was a much- 
touted experiment by General Foods at its Gaines Pet Food 
plant in Topeka, Kansas. The company discarded the tradi 
tional asssembly-line methods and members of work teams 
performed as many different types of tasks as possible. 7 
Similarly, both Motorola Corporation (Plantation, Florida) 
and Corning Glass (Bedford, Massachusetts) established fac 
tories in which individuals or small groups assembled, in 
spected, and tested entire electronic components or in 
struments. 8 While the permanence of results was suspect, the 
companies claimed at least short term successes, citing im 
proved morale, lower absenteeism and turnover, and 
substantially better product quality. However, because the 
option of reorganizing work on any basis other than 
assembly-line manufacture usually is feasible only through 
new plant construction, such radical attempts to "enlarge" 
jobs have stimulated far more discussion than replication.
A less revolutionary approach to job enrichment is to 
allow workers to perform various jobs, relieving assembly-
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line monotony by giving each worker more tasks which must 
be repeated less often. One such attempt at job enlargement 
was tried at the Maytag Company assembly and inspection 
of a new automatic washing machine was changed from a 
subdivided (average fifty-second interval) operation to a 
more complete job which took nine minutes to perform. 
Although training times were longer, the workers allegedly 
achieved levels of skill which put their productivity on a par 
with more fractionated methods. 9 Again, the Maytag pro 
gram reportedly brought at least temporary improvements in 
worker attitudes and product quality.
Most critiques of the workplace have centered on blue- 
collar jobs and assembly-line production, but the concepts of 
job enlargement and rotation have been applied to white- 
collar work as well. In general, the goal has been to reassign 
tasks so that each worker has a share of both boring, 
undesirable duties and more pleasant, creative ones, ideally 
including supervision and inspection. AT&T initiated one of 
the earliest experiments in an office setting in 1965, assigning 
individuals complete modules of work in an attempt to cut 
turnover and improve productivity. Thus, telephone book 
assemblers were given the entire job of processing and verify 
ing a section of a book, and billing clerks were given com 
plete responsibility for certain accounts instead of a single 
operation on each account. Along with this job enlargement, 
numerous positions were "upgraded" and offices were 
redesigned to facilitate communication among employees 
with related jobs. The claimed results presumably in 
cluding reduced absenteeism and turnover, improved pro 
ductivity and morale attracted widespread attention in the 
work reform debate. 10
A variety of companies have duplicated the AT&T 
methods. In most cases the emphasis has been on providing 
workers with a broader set of tasks and maximum freedom 
to accomplish them, a sharp contrast to the norm of frac-
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donated work roles and strict supervision. Although workers 
have been little involved in the planning processes of these 
experiments, they are usually given a greater measure of con 
trol in the actual performance of their work. The potential 
for this expansion of job responsibilities is limited by skill 
and staffing levels, but apparently some companies have 
found room to reverse past trends toward highly telescoped 
work roles.
While interest in job design spawned numerous reform ex 
periments, it should be noted that many such innovations 
were nothing more than improvements in the workplace. The 
renovation of workplaces to accommodate social interaction 
or work flow whether through circular benchwork ar 
rangements to facilitate conversation or the rearrangement 
of office furniture to facilitate interaction among members 
of work groups hardly constitutes genuine work reform. 
Improved dining, lavatory, and parking facilities, the aboli 
tion of time clocks, and the substitution of salaries for hour 
ly wages also aim at peripheral rather than structural 
features in job satisfaction. These approaches to poor 
worker morale may be effective, but they have less to do with 
the nature of work per se than with the amenities of the work 
environment and the differences in perceived status among 
various jobs. In this sense, such work "reforms" have 
familiar roots in the traditional union concern for worker 
dignity, supported now by management in the pursuit of im 
proved morale and productivity.
Participative Management 
and Quality Circles
Partly in recognition of the technical and economic limits 
to job redesign, advocates of work reform in the 1970s 
shifted their focus to broader concepts of participative 
management, seeking to promote greater diffusion of 
responsibility and control in work organizations. The move
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toward participative management is intended to serve multi 
ple goals: to more fully use the skills and information of 
workers; to enhance worker satisfaction; and to link to a 
greater extent the goals of the individual and the larger work 
organization. On the premise that even the most unpleasant 
jobs become more tolerable when workers have some voice 
in its overall planning and execution, work reformers have 
argued that worker participation provides a basis for iden 
tification with the firm's success. Experiments have run the 
gamut from suggestion boxes to autonomous work groups, 
but more time is needed to assess whether the fervor with 
which systems of participative management have been pur 
sued will have a lasting effect.
As with most other work "innovations," the sharing of 
responsibility and control is not a new idea. The optimum 
delegation of authority and control to achieve given objec 
tives has been debated at least since Jethro advised Moses on 
the organization of his chain of command, and has been 
thoroughly developed as a "science" in this century. Efforts 
to enlist workers' voluntary cooperation date as far back as 
profit sharing, an idea tried at the Bay State Shoe and 
Leather Company in 1867. Joint committees of management 
and labor have been tried at least since 1924 when the B&O 
Railroad instituted such a cooperative plan. The Elton Mayo 
pioneering studies in work teams at Western Electric Com 
pany and the profit sharing and worker suggestion systems 
developed by Joseph Scanlon are early examples of "par 
ticipative management." Although current work designers 
are mostly concerned with the sharing of responsibility as it 
relates to individual autonomy and work satisfaction, their 
methods have ample precedent.
It is the systematic analysis and implementation of this 
principle of worker participation which is relatively new. 
Ranging from quality circles to "quality-of-worklife" pro 
grams, attempts at highly structured labor-management
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cooperation have proliferated in the last five years and now 
dominate the discussions of work reform advocates. For 
organized labor, any positive reactions to these new thrusts 
into participative management are based on prospects for 
improved job satisfaction; for example, a March 1979 con 
ference of union officials examining quality-of-worklife im 
provement efforts defined the goal of such efforts as "the 
opportunity for employees at all levels in an organization to 
have substantial influence over their work environment by 
participating in decisions related to their work, thereby 
enhancing their self-esteem and satisfaction from their 
work." 11 Needless to say, management representatives come 
to quality-of-worklife programs with a somewhat different 
perspective, viewing participative management as a tech 
nique to improve worker morale and more importantly to in 
crease productivity. In both cases, however, there remains a 
belief that meaningful participation can alter worker at 
titudes in a significant and constructive way.
The recent resurgence of interest in participative manage 
ment is illustrated by the growing number of quality circles 
in American industries. Small committees in which manage 
ment and labor representatives jointly analyze and solve pro-
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duction problems, these quality circles were first conceived 
by American consultants in the early 1950s, but were widely 
adopted only in Japan. As one factor in impressive quality 
control and productivity gains in Japanese industry, the con 
cept attracted increasing attention in the mid-1970s and has 
now emerged as the latest fad in industrial management in 
the United States. Depending on what is counted and who is 
doing it, estimates of the number of American companies us 
ing quality circles range from 250 to 2,500, including such 
corporate giants as General Motors, American Airlines, and 
Honeywell Corporation. 12 Although a survey conducted for 
the International Association of Quality Circles indicated 
that many circles are "nothing more than monthly super 
visors' meetings or traditional project committees set up to 
deal with problems identified by management," they certain 
ly are an institutional mechanism through which worker par 
ticipation efforts are channeled. 13
The proliferation of quality circles, and the broader 
quality-of-worklife movement of which they are a part, are 
heralded by their advocates as offering diverse potential 
benefits for both management and labor. Irving Bluestone, 
the leading American union advocate of quality-of-worklife 
initiatives, has contended that such programs can lead to: 
more constructive collective bargaining; a more satisfied 
workforce; improved product quality and efficiency; and 
reductions in absenteeism, labor turnover, grievances and 
disciplinary actions. 14 Most of his fellow union leaders are 
less sanguine about the compatibility of management and 
worker interests, but increasingly there is a consensus that 
organized labor cannot ignore quality-of-worklife processes. 
And for management, quality circles and other participative 
management techniques are often viewed as the only alter 
native to deteriorating product quality and declining com 
petitiveness in international markets. Notwithstanding ex 
pressions of humanitarian concern for worker satisfaction 
and fulfillment, firms rarely devote resources to quality-of-
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worklife programs without an expectation of tangible results 
in the form of enhanced profits.
Of course, the crucial distinction between various quality- 
of-worklife efforts is the extent to which they actually 
delegate responsibility and control to workers. Nearly all 
companies find it advantageous to encourage voluntary 
cooperation from their employees, and yet few are willing to 
give broad policymaking authority to workers. Between the 
extremes, the varieties of shared responsibility and control 
come in every shade of gray, making it difficult to gauge the 
significance and effectiveness of the overall quality-of- 
worklife movement. Meaningful diffusion of responsibility 
and control is important to the success of participative 
management models, for only a clear sense of influence will 
convince workers that their participation and ideas are taken 
seriously. The desire of managers to elicit worker participa 
tion and thus achieve greater productivity while preserving 
traditional decisionmaking prerogatives creates the fun 
damental tension in quality-of-worklife schemes, and it is on 
the establishment of an acceptable balance that the success 
or failure of such projects depends.
A few examples help illustrate the range of options utilized 
in delegating authority to workers. In one of the oldest and 
most widely noted experiments in participative management, 
Donnelly Mirrors Corporation of Holland, Michigan, 
transferred responsibility for virtually the entire production 
function of the business to the workers on the line. A small 
company supplying mirrors to the auto industry with a long 
history of profit sharing and open labor-management com 
munication, Donnelly became a model of work reform near 
ly two decades ago by dividing employees into task-oriented 
teams responsible for setting and reaching production goals. 
The workers were given the authority to control the assembly 
pace and the assignment of jobs along the line. In addition, 
all employees received salaries rather than hourly wages, col-
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lectively setting the rates at which they would be paid but 
also holding the responsibility for implementing the produc 
tivity increases which must support pay raises. Under this 
system, the company enjoyed marked improvements in pro 
duct quality and manufacturing efficiency, making its pro 
gram one of the most successful of its kind. 15
"The management seems concerned that 
we're spending too much time on this topic."
This ambitious participative management technique in 
which fully autonomous work groups determine production 
quotas, work methods, job assignments, and pay rates in 
dependently of higher level management has been tried on 
ly infrequently and has generated few long term success 
stories. The full-scale diffusion of responsibility and control 
was attempted at Weyerhauser Lumber Company in 
Tacoma, Washington and resulted in some significant cost 
savings, but over time a number of autonomous production 
units failed to reach management-set standards and were 
abandoned. 16 Similarly, an in-depth study of work groups 
initiated at Sound, Incorporated in Los Angeles concluded 
that the most innovative attempts to give workers decision- 
making authority failed to get off the ground. 17 It is not sur 
prising that most companies still view the wholesale diffu-
166
sion of production responsibilities as more of a risk than 
they are prepared to take.
The mainstream of contemporary quality-of-worklife pro 
grams is typified by a hybrid of traditional and innovative 
management styles, in which top management reserves 
unilateral rights to overrule quality circle or worker recom 
mendations but must exercise such rights sparingly in order 
to preserve a spirit of meaningful participation. Thus, 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation has embraced a system 
of participative management based on a series of councils, 
committees and quality circles which deal with issues as 
diverse as the allocation of capital among production units 
and vandalism in worker restrooms. 18 General Motors and 
the United Auto Workers agreed in 1973 to form a national 
joint committee to improve the quality-of-worklife, and 
subsequently developed a set of guiding principles which 
have become the basis for at least fifty quality-of-worklife 
programs in local UAW-GM bargaining units, including a 
model program at the GM assembly plant in Tarrytown, 
New York. 19 The list of notable quality-of-worklife pro 
grams goes on and on including Xerox, Polaroid, General 
Electric, Texas Instruments, Sperry Corporation, Digital 
Equipment and many smaller firms. While it is uncertain 
whether these innovations will pay off for either labor or 
management, it is at least clear that a significant number of 
companies, including major corporations, are willing to ex 
periment with accepting workers as limited partners through 
participative management.
Work Reform in Europe
The debate surrounding the structure and implementation 
of work reform efforts has been more heated in Western 
Europe than in the United States. Virtually every major in 
dustrialized nation has its own record of work experiments 
addressing problems of worker satisfaction and productivi-
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ty, including numerous attempts by manufacturers in 
England and on the Continent to develop more humanized 
jobs in factories. European trade unions have succeeded in 
establishing a much stronger pattern of industrial democracy 
than ever contemplated in the United States, with substantial 
control of production frequently delegated to worker coun 
cils or representatives. In general, the concept of worker par 
ticipation is less foreign to the history and management 
psychology of European firms, and work innovations have 
been tied more closely to government policies and union 
demands.
Studies on autonomous work groups and worker motiva 
tion were pioneered by the Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations, founded in England in 1946. The Institute's early 
research among coal and textile workers spawned a wide 
range of work reform initiatives throughout Europe in the 
1950s and 1960s. In its continuing work on employee motiva 
tion and satisfaction, the Institute has examined issues of 
work reorganization, industrial democracy, and the impact 
of organizational and legal structures on the process of 
worker participation in Europe. Its landmark studies on 
worker attitudes have shaped much of the subsequent debate 
on work reform, and its contributions continue to move that 
discussion forward in the 1980s.
As in the United States, numerous work reform ex 
periments in European nations have concentrated on 
relatively narrow issues of job redesign. Attempts at Saab 
and Volvo plants in Sweden to avoid the worst aspects of 
auto assembly-line work, through bothjob enlargement and 
the creation of work teams which assemble entire vehicles, 
gained widespread media attention. In France, considerable 
attention has been given to the architectural design of work 
environments and the size of production units as important 
factors in work satisfaction. 20 West Germany has supported 
experiments in work reorganization, and the government's
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program has been criticized for assisting companies in 
worker safety and automation initiatives more appropriately 
financed by the firms themselves. 21 In all of these cases, the 
study of job design has addressed concerns for occupational 
health and safety as well as less tangible areas of 
psychological stress and job satisfaction.
State programs in France and West Germany are signifi 
cant because they have linked issues of work organization 
with broader strategies for economic modernization and 
with responses to larger socio-technological problems. 22 
Believing that a movement away from short work cycles and 
conventional assembly-line techniques will enhance produc 
tivity and international competitiveness, the German govern 
ment spent about $42 million on "humanization" projects, 
with its Ministry of Research and Technology reimbursing 
employers for 50 percent of the direct cost of restructuring a 
work operation and retraining workers. The French govern 
ment played a similar role in promoting work 
reform legislation passed in 1973 created the national agen 
cy for the improvement of working conditions, which 
publishes periodic reports on trends in work reform and also 
subsidizes experimental projects in private industry. The 
willingness of the German and French governments to 
devote public resources to work reform experiments is in 
stark contrast to the lack of United States' public involve 
ment in such activities.
The concept of worker participation and control has also 
been developed in European countries to a far greater extent 
than in American firms. In Yugoslavia, production systems 
in which small teams determine production goals and job 
assignments while reaping the benefits of productivity gains 
have flourished since the end of World War II. Trade unions 
in Scandinavia have had sufficient muscle to secure govern 
ment mandates guaranteeing worker participation in the 
decisions of private companies and sharply curtailing
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management prerogatives in a wide range of areas. A 1977 
Swedish law required full disclosure of information related 
to management decisions and removed limitations on the 
sphere of collective bargaining so that even decisions on in 
vestment policy and plant location could be subject to union 
negotiations. 23 Similarly, a 1977 Norway law included far- 
reaching demands for the reduction of stress and monotony 
at the workplace, for variability and opportunities for per 
sonal development in jobs, and for self-determination in the 
labor process. 24 While union leaders in both countries have 
concentrated their efforts on occupational health and safety 
and less concrete participation and job content mandates 
have proven difficult to enforce, the policy changes 
themselves reflect the level of interest and commitment to 
work reform and enhanced worker participation.
The contrast between American and European models of 
industrial relations is most clearly illustrated by cultural 
perspectives on codetermination, the direct participation of 
labor representatives in company management. With higher 
levels of unionization and greater politicization of European 
unions, codetermination has become an integral part of 
worker participation mechanisms in West Germany, 
Sweden, and Norway, and has drawn increasing attention in 
France and Italy. Yet the codetermination model has been 
coolly received in the United States by management and 
labor alike. Noted labor economist Jack Barbash has argued 
that codetermination "runs against the grain of the 
American way in industrial management," rejected by 
management for fear of losing control and by labor for fear 
of losing bargaining effectiveness through shared respon 
sibility. 25 The president of the Communications Workers of 
America, Glenn E. Watts, put the union position succinctly 
when he remarked,"! don't want to sit on the board and be 
responsible for managing the business. I want to be free as a 
unionist to criticize management." 26
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This adversarial tenor of American industrial relations 
also plays an extremely important role in distinguishing be 
tween work reform experiments in the United States and 
Japanese models of participative management currently in 
vogue. While Japanese concepts of quality control and in 
novation may be applicable in some circumstances to 
American firms, the cultural differences which separate 
workers in Japan and the United States seriously limit the 
relevance of Japanese models of work organization to 
American problems. American labor exhibits neither the 
heightened class consciousness of its European counterparts 
nor the docility of Japanese workers. It occupies a middle 
ground characterized by a practical distrust of management, 
resisting both the internalization of corporate goals and the 
ideological pursuit of anticorporate sentiments through 
class-based political action. The structure of American in 
dustrial relations is not immutable as but one example, it 
seems possible that conservative economic policies embraced 
in the early 1980s will lead to a period of greater political ac 
tivism by unions. Yet the historical development of labor- 
management relations does define both the prospects of and 
limits to change at the American workplace.
The Importance of Reform Experiments
The attention focused on experiments to redesign jobs 
stemmed originally from the publicized notion of the 
"alienated" worker, but the impact of work reform has now 
stretched well beyond that narrow discussion of job satisfac 
tion. Even if no crisis of discontent is in sight, the discovery 
that work in many cases can be reorganized while still 
meeting productivity and profit goals is of humanitarian in 
terest. Menial and monotonous jobs requiring hard and dirty 
work are not new, but neither are they illusions created by 
work reformers they simply are the continuing byproduct 
of an industrial system now populated by a less timid and 
less patient generation. On this basis alone, there is ample
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reason to believe that work reform experiments will continue 
and that new solutions to problems of undesirable work will 
be sought in an attempt to cope with rising expectations 
within the labor force.
The increasing awareness among management and labor 
of the potential for marginal improvements in work has been 
particularly encouraging. Although the basic concepts in 
modern work design experiments are familiar, the use of 
these techniques seems more common than even a decade 
ago. Similarly, while all workers may not strive for self- 
actualization through work, many will no doubt appreciate 
the benefits of more challenging and rewarding jobs. It is im 
portant to keep the rhetoric of work reformists in perspec 
tive, for the limits of job redesign and worker participation 
are at times severe. Yet by emphasizing the importance of 
workers as human capital, the advocates of work reform 
have made a lasting contribution to the quality of work for 
generations to come.

8 The Limits to Change
The fact is that the work which
improves the condition of mankind,
the work which extends knowledge
and increases power and enriches
literature, and elevates thought,
is not done to secure a living. It is
not the work of slaves, driven to
their task by the lash of a master
or by animal necessities. It is the
work of men who perform it for
their own sake, and not that they
may get more to eat or drink, or
wear, or display. In a state of
society where want is abolished,
work of this sort could be
enormously increased.
 Henry George, 
Progress and Poverty
Reports of work reform experiments are almost always 
"success" stories. These positive accounts are understand 
able the literature is most often the product of reform ad 
vocates committed to change at the workplace. Yet a calmer 
evaluation of the potential for work reform must recognize 
the biases of such messianic tracts, and examine the full 




The tendency toward selective reporting of work reform 
results is impossible to ignore. Companies whose enrichment 
and participation plans turn sour rarely trumpet the news, 
just as consultants drawing fees for their advice have little in 
centive to emphasize the limits to work reform. Even jour 
nalists seeking good copy tend to overlook the continuing ef 
fectiveness of authoritarian controls and traditional job 
rewards while publicizing less representative innovations by 
employers. Although acclaimed experiments at the 
workplace do provide useful lessons as to what "works" and 
why, their achievements must be viewed in a realistic 
perspective which acknowledges the obstacles to long term 
and widespread change.
Permanence and Replicability
It is common for proponents of work reform to cite im 
mediate gains in productivity, worker morale and product 
quality following the implementation of work innovations. 
Yet short term results of such efforts are not in themselves 
significant. As documented by industrial psychologists at 
Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant in the 1920s, 
any change in management style, whether autocratic or 
democratic, may generate short term productivity 
gains workers simply respond to expressions of manage 
ment interest. This "Hawthorne effect" makes longitudinal 
studies of work reform experiments particularly important, 
and yet such long term analyses of work innovations remain 
extremely rare. In fairness to advocates of work reform, the 
difficulties of establishing rigorous controls and isolating 
other variables at the workplace are numerous, and manage 
ment attempts at work reform usually emphasize tangible 
results rather than valid proofs of causal relationships. The 
inevitable record, however, is garbled accounts of produc 
tivity gains and tenuous assumptions about their origin, pro 
viding a weak research base for any claims of success.
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If the productivity gains of work experiments are of in 
determinate duration, changes in worker attitudes and 
morale may be even less permanent. Just as today's young 
union members may have little appreciation for the wages 
and working conditions won by earlier generations, so new 
workers in "humanized" plants may fail to find their work 
upgraded or more enjoyable. Those who are present for the 
change from assembly lines to benchwork, or those who 
remember the authoritarian supervision which preceded the 
introduction of participative management, may appreciate 
the better quality of their work. But positive reactions 
resulting from innovations inevitably fade as novel systems 
become routine, and new arrivals are likely to see only jobs 
with certain sets of tasks, wages, and bosses. An initial spurt 
of enthusiasm for redesigned work may objectively reflect 
"better" jobs, but there is ample reason to believe the long 
term result will be higher expectations rather than enhanced 
worker satisfaction.
The question of permanence is perhaps most critical in 
programs of participative management. Because an un 
wavering commitment to nontraditional management styles 
is essential to the continuing success of worker participation 
schemes, many initiatives falter when the novelty wears off. 
Managers may become frustrated with the demands of par 
ticipative decisionmaking, and workers may become disillu 
sioned with the slow pace of change or the limited extent of 
their influence. In either case, a sense of meaningful worker
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participation is easier to create through work innovations 
than it is to sustain over long periods of time. Unlike changes 
in actual job design, the benefits of participative manage 
ment are as ephemeral as the spirit of cooperation and open 
communication from which they arise, and thus may 
evaporate in the face of personnel changes and unfulfilled 
expectations. Reports of the short term gains may encourage 
reform advocates, but the true test of participative manage 
ment efforts lies further down the road.
These transient and illusory characteristics of many work 
reform attempts serve as important qualifications to the 
literature describing such experiments. Yet even in those 
cases in which lasting results are achieved through innova 
tions at the workplace, the expansion or diffusion of suc 
cessful reform methods has proven extremely difficult. In a 
discussion of past work redesign initiatives, one observer 
argued that successful case studies have left us with little 
systematic knowledge of how to effectively organize work 
activities, claiming that few experimental programs had been 
replicated in other organizations or even diffused 
throughout the organizations in which they were launched. 1 
Frequently, work reforms are undertaken in relatively small 
companies on a comprehensive basis, or else become encap 
sulated in a particular unit of a larger corporation as a "pilot 
project." In either event, new principles of work organiza 
tion and design which can be clearly articulated and applied 
in diverse work environments remain very limited.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that diffusion of 
innovative work systems is inherently slow, particularly for 
the more nebulous quality-of-worklife programs currently in 
vogue. Initiatives in participative management tend to be 
highly subjective and personalized, providing more a process 
for improved communication than a standardized solution 
for specific problems of work organization and design. For 
this reason, even when quality-of-worklife programs offer
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relative advantages over existing systems, they often are dif 
ficult to replicate by nature they tend to conflict with 
established norms and values, to defy easy description, to 
pose risks of failure, and to threaten the authority and con 
trol of traditional decisionmakers. 2 Furthermore, for unit 
managers there is little to be gained by adopting a work 
design successfully tested in another branch of the organiza 
tion. At best, credit for the diffusion is shared with the 
original designers, while responsibility for failure to replicate 
a "proven" model is likely to fall solely upon the unit 
manager.
The combined lack of permanence and replicability has led 
James O'Toole to conclude that almost all of the well- 
publicized efforts of the 1970s to restructure the work en 
vironment have failed to survive intact. Rather than thriving, 
he contends that "the general pattern in more than 100 
plants, ranging from a radio factory to a telephone com 
pany is one of a brief leap forward followed by a prolong 
ed backslide." 3 Although O'Toole attributes these failures to 
experimental designs which were monolithic, static, and in 
sufficiently tied to monetary rewards, it seems that an ex 
haustive list of barriers to work reform would be con 
siderably longer and that the very potential for improved 
work may be seriously limited.
Without question, some experiments in job redesign and 
participative management have produced promising results 
from the perspective of both management and labor. 
Reported gains in product quality, productivity and worker 
satisfaction cannot be totally dismissed, and yet they also 
may not represent the wave of the future for most organiza 
tions and workers. Such experiments focus heavily on 
manufacturing settings, a work environment which is in 
creasingly dwarfed by the growth of the service sector. More 
importantly, even in this relatively narrow context, 
technological and economic forces seriously constrain alter-
178
native ways of organizing work. In the absence of fun 
damental revisions of our economic system, voluntary ef 
forts at work reform will never transform the workplace, but 
will remain confined to narrow areas in which the common 
interests of labor and management are clear and compelling.
Technology and Job Redesign
The concept of redesigning or enriching jobs is fundamen 
tally a challenge to the idea that technology dictates work 
organization and job definitions. To replace more tradi 
tional notions of technological determinism, work reform 
proponents suggest that there are a number of equally pro 
ductive alternatives for job design within any technological 
framework, some of which exact greater human costs than 
others.
The goal of job enrichment is to correct what advocates 
view as a longstanding failure to consider the human costs of 
production alternatives costs which some suggest will 
render modern organizations increasingly dysfunctional. 4 In 
this sense the plea for "enriched" or "humanized" jobs is 
coupled with a vision of vast, untapped human potential. A 
major advocate asserted:
If only a small percentage of time and money that is 
now devoted to hygiene . . . were given to job 
enrichment efforts, the return in human satisfac 
tion and economic gain would be one of the largest 
dividends that industry and society have ever 
reaped through their efforts at better personnel 
management. 5
Not only can job redesign be accomplished with minimal ef 
fort, the argument goes, but it is an avenue for raising pro 
ductivity through the more enlightened use of human 
resources.
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The surge of interest in job design has not been without its 
useful contributions to accepted ways of dividing tasks at the 
workplace. At a basic level, the debate concerning job 
enrichment has counterbalanced overly narrow views of 
technological efficiency in which human resources are 
forgotten as important variables in the production process. 
For example, work reform advocates have succeeded in 
focusing discussion on the inefficiencies of excessive divi 
sions of labor with extremely short and highly repetitive job 
cycles. It is very possible that some workers would be more 
productive if they had more interest in their work, and that 
job cycles of three or ten minutes would be less monotonous 
and more efficient than those of thirty seconds. Experiments 
in job redesign serve as reminders that workers themselves 
have some control over output and productive efficiency, 
and that at some point the pursuit of narrower goals of 




In their zeal, however, advocates of job redesign have 
often overstated their case, ignoring the constraints imposed 
by technology in the search for production efficiency. Even
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if technology is not an absolute determinant of job design, it 
remains a decisive influence in the great majority of work 
settings, particularly in manufacturing. Milling machines, 
computers, forklifts and arc welding techniques tend to 
dwarf any choices of task assignment in dictating the nature 
and scope of individual jobs. Particularly in mass produc 
tion systems, there is little room for variation of work roles 
without decreasing productivity. The traditional structure 
of manufacturing industries has not evolved 
haphazardly specialization may be costly in terms of 
human satisfaction, but it promises relatively cheap produc 
tion. At some point, advocates of job enrichment clash 
directly with the logic which first spawned the division of 
labor as an essential ingredient of efficient mass production, 
overlooking the unprecedented advances which the assembly 
line has made possible.
A few attempts to depart radically from assembly-line pro 
duction methods have met with some success, and yet the 
alternative systems of manufacture are applicable to only a 
small number of situations. For example, the widely herald 
ed "benchwork" assembly methods at Motorola, Maytag, 
and Corning Glass involved products with small com 
ponents, fairly lengthy assembly times, and few tools. In 
dividual and small group assembly of whole items is much 
less feasible in industries which involve large units or com 
plex, expensive tools the inescapable logistics of storing 
and moving large components generally means that assembl 
ing cars or refrigerators or engines can be accomplished most 
efficiently on a conveyor belt. Even the reform-minded 
managers of Donnelly Mirrors realized that an assembly line, 
with specialized jobs and constantly paced synchronized 
operations, was essential to profitable mass production.
In industrial sectors where existing technologies are par 
ticularly rigid or oppressive, the benefits of work restructur 
ing may be severely limited, offering "little more than a
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Band-Aid." 6 One critic of job enrichment efforts viewed the 
search for more "humanistic" designs as fundamentally at 
odds with production goals:
Given . . . the basic nature of mass production, 
where can there possibly be opportunities for such 
highly individualistic activity as autonomy, 
creativity, and self-actualization? I am afraid there 
are few if any at all. 7
In many ways, the mass production of multiple, identical, 
consumer goods is dismally confining. The worker in an effi 
ciently designed, machine-dominated factory is often a cog, 
performing jobs that cannot be deeply satisfying. While 
management techniques may have the potential for relieving 
pressures or enhancing self-esteem, the prospects for 
creating interesting or meaningful work roles in these set 
tings are very slim.
Of course, the champions of job enrichment launch their 
arguments with appeals to the profit motive. They claim that 
the advantages of eliminating high turnover rates, raising 
product quality, decreasing waste, and tapping firsthand 
knowledge for design innovations justify improvements in 
work quality on economic grounds alone. Yet proponents of 
work reform ultimately seek to enlarge jobs, increase skills, 
lengthen job cycles or rotate tasks for the sake of workers 
themselves, as part of an effort to make work more 
"humane." In the extreme, this view becomes an argument 
for a return to craft production, characterized by more com 
plex jobs with longer training times. When the true costs of 
job enrichment (including higher training costs, greater in 
ventories, and duplication of tools) are tallied, such reforms 
are exposed as appealing but noncompetitive and thus of lit 
tle interest to management. An automobile can be produced 
by craftsmen, but only at costs that few can afford.
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Even when technological advance or creative engineering 
designs make possible more "humane" forms of work 
organization, the awesome capital investment necessary to 
revamp established methods of production poses a major 
barrier to job redesign. If manufacturing jobs have become 
hardened into molds cut generations ago, much of the reason 
lies in the physical plant and machinery accumulated over 
the years. Plants manufacturing durable goods contained an 
average of approximately $60,000 of fixed capital per worker 
in 1980, and these real costs are constantly rising. Particular 
ly as automated machinery is introduced to ensure more 
stringent quality controls, the factory will become increas 
ingly capital-intensive and even less susceptible to the 
dramatic reorganization of work processes. It is hardly sur 
prising that the most innovative experiments in job redesign 
have been undertaken in newly-constructed facilities, 
without the limitations implicit in years of accumulated 
capital.
Changes at the workplace are painfully slow and evolu 
tionary in nature. The design of jobs may be far from ideal 
in terms of potential job satisfaction, but they do reflect the 
plodding rate at which new technologies are adopted in a ra 
tional search for production efficiency. Industrial 
psychologists can sweep through factories unlocking ex 
ecutive toilets and removing time clocks, and such incidental 
improvements in the work environment may bolster worker 
morale. Yet the same workers and machines will be left to 
crank out coffee pots or card tables or cookie jars, with little 
flexibility to alter basic manufacturing processes. Placed in a 
realistic framework of technological change and production 
constraints in competitive markets, principles of job redesign 
can do little more than correct excessively narrow definitions 
of efficiency and remind us that workers remain a significant 
variable in the drive for improved productivity.
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Common Interests and Participation
Just as the enthusiasm for job redesign has been based on 
an overly optimistic view of technology, the growing interest 
in participative management is rooted in a rose-colored vi 
sion of the commonality of interest between management 
and labor. Participative decisionmaking, profit sharing, and 
autonomous work arrangements all seek to unite the in 
dividual's goals with the firm's pursuit of profits. From an 
employer's perspective, the hope is that shared responsibility 
will cause workers to identify with the larger organization,, 
and that an acceptance of the organization's aims will 
transform a monotonous job into a labor of love. 
Presumably, everyone wins under this enlightened manage 
ment style workers feel more important and thereby more 
satisfied, while management reaps the benefits of greater 
productivity and fewer disruptions at the workplace. Yet few 
proponents pause to examine the strength of this com 
monality of interest, and they ignore the tension between 
management and labor priorities which seriously limits the 
scope and significance of participative management efforts.
Except in the face of deep crisis, the goals of any sizable 
corporation and those of its employees are not easily har 
monized. By its nature, the corporation is not primarily con 
cerned with worker satisfaction, but rather is openly in 
terested in profits and evaluates most other goals in relation 
to this single variable. Similarly, workers are concerned with 
improving their own lives, a goal only incidentally related to 
the corporation's success and often in direct conflict with the 
corporate drive for higher profits. Unless corporate enter 
prises radically alter their function to make the welfare of 
employees their first reason for being, the basis on which 
workers would fully embrace the firm's goals is hard to im 
agine. Management and labor simply have distinctly dif 
ferent sets of priorities and concerns at the workplace.
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The tension between management and labor goals is 
revealed when the actual implementation of participative 
management is considered. For example, management 
respondents commenting on a recent labor conference on 
quality-of-worklife programs repeatedly voiced concerns 
that too much attention was being given to worker needs, 
noting that increased productivity and improved organiza 
tional effectiveness are among the key objectives which make 
management willing to spend time and money on par 
ticipative management. 8 In a similar vein, while former 
UAW vice-president Irving Bluestone asserts that 
"democratizing the workplace and humanizing the job need 
not be matters of confrontation" between labor and 
management, he also expresses hope that the auto manufac 
turers will abandon "the historic trickle-down theory that 
profits come first, that profits exemplify good in themselves 
and can only redound to the benefit of society." 9 Amidst 
fears that the priorities of both parties will somehow be lost 
or forgotten, the common ground for labor-management 
cooperation seems much smaller than theorists suggest.
The distinction between labor and management interests is 
more than some abstract Marxist truism. Rather, the poten 
tial for conflict is apparent whenever the cost of work 
reforms becomes significant. Employers are acutely aware of 
what reform initiatives may cost, and they rarely pursue such 
innovations without the promise of long term payoffs in pro 
fit and productivity. More importantly, when work reform 
fails to produce benefits for management, the effort is quick 
ly dropped even if it offers gains in worker satisfaction. The 
experience of one corporation, an early participant in job 
humanization experiments, illustrates the point: The owner 
was committed to improved work, but he abandoned the 
concept when profits plummeted, observing that "the pur 
pose of business ... is not to develop new theories of 
management." 10 A better lot for workers does not always
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translate into higher profits for employers, and few firms 
stick with experiments on humanitarian grounds alone.
Workers are no less disinterested in their approach to 
work reform. Few employees would give up a part of their 
compensation to support costs of job redesign or par 
ticipative management, and many might reject 
"humanized" work if it meant accepting lower levels or even 
slower growth of wages. Furthermore, labor is wary of the 
source of higher profits and productivity stemming from 
work reform, believing that experiments at the workplace 
may simply elicit greater work effort without providing fair 
compensation in return by raising production standards, cir 
cumventing seniority systems, and upgrading skill levels 
while avoiding additional remuneration. 11 Particularly if 
they do not enjoy any of the benefits of reduced costs and 
higher productivity, workers may be justified in viewing 
work reform as part of a long tradition of management 
manipulation contrary to labor interests.
standard oMiving 
humanization
The adversarial relationship between labor and manage 
ment is evident not only when considering the costs and 
benefits of work reform, but also when determining the ex 
tent of worker responsibility and control in participative 
management schemes. From a management perspective, the
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retention of control or ultimate decisionmaking authority is 
an integral part of profit maximization, and very few firms 
are so devoted to worker participation that they are willing 
to surrender "veto" powers over worker recommendations. 
Some employers may demonstrate a genuine interest in 
engaging workers in the solution of production problems, 
but beyond this narrow realm the goal is to give employees a 
"sense" of control without surrendering decisionmaking 
prerogatives. To the extent that meaningful influence and 
authority are withheld, such experiments in participative 
management may be rightly viewed by labor as shams, as 
sophisticated attempts at behavior modification. Yet the 
alternative to relinquish actual control of production and 
profits to a group of workers poses a threat to the very ex 
istence of the corporation in its traditional form.
In practical terms, the social and institutional forces 
resisting meaningful diffusion of responsibility and control 
are extremely powerful. As sociologist Robert Schrank has 
noted, the primary purpose of hierarchy is control, and any 
shift in the nature of control threatens those who might lose 
some authority. 12 Middle managers upon whom the success 
of more open, participative styles of management depend are 
only too frequently disposed toward autocratic forms of 
supervision and decisionmaking this management ap 
proach fits nicely with traditional organizational structures, 
enriches managerial roles, and is consistent with the domi 
nant behavior styles of both employees and managers in con 
temporary organizations. More innovative management 
styles not only require a distinctly different set of interper 
sonal skills, but they also run counter to the competitive in 
stincts which are usually responsible for corporate survival 
and achievement. In this context, middle management has 
emerged as a major institutional barrier to even the most 
well-intentioned participative management efforts.
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Supporters of worker participation are guilty not only of 
underestimating the divergence of labor and management 
goals they can also be faulted for failing to acknowledge 
the strength of authoritarian and meritocratic norms embed 
ded in American culture.' 3 Throughout our society, we place 
great emphasis on individualism, on a competitive struggle 
for recognition and authority, so that the concept of col 
laborative decisionmaking and its implicit diffusion of 
responsibility and control is typically rejected in large 
American organizations as foreign and counterproductive. 
While most reform advocates discuss prospects for par 
ticipative management as though these experiments were to 
be undertaken in a cultural vacuum, their effectiveness in 
reshaping the modern workplace is severely limited by strong 
philosophical and behavioral biases favoring authoritarian 
and hierarchical control. With managers and workers ac 
customed to other norms, the drive for acceptance of par 
ticipative values will remain an uphill battle.
It is not surprising that American management has 
responded to these problems of diverging interests and 
cultural biases by establishing very modest objectives for 
worker participation. Rejecting the extremes of complete 
management manipulation or worker control, "quality 
circles" and related initiatives seek cooperation within 
relatively limited areas, hoping to establish some basis for 
improved communication between managers and workers 
while realizing marginal gains in productivity, product quali 
ty and profitability. Limited profit-sharing schemes 
sometimes are adopted as a means of strengthening worker 
commitment to such participative mechanisms, although 
even this distribution of profits can be only partial if 
management incentives to adopt work reforms are to be 
maintained. Workers typically are given a voice without 
gaining significant responsibility or authority, and therefore 
the likelihood that they "internalize" the firm's goals seems
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very slim. Employees who enjoy opportunities to voice their 
opinions and participate in joint undertakings may feel more 
satisfied with their jobs, but the adversarial tenor of 
American industrial relations will hardly be dispelled in the 
process.
The eventual success of participative management tech 
niques depends largely on the relationship between managers 
and workers. Some advocates stress that positive attitude 
and commitment within managerial ranks are critical to the 
effectiveness of such work experiments, while other pro 
ponents have emphasized a presumably direct relationship 
between the scope of participation and improvements in 
morale, motivation and productivity. Unfortunately for 
work reformers, the intangibles of managerial behavior are 
extremely difficult to alter or influence in a systematic 
fashion, and the expansion of worker responsibility and 
decisionmaking authority heightens the risks of participative 
management, thereby diminishing its attractiveness. The 
useful lesson found in concepts of participative management 
is neither revolutionary nor complex, but perhaps far more 
useful in practice any change in management style or deci 
sionmaking which treats workers as individuals with ideas of 
potential value, rather than as cogs in a machine, is likely to 
allow workers a greater sense of dignity and foster a more 
positive attitude toward management and work as a whole. 
In this sense, even the simplest reforms to increase worker 
participation will have some humanistic value when adopted 
by enlightened and well-intentioned employers.
The Fallacies of Radical Work Reform
Inflated expectations for reforming work may often be 
traced in part to the redesigner's inaccurate or incomplete 
understanding of the job market and the workforce realities. 
Too frequently job redesign consultants seem to attack and 
"solve" problems which exist mostly in their imaginations.
189
Even when the problems of harsh or unsatisfying work do 
exist, reform speculations tend to ignore the basic 
technological and economic forces which created them and 
to offer solutions which are unworkable in a market context. 
Clearly there are some improvements in job design and 
worker participation which can be adopted in a manner con 
sistent with societal norms and economic constraints, but to 
expect too much from the restructuring of jobs and work 
organizations is to invite disappointment and discontent.
In both job redesign and participative management, much 
of the work of reform advocates invokes a sense of 
nostalgia, wistfully seeking a return to an earlier era of in 
dustrial development. Jobs are to be enlarged toward the 
ideal of the highly skilled craftsman, and organizations are 
to be split into smaller units where the individual "doesn't 
get lost." Yet whatever the price that society is paying in 
terms of "dehumanized" jobs in monolithic, faceless 
organizations, it is unrealistic to hark back to a simpler 
world in which organizations were small and jobs were large, 
as though "paradise lost" could be regained. Specialized 
roles and specialized knowledge are essential to large 
organizations, and large organizations are unavoidable in an 
advanced society. Breaking up the corporation into small
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units with broad work roles may indeed be desirable from 
the standpoint of improving the quality of work, but it 
would not provide the efficient production which supports 
the tremendous affluence to which we have become ac 
customed.
Some critics of the modern workplace have gone so far as 
to reject the importance of economic efficiency as a 
necessary attribute of reformed work, arguing that the needs 
of workers should dictate the design and organization of 
production processes even if overall productivity is reduced. 
In this model of social efficiency, traditional economic costs 
presumably are to be balanced against the social costs of 
alienation, dissatisfaction, poor health and other products of 
unrewarding work. Yet any retreat from the productivity 
front to more primitive, costly, and "human" methods of 
manufacture would certainly occur only through govern 
mental intervention, and most likely would not reflect the 
priorities and values of workers or of the majority of society. 
In a complex society seeking to support its growing popula 
tion at an ever-rising standard of living and to pull in many 
more who were excluded from partaking in the rewards of an 
affluent society, the trends toward increased specialization 
and large hierarchical organizations are far more willful than 
accidental. The values and priorities conceivably could 
change, but at present we seem far away from placing work 
quality before affluence.
There is an inescapable irony in the debate over work 
reform and concepts of social efficiency. In a sense, the 
methods of production so decried for their low-quality work 
have spawned their own opposition, generating un 
precedented standards of living which now provide the basis 
for criticisms of work quality. Without the tremendous af 
fluence generated by efficient mass production, there would 
be no alternative lifestyles or occupations for workers to en 
vy, and no time to invest in the education which has con-
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tributed to workers' dissatisfaction. Even while indulging in 
nostalgic longings for "better" work, there is little 
likelihood that the vast majority of current society would ac 
tually sacrifice more income in favor of a more "human" 
form of work. For now at least, it does not seem that we can 
afford both.
By ignoring the diversity of human interests and 
needs,work reform proponents run the risk of projecting 
their personal value systems on others as though there were a 
single, optimal approach to the design and organization of 
work. Advocates of job redesign have been the most specific, 
in their criteria for "meaningful" work. For example, Louis 
Davis developed an exhaustive list of social objectives for 
job redesign, ranging from self-organization and self-control 
to independence, variety of job tasks, a sense of relationship 
to the larger production system and a basis for relating one's 
work to the outside community. 14 Yet, as one skeptic of such 
job redesign schemes put it, "It is not clear that all workers 
want job enrichment or that job enrichment alone, without 
increased wages, increased promotion opportunities, and a 
higher social status for blue-collar work, would resolve such 
blue-collar dissatisfaction as does exist." 15
The desire for "challenging" work is far from universal. 
In initiating a team production system in its Westminster, 
Massachusetts plant, Digital Equipment Corporation found 
that only two of every three workers were interested in work 
requiring personal initiative as opposed to traditional 
assembly-line production. 16 Some workers who lack the 
aspiration for such changes and others who may favor 
authoritarian supervision find newly-redesigned jobs less 
than comforting. Reform advocates have oversold the need 
for change as well as their ability to effect it.
Experiments in participative management are less likely to 
impose values on workers (presumably participation is not 
mandatory), and yet these reform efforts highlight another
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sort of moral question. As already noted, the potential 
benefits reaped by management and labor under work 
reform programs are distinctly different workers gain 
satisfaction while employers gain profits. Reform advocates 
hail this outcome as the basis for cooperation and common 
action at the workplace, but they ignore the very real sense in 
which workers can be manipulated and exploited under the 
guise of work reform. Because worker gains are so intangi 
ble, management is likely to be far more concerned that 
workers "feel" involved than than their participation is ef 
ficacious. One analyst wondered: "If management's gains 
are real, while workers' benefits are only in their minds, who 
has really benefitted?" 17
Reform advocates have not only overlooked the diversity 
of worker interests and needs, they have also ignored the 
market mechanisms which foster evolutionary rather than 
cataclysmic change. To a considerable extent, the economic 
system provides a basis for determining whether a job is 
worth doing employers decide what they are willing to pay, 
and workers what they are willing to accept. Assessments of 
overall job quality and satisfaction thus are reflected every 
year in myriads of individual decisions on what jobs to seek, 
which one to accept, at what level of compensation, and how 
long to remain on the job. While slack labor markets can 
severely limit worker choices, crises at the workplace are 
avoided largely because individuals change jobs and jobs 
themselves change. The market system cannot incorporate or 
address many goals, and it does not guarantee satisfying 
work, but its pricing mechanisms do respond in a way which 
promotes gradual shifts in both jobs and worker expecta 
tions.
Most prophecies of doom advanced by would-be work 
reformers ignore society's well-oiled machinery for matching 
workers to jobs. Should a particular task be deemed in 
tolerable by workers, it will begin to price itself out of the
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market, increasingly left to machines or eliminated 
altogether. If job satisfaction ever assumes overwhelming 
importance among worker priorities, the existing structure 
of pay differentials and the mix of jobs itself will change 
considerably as these new priorities are at least crudely 
translated in the normal functioning of the labor market. 
Job satisfaction may take on a greater role in balancing the 
costs and benefits of employment, but it cannot alter the 
nature of the trade.
Of course, the range of choice confronting most workers is 
not unlimited, and particularly during times of high 
unemployment or within groups with limited skills the 
employment options may prove far less than desirable. The 
willingness to accept a job is not the same as liking it, and it 
is in this sense that job reformers are addressing real issues of 
growing importance. As greater education and affluence lift 
worker expectations to new levels, employers will have to 
respond in some way or face unrest in their workforce. Even 
now, innovations at the workplace offer the only hope for 
those trapped at the bottom of the labor market, whose 
problems alone warrant the attention devoted to work 
reform initiatives.
Reform innovations will gather greater force as they come 
to represent the wishes of workers, rather than those of 
productivity-minded managers or well-intentioned con 
sultants. Many workers with demeaning jobs accurately 
perceive their work as unstimulating activity in the service of 
others, and they view collaborative efforts with their 
employers with deep skepticism. As bolt tighteners and 
machine watchers, they may seek to escape their work but 
carry few delusions about making those tasks somehow more 
challenging. When those workers become more prepared to 
demand changes in the nature and organization of their jobs, 
the work reform movement will have moved an important 
step beyond the manager's search for greater productivity 
and profits.
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Union Response to Work Reform
Due to the importance of worker interest in attempts to 
restructure work, reform advocates have sharply criticized 
unions for their historical lack of enthusiasm for innovations 
at the workplace. Persuaded by the truth of their own 
message about the crying need for work reform, some of its 
ardent supporters have claimed that labor leaders who don't 
place work reform as a top priority on their agendas are out 
of touch with the rank and file and unaware of the scope of 
dissatisfaction at the workplace. Others have adopted a more 
reasoned approach, seeking to identify institutional barriers 
to union involvement in work reform. Yet virtually all 
observers concede that the response of organized labor will 
play an important role in the future of work reform efforts.
The most simplistic explanation of union disinterest in 
work reform that union leaders do not know what their 
members want is supported neither by evidence nor logic. 
The frequency with which members vote to reject settlements 
negotiated by their bargainers demonstrates that workers
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seldom keep their wishes secret, and the law guarantees them 
the right to express their wishes. Surely no outside urging 
was necessary to win workers' support for better pay, shorter 
hours, or improved working conditions. Similarly, the 
longest lasting models of participative management in the 
United States are the Scanlon plans, which were designed 
and instituted by union members. Given this record of union 
activism, the claim of stifled memberships seems less plausi 
ble than the alternative that union leaders and members just 
have not viewed work reform as crucially important.
Much of the detachment of organized labor from ex 
periments in job redesign and participative management 
reflects a set of worker priorities which reform advocates 
prefer not to acknowledge. Before unions vigorously seek 
improvements in work, a majority of their members must 
feel such changes are worth striking for. At present, a ma 
jority of union members occasionally supports strikes over 
pay, leisure, pensions, job security and work rights, but they 
seldom protest the quality of their work in such walkouts. 
Furthermore, the leverage of organized labor on issues con 
cerning the content and control of work is limited, as the 
self-interest of management has always far exceeded that of 
union members. While union negotiators may broach a few 
of these subjects as peripheral concerns, they will not be like 
ly to stick by them under pressure until the rank and file is 
prepared to trade or risk other benefits for improvements in 
work quality.
There is some reason to believe that the structure and in 
ternal politics of labor organizations may cause union 
leaders to underemphasize less tangible quality-of-worklife 
issues in negotiations with management. Wages and other 
forms of compensation are easily quantified and universally 
desired by union members, while the value of gains in work 
quality is more subjective and may vary considerably for dif 
ferent segments of the membership. Pay increases can be
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spread across the entire workforce, while union efforts to 
eliminate or improve the worst jobs in a given factory or of 
fice would directly aid a few and do little or nothing to 
benefit other members. For this reason, work quality issues 
pose thorny political problems for union leaders, and it is 
hardly surprising that, in the absence of strident complaints 
from workers, they have maintained a more cautious ap 
proach by focusing on "bread and butter" issues of pay, 
benefits, work rules and occupational safety.
Nevertheless, the conservative and often skeptical reac 
tions of unions to work reforms initiated by management is 
also fueled by past experience. Ever since the days of 
Frederick Taylor, management innovations at the workplace 
have been associated with work "speed ups" and other steps 
to raise employee output and effort without commensurate 
rewards. Workers are keenly aware of the profit motives 
which draw employers to these work reform ideas, and can 
not avoid suspicions that management is pursuing subtle con 
games to manipulate labor. To them, absenteeism, turnover 
and disruptions on the job are not signs of a decaying work 
ethic, but simply the logical response to jobs that are not 
worth doing well, or perhaps not worth doing at all. Unions 
have little faith in the management and labor community of 
interest, and they display strong skepticism, if not hostility, 
to claims that work reform can transform lousy jobs into im 
portant or challenging work.
The most recent wave of interest in work reform has pro 
voked concerns that quality circles and other forms of par 
ticipative management pose direct threats to unionism, 
reflecting conscious efforts by employers to co-opt workers 
and to undermine traditional union goals. The bitterness of 
the political battle between management and labor during 
congressional consideration of labor law reform legislation 
in 1978 renewed fears of an all-out attack on organized 
labor, and the "humanization" of work is often viewed as
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part of this broader anti-union effort. No doubt many firms 
bring more benign motives to their reform programs, and a 
number of major unions have committed themselves to 
cooperative quality-of-worklife initiatives in spite of linger 
ing skepticism. In some cases, organized labor actually may 
have little choice but to establish a role and a voice for itself 
in reform efforts, lest participative management schemes 
proceed without input from union representatives. Yet most 
work reform programs have started in nonunion shops, and 
the idea that they are designed partly to avoid future organiz 
ing efforts is anything but farfetched.
Amidst highly publicized union "give-backs" and conces 
sions in 1982, some analysts have begun to speculate that 
harsh economic conditions as well as management initiatives 
may force unions to take cooperative efforts more seriously. 
There is no question that unions in declining industries, fac 
ing the worst recession in decades, have responded by ex 
changing wage concessions and labor prerogatives for 
greater job security. Yet outside of clearly troubled sec 
tors including automobile, rubber, steel and airline in 
dustries the evidence in support of proclamations announc 
ing a "new mood" of cooperation in American industrial 
relations is far from clear. 18
For the future of work reform and participative manage 
ment efforts, the issue is not whether labor has moderated its 
demands to reflect hard times, but rather whether it has 
altered its approach to collective bargaining and negotiation 
in fundamental and lasting ways. Former Labor Secretary 
John Dunlop contends that the current wage-concession 
trend is neither the sign of a new era of union-management 
relations nor especially important in the long run. Similarly, 
Daniel J. B. Mitchell of the University of California con 
ducted a study of 45 cases of union concessions in 1981 and 
early 1982 and concluded that they did not represent "a 
sharp break from past behavior" or a significant change in
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historical patterns of negotiation. 19 In contrast, Jack Bar- 
bash and others view experiments with quality-of-worklife 
programs, codetermination, employee ownership and tripar- 
titism as rudimentary forms of labor-management coopera 
tion and as part of a larger trend fueled by poor economic 
conditions. 20
The true test of such fledgling innovations will come dur 
ing a period of economic prosperity, for only then will it be 
possible to distinguish between union responses to adversity 
and more permanent changes in labor attitudes toward 
management and contract negotiations. The basic adver 
sarial structure of labor-management relations will no doubt 
remain in place following the current wave of "give-backs" 
and concessions, for the common interests of labor and 
management will continue to be limited. However, it is 
significant that labor leaders such as Victor Gotbaum are 
beginning to urge unions to pay greater attention to manage 
ment's business, not as an exercise in altruism but rather out 
of a need "to recognize management's motives and options 
and to present alternatives." 21 Even if unions do not wish to 
accept the responsibilities of being managers, they may find 
it in their interest to understand the concerns of the opposi 
tion.
In the meantime, most unions will tend to view warily 
management initiatives to restructure work for fear that such 
efforts will become a means of co-opting their members. 
Limited gains in work quality will continue, as management 
and labor identify narrow issues of common concern or as 
unions slowly expand their traditional demands for improv 
ed working conditions. Yet knowing that the potential for 
"enriched" jobs or meaningful participation within manage 
ment profit constraints is limited, unions are likely to place 
little stock in the voluntary overtures of management for im 
provements in the quality-of-worklife.
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Means for Lasting Success
Work reform will remain inconsequential to most workers 
until they are willing to pursue improvements in work quality 
as rights secured through collective bargaining. When 
worker interest is spontaneous and vocal, job enrichment 
will develop as a logical extension of organized labor's 
demands on behalf of its members. Assuming that workers 
come to care enough about challenging and rewarding jobs 
to be willing to bargain and strike for them, unions will seek 
a voice in determining the content of jobs, further en 
croaching on management prerogatives. Bargaining may 
force the elimination or improvement of jobs which workers 
find undesirable, and pay scales may reflect to a greater ex 
tent the intrinsic benefits of individual work roles. Such im 
provements in work quality under these conditions would 
not be subject to the whims of management or the pro 
fitability of such innovations, but would be secured as 
benefits by organized labor in the same lasting manner that 
more traditional forms of compensation are now won.
When sufficient interest is aroused, the mechanisms for 
union pursuit of improved work quality will be familiar 
ones. The kinds of demands which unions might make 
through collective bargaining and to which employers might 
acquiesce include:
1. Special rewards to those with undesirable jobs: Workers 
with harsh or unchallenging jobs might receive extra 
holidays, more flexible work hours, or higher wages, 
providing incentives for management to improve or 
eliminate these work roles.
2. A voice in the design of new production systems: 
Unions might seek an opportunity to evaluate or com 
ment upon new methods of production, or they might 
even push for a system through which they could 
pressure management to abandon undesirable changes.
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A threat of strikes or abandonment of jobs would have 
far greater impact when work plans were still on the 
drawing board than when such innovations had already 
been introduced on the factory floor.
3. Expand occupational safety and health legislation: 
Following European models, organized labor might 
work to expand coverage under existing occupational 
safety and health laws so as to encompass harmful 
physical and psychological effects of monotonous or 
unchallenging jobs. Some further research might be 
necessary to defend such an effort, but surely the health 
of workers can be interpreted to include more than their 
protection from imminent physical danger.
4. Participation in overall management decisions: Short of 
codetermination, unions might insist on a greater role in 
the setting of production goals or the allocation of in 
vestment capital as decisions which influence the quality 
of worklife. The scope of such demands will depend 
partly on future interpretations of the proper adver 
sarial role and focus for organized labor.
The willingness of workers to pursue these further steps 
toward controlling their worklives is not clear, for such gains 
only will be secured in at least partial exchange for a slower 
rate of growth in traditional union benefits. Yet if produc 
tivity resumes its historical growth and as the affluence of 
American workers continues to increase, they may become 
more and more willing to trade marginal amounts of pay and 
benefits for more challenging work environments. If that 
shift in attitudes occurs, advocates will neither have to plead 
for the adoption of work reforms nor justify their value in 
terms of management profits.
9 The Future of Work
You ask . . . why I go on working.
I go on working for the same reason
a hen goes on laying eggs.
 H.L. Mencken 
Letter to Will Durant
Most predictions about the future of work are specula 
tions based on straight-line forecasts of a single trend or even 
an isolated event. A rise in unemployment is cited to support 
the prognosis that society will soon have little use for the 
labor of most citizens. Rapid advances in computers arouse 
forebodings that workers will soon be " future shocked" by 
the baffling complexity of their jobs or replaced by bat 
talions of robots. Incidents of worker unrest supposedly 
threaten impending crises and demand radical work reforms. 
More optimistically, successful efforts to redesign certain 
jobs or to elicit worker participation are hailed as precursors 
of an era in which all jobs will be "humanized." Each theme 
traces a single thread, but fails to examine the broader social 
fabric of which it is a part.
Even while illuminating important facets of work, these 
monolithic forecasts offer misleading half-truths about its 
future. Current trends are extrapolated to an extreme, with 
little or no thought given to factors which would limit the 
scope or slow the pace of such change. While would-be 
reformers and self-proclaimed seers find visions of a
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dramatically new future appealing, a gradual evolution of 
the workforce and of work itself is far more likely in a com 
plex and diverse society. Not ignoring the disturbing 
developments in the labor market, there are also major 
causes for optimism usually overlooked by work's prophets 
of doom.
Familiar Prophecies
None of the dubious notions advanced about the future of 
work have been more persistent than the idea that work will 
someday disappear. Whether the result of an alleged waning 
of commitment among workers or of a compelling wave of 
technological advance, such prophecies portray a workless 
society in which civilization withers from lack of productive 
challenge. While one could imagine a "leisure society" 
characterized by unprecedented diversity and cultural 
development, most choose to conjure visions of a population 
dead-ending itself in front of a television set or perpetually 
lost in drug-induced euphoria. Implicit in these warnings is 
the assumption that leisure time would not be spent wisely by 
the great majority of the populace, an argument reminiscent 
of the debate over the 40-hour week which occurred a cen 
tury ago.
When the actual patterns of work and leisure are more 
closely examined, images of a workless society are quickly 
dispelled. No reasonable reading of current trends, including 
gains in leisure time, supports the conclusion that jobs will 
become anachronisms even in the distant future. Despite 
phenomenal productivity gains, the labor force remains a 
steady or slightly rising percentage of the population, and 
women are virtually stampeding into the labor market. Con 
currently, demands for goods and services have unflaggingly 
kept abreast or ahead of the economy's production and show 
no signs of giving up the race. Concern over the disintegra 
tion of the "work ethic" is more an uncritical and literal ac 
ceptance of presumed dedication to work in eras past that ex-
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isted in the writings of moralists. In fact, today's workers 
continue to toil for reasons very similar to those of their 
predecessors. Even if they expect more at the workplace, 
most Americans still find reasons to remain employed.
Contrary to the gloomy forecasts of some futurists, the 
opportunity to work has also not lagged far behind the desire 
to work. While robots and other computerized technologies 
will make inroads in the production of goods and the 
delivery of services, there is good reason to believe that the 
expanding tasks which society deems necessary will maintain 
aggregate employment levels. As manual work has been 
mechanized, it has been replaced with mental effort; if minds 
are to be computerized into obsolescence, then work may be 
redefined to include emotional or spiritual labor. Already 
the work of psychiatrists, social workers, clergymen and 
related professions involves less manual or rational effort 
than emotional support, and in an affluent society the de 
mand for such "human" services can be expected to rise 
even faster than the decline in more traditional production 
roles. The new technologies of the workplace will have some 
far-reaching consequences for our lives, but widespread 
joblessness is not likely to be among them.
Service Work
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The trend toward greater leisure for American workers is 
clear and significant, but those predicting the demise of work 
have misjudged the nature of this shift. Aside from earlier 
retirement, the expansion of leisure time in recent years has 
not come through an exodus of workers from the market 
place, but rather through the gradual growth of holidays, 
vacation, and other forms of paid leisure as well as through 
increases in the number of part-time workers. For in 
dividuals, the gains in leisure time have come in small in 
crements and as part of a changing mix of work and leisure, 
rendering the visions of a workless society largely irrelevant. 
And because the demand for greater leisure arises from a 
workforce of ever-increasing affluence and education, even 
the assumption that Americans would be unable to cope with 
their new-found leisure seems highly questionable.
Although less dramatic than predictions of the disap 
pearance of work for most members of society, recent claims 
of widespread worker dissatisfaction enjoy no stronger sup 
port from current labor market trends. While some workers 
are undoubtedly frustrated or unhappy in their jobs, it seems 
certain that this reaction has always characterized a portion 
of the workforce engaged in unpleasant and unrewarding 
tasks. Contemporary studies of work satisfaction are 
plagued by methodological uncertainties, offering no 
guidance as to how worker attitudes have changed over time 
and frequently reflecting the biases of survey questions more 
than the concerns of labor force participants. The problems 
of undesirable jobs certainly should not be ignored, for they 
continue to exact a significant toll from workers in the form 
of poor health, personal suffering and lost potential. Yet the 
evidence does not suggest that the feelings of this generation 
of workers are unique, and prophecies of widespread revolt 
at the workplace have gone unfulfilled.
The concern for worker satisfaction has spawned some 
useful experiments with the design and organization of
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work, and their lessons may help to alleviate some of the 
strains at the workplace in years ahead. As is often the case, 
the most zealous advocates of work reform have pressed 
their point too far, losing sight of the technological and 
economic forces which limit the feasibility of job redesign 
and participative management schemes in practical work set 
tings. Given the dichotomy of labor and management in 
terests, the day in which all work will be "humanized" ap 
pears far off, and pragmatic attempts to implement work in 
novations in the meantime will be necessarily restricted to 
rather narrow areas of cooperative activity. These realities of 
the labor market offer a more reliable basis for sketching a 
vision of the workplace of the future than visions of futurists 
who predict a social order where workers will perform only 
"meaningful" and attractive labor.
Sources of Optimism
In some ways, the general tone of most visions of the 
future of work is surprising. Regardless of whether one 
believes any specific scenario of impending change, the em 
phasis on potential crises in the literature leaves an impres 
sion that the next few decades at the workplace at best will be 
typified by the successful aversion of various pitfalls and 
catastrophes. Perhaps it is the inclination of consultants to 
search for problems in need of resolution, or perhaps just the 
habit of most people to take evolutionary improvements for 
granted. Yet for whatever reason, causes for considerable 
optimism which are clearly apparent in current labor market 
trends have been overlooked in most accounts of the future 
of work.
The most basic sources of promise and hope are the strong 
and unwavering trends toward greater affluence and leisure 
in American society, fueled by dramatic gains in productivity 
during this century. In 1900 a workforce of 29 million 
labored approximately 80 billion hours to produce a gross
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national product of $154 billion (in 1980 dollars). In 1980 an 
average of 97 million people worked 182 billion hours to ad 
vance it to $2,626 billion. An hour of labor which produced 
the equivalent of less than $2.00 in goods and services in 
1900 produced $14.00 in 1980. While lagging productivity 
growth in recent years has prompted some concern regarding 
the permanence and future magnitude of this overall trend, 
the most likely scenario is that national productivity will 
resume its upward climb.
Past gains in productivity have enabled the average 
American to enjoy both markedly higher incomes and addi 
tional leisure time. The extent of these gains has already been 
portrayed, and indeed they have occurred slowly enough to 
permit their full scope and significance to escape notice. Yet 
the affluence and leisure which rising productivity has made 
possible are now reshaping the nature of work in American 
society, and driving three distinct and hopeful trends: (1) the 
expansion of individual choice in work; (2) the removal of 
unpleasant or undesirable work; and (3) the growth of con 
cern for human potential at the workplace. In this context, 
while increasing productivity may never pardon us from our 
term in the "workhouse," it seems certain to lighten the 
sentence.
Toward Choice in Work
Freedom of choice in employment is by any measure a lux 
ury. In agrarian and early industrial eras, virtually all 
members of a family had to contribute to its support, and the 
range of work options for even the most fortunate was 
limited to a very few trades. Even today, the great majority 
of the labor force is confined by established rules which 
guarantee certain wages and demand certain hours, and 
comparatively few individuals are free to change jobs at will 
or to avoid employment entirely. But with the rise of multi 
ple family earners and increasing wealth, the stranglehold of
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work is gradually relaxing. Once productivity resumes its 
historical trend, higher incomes will grant broad discretion 
in work to an unprecedented number of individuals, transfer 
payments will allow many to escape from jobs entirely, and 
accumulated wealth will make labor optional to hundreds of 
thousands more. In all cases, the degree of personal choice 
and control at work can be expected to expand steadily.
Commonplace signs of the movement toward choice in 
work abound. As wages have risen, absenteeism and inter 
mittent or part-time job holding have become more feasible. 
Households are often able to support several nonworkers 
with the earnings of a single member, and those with two or 
more workers effectively reduce the risks of voluntary job 
changes. Children are now supported for many years during 
their education, and most wives have the option not to work 
even when freed from the burden of household chores. The 
development of extensive public and private retirement 
systems enables older workers to leave the labor force even 
when still able to work. All of these shifts have moved us 
slowly but steadily in the direction of greater choice in work 
for a larger portion of the labor force.
The option of not working currently is meaningful only at 
extreme ends of the economic spectrum. At the top end of 
the income scale, work has always been voluntary, whereas 
public and private transfer payments have provided an alter 
native to the most low-paying employment for society's 
poorest members. It is particularly significant that transfer 
incomes have grown dramatically in recent years, climbing in 
1980 dollars from $8.2 billion in 1929 (prior to the New Deal) 
to $90 billion in 1963 (prior to the Great Society) and then to 
$318 billion by the time President Reagan took office. Dur 
ing this half century, transfer payments rose as a share of 
total disposable income from 1.8 percent to 17.5 percent. 
Should this trend continue as our society becomes more 
prosperous, increasing numbers of Americans will enjoy
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either a cushion of high income to mitigate the risks of job 
choices or a gradually rising "floor" under employment 
which offers an alternative to the most undesirable and low- 
paying work.
For the great majority of workers between these extremes, 
greater flexibility to choose desired work is a more realistic 
goal than any complete departure from the workplace. Ris 
ing levels of affluence and leisure have had a direct role in ex 
panding this aspect of occupational choice as well. With 
higher incomes, households have a greater opportunity to 
develop their own financial cushions to protect against hard 
times and to weather short periods of unemployment during 
voluntary job transitions. Increased leisure has made it easier 
for workers to explore other career options while still retain 
ing their present jobs. Finally, the prosperity of American 
society has triggered other developments which are closely 
linked to leisure and choice in work most notably, rising 
levels of educational attainment and improvements in home 
and transportation technologies.
Mass education has not only raised expectations but ex 
panded the range of occupational choices for most in 
dividuals. Even a high school education postpones occupa 
tional decisions and provides limited chances to explore 
alternative job opportunities before entering any particular 
field. Pursuit of a college education offers even greater op 
portunities to test and alter career choices or to tailor educa 
tional programs for specific jobs for example, the would- 
be doctor who has no stomach for dissecting frogs or the 
aspiring astronomer who has no facility for numbers will 
discover these shortcomings in time to switch occupational 
futures without great difficulty. These opportunities do not 
guarantee that graduates and their professions will be 
perfectly matched, but the chances that individuals will be 
satisfied with their eventual work roles are certainly improv 
ed.
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Choice in work has also been promoted by advances in 
home and transportation technologies. A few decades ago 
most individuals were confined to the endless routines of 
homemaking, or confined to employment within a narrow 
circumference of their homes. Today's workers accomplish 
most of their daily maintenance tasks with little time and ef 
fort and are free to travel substantial distances to take jobs 
of their choosing. Despite the criticism leveled at unreliable 
gadgetry and wasteful automobiles, these machines have cer 
tainly released people to pursue the activities which they 




Clearly, a plethora of factors have contributed to expand 
ed control and choice of employment. Lengthening prework 
education, shrinking time spent on jobs, enlarged geographic 
mobility, the elimination of many routine daily tasks, the 
growth of various transfer payments, and the general diffu 
sion of affluence have combined to make a person's job 
more an expression of his own decisions and less a function 
of his economic or social background. It is important to note 
that not all segments of the labor force enjoy this greater 
freedom of choice, and many Americans remain trapped in 
poor jobs or with few work options. Yet most individuals are 
increasingly free to choose their work rather than condemn-
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ed to accept it, and they are able to make decisions based less 
on what is most available than on what is most desirable. 
Rising productivity and wealth will continue to weaken the 
bonds which tie workers unwillingly to their jobs.
Eliminating Undesirable Work
Increasing choice will bring new pressures to bear on the 
design and organization of work and is likely to hasten the 
elimination of unpleasant or unrewarding jobs. To the extent 
that workers are willing and able to demand more desirable 
work, their interests will become a significant force for 
change at tomorrow's workplace. The worst jobs will be 
shunned by growing majorities, forcing some employers 
either to raise wages or to eliminate the jobs. Where 
organizational changes and job redesign can upgrade work, 
there will be intense pressure for these improvements. Most 
importantly, the work which society chooses to accomplish 
will be increasingly determined by what workers want to do, 
as well as by what tasks society wants done.
Under any circumstances, the occupational mix within the 
labor market is not static. As the demand for goods and ser 
vices shifts and production technologies change, many of the 
worst jobs are automated or in some way improved (in 
cluding by better pay). While work reform advocates 
repeatedly use examples of assembly lines, steel and textile 
mills, and machine tool factories to bolster their arguments, 
workers in these settings represent a small and dwindling 
portion of the labor force. The job problems in some of 
these fields remain serious, but the workers in these in 
dustries constitute only a tiny fraction of the expanding 
workforce and considerable incentives to phase out the least 
desirable work roles already exist. The rising expectations 
and expanding job choices of workers will simply accelerate 
this natural progression of technological advance in a 
modern era.
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The prospect of eliminating harsh employment is one of 
the most positive results of recent advances in robotics and 
other computerized technologies. Although the impact of 
automation on individual workers may be severe, the long- 
range effect on occupational structure will be to remove 
workers from the most dangerous and debilitating work 
roles. The monotony of assembly lines will be gradually 
borne by robots which do not mind the tedium, and the 
hazards of welding, material handling and sundry other jobs 
will be experienced by costly machines which can be damag 
ed but not hurt. The process of eliminating undesirable work 
will be necessarily slow and not without its own human and 
economic costs, but it will represent one of the most signifi 
cant trends shaping the future of work in the coming 
decades.
The rise in worker expectations and expansion of occupa 
tional choice will ensure that the quality of work becomes an 
increasingly important issue at the workplace. In a very rich 
and educated society, it is possible that money and leisure 
rewards may become less important social issues than the 
redistribution of creative and responsible work. As workers' 
freedom grows, pressure to restructure jobs may lead to the 
acceptance of reforms which are deemed unrealistic today. 
Such "enlightened" revisions by employers will not emerge 
from any newly-discovered sense of humanism or philan 
thropy, but rather from very direct economic pressures to 
maintain a stable and competent set of workers amidst an in 
creasingly selective labor force. In those cases where new 
technologies do not improve the quality of work in large- 
scale production, manufacturing employers will progressive 
ly be forced to find their new employees in pools of surplus 
labor filled with the poor and undereducated. Advancing 
technology alone will not upgrade all jobs, and yet the 
monetary and leisure incentives required to man industries 
with rigid and undesirable work roles may escalate sharply as 
the economy develops alternate jobs.
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So long as significant sectors of society remain 
unemployed and underemployed, no sellers' market for in 
dustrial labor will develop. Still, the growing awareness in 
society that each person should have a right to choose work 
will undoubtedly place factory employers at a disadvantage. 
The greater the value society places on meaningful work, the 
more rewards workers at monotonous and unchallenging 
jobs will be able to demand for their labor. Workers in those 
roles will pursue an already familiar path they will radically 
divide their lives, putting up with hours of drudgery at work 
while seeking more money and more time off in which to en 
joy this expanding supply of goods and services. Some will 
make the trade more willingly than others, but as a group 
they will steadily decline in numbers as technological change 
and worker priorities whittle away the most unpleasant and 
unrewarding work.
Workers as Human Resources
The same forces which are accelerating the elimination of 
undesirable work are also drawing increasing attention to the 
productive potential of workers themselves. Most discus 
sions focus on the negative side of the issue, examining "pro 
blems" of worker dissatisfaction with unrewarding jobs, but 
the rediscovery of workers as a significant variable in pro-
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duction equations has an important positive side as well. In 
the face of growing pressures to respond to worker needs, 
both management and labor have begun to search for more 
effective ways to utilize individual capabilities and to reach 
previously untapped potential. It is a trend which promises 
both greater dignity for workers and more challenging or 
human work settings.
Again, signs of a fundamental change in attitudes toward 
workers are already apparent. Even if current experiments in 
participative management are not successful in promoting 
sustained collaboration between management and labor, 
they do indicate that the basic assumptions of traditional 
management styles are being seriously questioned not only 
in academic classrooms, but also in corporate board rooms. 
Alternative styles of management designed to promote 
worker participation and tap worker knowledge are receiving 
increasing attention by progressive employers, and graduate 
programs in business administration at scores of institutions 
have been revised to include the study and practical applica 
tion of such theories.
This heightened awareness of workers as valuable 
resources will not have the sweeping impact that reform ad 
vocates might hope. While the shift toward a collaborative 
style of decisionmaking in hierarchical work organizations 
can only bode well for the satisfaction of those who hang on 
to the bottom rungs, it remains to be seen how quickly these 
new attitudes will filter down to first-line managers who deal 
directly with and may Be threatened by workers. Still, the 
renewed attention given to workers will give them some 
greater sense of dignity, and may correct poor job designs 
based on overly narrow concepts of technological efficiency. 
Yet once the tasks desired by society are determined, they 
cannot be greatly altered chambermaids will continue to 
make beds, janitors sweep floors, gas station attendants 
pump gas, and garbage collectors, even if they are called
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sanitation engineers, still collect garbage. What we can hope 
for is marginal gains which will make some jobs more 
tolerable and which will alter the way in which future jobs 
are conceived and decisions made in modern work organiza 
tions.
Perhaps the most important outgrowth of a greater em 
phasis on workers as human resources will be the develop 
ment of new government initiatives to create and channel 
discretionary employment. As previously discussed, a large 
portion of work in an affluent society is "non-essential," 
and the public sector plays a major role in allocating 
resources in pursuit of societal goals. Dramatic changes in 
manpower distribution are usually initiated only in the midst 
of serious national crises, but even routine government deci 
sions channel workers into fields as diverse as space explora 
tion, health care and public education. If the current surge of 
interest in human potential at the workplace extends far 
enough to affect popular values, government may devote in 
creasing attention to the needs and desires of workers as well 
as to substantive goals of public policy in allocating discre 
tionary resources and employment. Already, the debate over 
federal employment programs has come to emphasize the
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creation of "good" jobs as opposed to the subsidization of 
"make-work" employment. An affluent and sophisticated 
society may increasingly define the purpose of work not only 
by what is to be accomplished, but also by the human 
benefits of accomplishing it.
Clouds on the Horizon
There remain many reasons for being optimistic about the 
future of work in affluent, post-industrial societies. There 
are also a few sources of serious concern. The opportunities 
for exercising choice of work are steadily expanding, but 
such freedom is denied to a significant segment of the labor 
force. While undesirable work will gradually disappear, the 
process will be too slow to aid some workers and will 
preclude others from using the only occupational skills they 
possess. While most Americans will enjoy the fruits of rising 
productivity and societal wealth, a minority will be left 
behind in what may become a permanent underclass in an 
otherwise affluent society. In all cases, the prospect of a 
growing gap between the most and least fortunate challenges 
our basic concepts of equity and our quest for continuing 
social progress.
The rosy vision of a future in which individuals have ever- 
greater measures of choice in determining their work roles 
certainly is an empty mirage to those who have not shared in 
the economy's bounty. Choice in work is a luxury afforded 
to those with the incomes and leisure to pursue their own 
goals. For those who have been denied a share of the money 
and free time which prosperity has wrought, choice of work 
will be one more unattainable hope. Included in this group 
are the millions who are unemployed, the millions who are 
trapped in low-paying jobs, and the millions who cannot ac 
cept the risks of abandoning work they hate. Regardless of 
how bright the eventual prospects or how positive the current
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trends, society cannot ignore its responsibilities to these 
members at the bottom of the labor market.
As the gains in freedom of choice in work leave part of the 
workforce behind, so the advances brought by technological 
change have also failed to improve the lot of many workers. 
Because the processes of investment and automation occur 
relatively slowly, some Americans will continue to hold 
menial jobs for decades to come. The most dangerous work 
is likely to be automated or eliminated first, but the society 
in which all workers have challenging or rewarding roles re 
mains far beyond our reach. Even the growth of the service 
sector, which appears to offer long term relief from the 
harsh work associated with assembly lines in manufacturing, 
will generate an ample share of unexciting and undesirable 
jobs for tomorrow's worker. Given the direction of changes 
in occupational mix fostered by technological advance, there 
is cause for encouragement, but the transformation of work 
advocated by would-be reformers will be a long time in com 
ing.
The most disturbing threat to the welfare of workers posed 
by technological change is the displacement of those with 
narrow or limited skills. These problems are already becom 
ing acute in declining manufacturing industries where unions 
have succeeded in achieving for their members relatively high 
pay for example, in the domestic steel and auto industries. 
Individual skill levels offer little or no assurance of job 
security, and some of the most highly-skilled trades which 
typify well-paid blue-collar work will be rendered obsolete in 
an age of computerized design and production. Hardest hit 
by these occupational shifts will be middle-aged workers who 
have worked their entire lives in jobs requiring limited skills 
and offering little job mobility. Since areas of new employ 
ment growth will require skills much different from those 
needed in declining manufacturing sectors, the spectre of 
long term, structural unemployment for displaced workers 
must be taken seriously.
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This problem of worker displacement, if unchecked by 
private and public remedies, will have a growing impact on 
both regional and national economies. Disparities in regional 
growth are already triggering stern warnings of a potential 
polarization of the nation's political system by region, with 
the Northeast and Midwest struggling to maintain levels of 
economic growth and political power now threatened by the 
burgeoning Sunbelt states. The concentration of displaced 
workers in areas of broader economic decline will make ef 
fective state and local responses to their employment ills con 
siderably more difficult, and could heighten an already visi 
ble trend toward pockets of high unemployment and labor 
shortages existing side by side in different regions and sectors 
of the economy. Notwithstanding the tragic human suffering 
implicit in such a scenario, the costs of this pattern of oc 
cupational and geographic displacement in terms of lost pro 
ductive capacity alone suggest the need to pursue an alter 
nate course.
Finally, the long term future of work is clouded by the 
continuing exclusion of impoverished women, minorities 
and other jobless Americans from the harvest of growing 
prosperity. Even as choice in work and personal incomes in 
crease for the majority of the labor force, disadvantaged 
subgroups continue to lag far behind either because of defi 
cient education, lack of skills or discriminatory employment 
policies. Extremely high rates of joblessness among teen 
agers and minority groups serve as reminders that portions 
of the workforce are being left behind in a generally improv 
ing labor market, and that it may become increasingly dif 
ficult for these groups to catch up with or even to keep from 
falling further behind the affluent majority. It is this pros 
pect of a permanent underclass, enjoying neither the hopes 
nor the benefits of future improvements in work, which must 
be averted by a just society.
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Unfortunately, for the disadvantaged minority it appears 
as though things will get worse before they get better. After a 
long period of declining poverty levels (in both relative and 
absolute terms) responding to Great Society programs, the 
trend has reversed and the incidence of poverty in America is 
now rising. In 1978, 24.5 million people, or 11.4 percent of 
the population, were living in poverty. Only three years later, 
the ranks of the poor had swelled to 31.8 million, 14.0 per 
cent of all Americans and rising. Economic growth alone will 
not correct this disturbing imbalance, and a narrow reliance 
on private sector initiatives can only generate a society in 
which the majority enjoys greater freedom and affluence 
while the rest languish in pockets of poverty, unemployment 
and broad economic decline. Given the significant cuts in in 
come transfers initiated by the Reagan administration during 
its first year, such an expansion of the ranks of the poor now 
seems unavoidable.
Public Policy and Work's Future
For some, work is already becoming what they would 
"rather do anyway." For others the hewers of wood and 
the drawers of water no reform may ever make their work 
satisfying or worthwhile in its own right. The government 
has a responsibility to encourage a more equitable distribu 
tion of preferred jobs, and it can do so by arbitrating, within 
free labor markets, the rights of workers and the needs of 
society. Yet society should place top priority on ensuring 
that all who want jobs have them, that even the wages of the 
lowest-paid workers will support a decent standard of living, 
and that those who suffer temporary misfortunes are shield 
ed from the market's harshest blows.
Public policy already plays a central role in cushioning the 
impact of economic uncertainties on labor force par 
ticipants. Income transfers have placed a floor beneath many 
of those out of work, and job training programs have at-
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tempted to smooth the transition into new occupations. 
Public financing of education has also fostered greater 
choice in work, and thereby enhanced the control which in 
dividuals exercise over their worklives. In the absence of 
such direct and indirect government efforts to ease job 
changes and to reduce the suffering caused by economic 
cycles, the uncertainties of a market system would be far less 
acceptable to an affluent, democratic society.
The clouds on the horizon suggest that the role of public 
policy in shaping the future of work will be no less important 
in the years ahead. The problems of displaced workers and 
regional decline stemming from technological advances will 
be well beyond the reach of voluntary individual or collective 
action, and can be ameliorated through government in 
tervention. Similarly, the disturbing abandonment in the ear 
ly 1980s of governmental efforts to provide opportunities for 
work and training in the marketplace may fuel the growth of 
an American underclass populated with the unskilled and 
deficiently educated. The health of the larger economy and 
the rise of affluence and choice in work will offer no con 
solation to these groups who are increasingly left behind in- 
the process of technological and economic change. It re 
mains a public challenge and responsibility to include the 
least advantaged in the prosperity which our system has 
wrought.
Those who proclaim the demise of work have missed the 
mark. Work is surely here to stay, and it is only by virtue of 
the tremendous fruits of our labor that we can now con 
template more leisure time and greater choices in our selec 
tion of jobs. As we continue to rely upon work as the 
mainstay of our lives and our economy, we must also con 
tinue to search for the vehicles by which we can offer this 
role and its many benefits to all of society's members. 
Should we not fulfill this prime responsibility, the failings of 
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